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ABSTRACT 
Khimendra Singh: Essays on Product Recall Decision and Effect 
(Under the direction of Rajdeep Grewal) 
Product recalls are pervasive events across many industries, such as automobile and 
consumer product. Notably, the cost of these product failures could be astronomical. Therefore, 
these adverse events are of considerable interest to academics, policymakers, and practitioners. 
My dissertation contributes to this literature by investigating two different yet related aspects of 
recalls. The first two essays explore underlying elements that affect the recall decision-making 
process (pre-recall phase). The third essay explores the impact of these adverse events (post-
recall phase). 
In essay 1, I examine whether corporate lobbying influences recall decisions. Lobbying 
as a political mechanism is widely studied in social science research but remains relatively 
unexplored in the marketing literature. I find that a firm with higher lobbying expenditures is less 
likely to initiate a recall, such that approximately $417,014 more in lobbying expenditures is 
associated with one less voluntary recall by the firm. Results also suggest that a firm’s political 
influence also led the regulatory agency to adopt a bias that favors the lobbying firm. In essay 2, 
I capture the game-theoretic strategic interaction between an automaker and its supervising 
regulatory agency recall decision-making process. By modeling one player’s decision as a 
function of another player’s expected decision, I examine whether the regulator’s presence 
affects an automaker’s decisions after controlling for other relevant factors (e.g., defect and 
product-level characteristics). Results suggest a significant strategic interaction such that 
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automakers act proactively in anticipation of the regulator’s actions, highlighting an underlying 
trade-off in their decisions. 
In essay 3, I study how recalls transcend business-to-business (B2B) secondary markets 
(i.e., used products) by examining recalls’ effects on intermediary B2B buyers’ purchases. By 
conceptualizing vehicle recalls as exogenous shocks to the automobile secondary market, I find 
that the transaction prices for recalled products reduce by about 10% in the B2B used vehicle 
market. The price for recalling automaker’s non-recalled vehicles, which belong to the same 
segment (e.g., compact) as the recalled vehicle, also declines by 5.54% (negative spillover). In 
contrast, the price of recalling automaker’s non-recalled vehicles belonging to a different 
segment increases by 4.91% (positive spillover). Other automakers also experience a negative 
spillover.    
.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Product recalls are inevitable in many industries (e.g., medical equipment, consumer 
products). Examples of prominent recalls include Johnson & Johnson’s Tylenol recall, Pfizer’s 
Bextra recall, Volkswagen’s diesel emission recall, and Mattel’s toy recall. For the automotive 
industry, recalls are especially pervasive. In 2016, recalls affected 50.5 million vehicles and cost 
automotive firms almost $22.1 billion (Jibrell 2018). Due to such impact, academics, 
policymakers, and practitioners have paid considerable attention to product recalls (Cleeren, 
Dekimpe, and Heerde 2017). Extant empirical research, however, has primarily focused on the 
post-recall phase, which includes the impact of recalls on financial and non-financial elements 
(e.g., Chen et al. 2009; Liu and Shankar 2015; Thirumalai and Sinha 2011); it is mostly silent on 
the pre-recall phase (i.e., strategic decision-making to initiate a recall). For example, which 
underlying factors or mechanisms affect firms’ recall decisions? Recalls have a direct (e.g., 
reduced sales) and indirect (e.g., reputation loss) impact, which would prompt firms to think 
carefully before deciding whether to initiate a recall. Despite such decisions being endogenous, 
most studies in the literature have considered a recall an exogenous shock while examining its 
post-recall impact (e.g., Borah and Tellis 2016; Chen et al. 2009; Germann et al. 2014). 
Shedding light on factors that could influence recall decisions (voluntary or mandatory) by 
concerned entities (firms and the regulatory agency) is important from strategic marketing and 
policy perspectives. 
One potential strategy, which could influence recall decisions could be a firm’s corporate 
lobbying, through which the firm attempts to create political connections and alter the regulatory 
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landscape (Bertrand, Bombardini, and Trebbi 2014). In 2009–2010, after Toyota acted slowly to 
accidents reports, which suggested its vehicles’ sudden acceleration flaws, a US Congressional 
report, examining this case, alleged lobbying influences by automotive firms (Kirchhoff and 
Peterman 2010), citing an internal Toyota document (dated July 6, 2009), in which the chief 
operating officer highlighted several “wins,” such as delaying final safety rules by National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). For example, Toyota’s internal document 
suggested that the negotiated equipment recall on its Camry model saved the company $100 
million. This report raises some important questions: Does lobbying influence product (i.e., 
automobile) recall decision-making? Do a firm’s voluntary recall decisions change significantly 
as the firm’s lobbying expenditures change? Does lobbying influence the regulatory agency’s 
(i.e., NHSTA in the case of automobiles) mandatory recall decisions? Conventionally, objective 
product quality should be the only factor influencing recall decisions. However, the anecdotal 
evidence discussed above may suggest otherwise. Product defects have severe societal impacts 
(e.g., loss of lives, economic loss). Therefore, any element that may bias necessary corrective 
actions to address product defects needs scrutiny. 
In essay 1, I find that automotive firms that engage in lobbying are less likely to initiate a 
recall voluntarily. In particular, approximately $417,014 more in lobbying expenditures is 
associated with one fewer voluntary recall, on average. A quick calculation indicates potential 
benefits to the firm: An average recall in our data involves 247,305 vehicle units. With an 
average conservative cost of $50 per vehicle (e.g., repair or replacement, loss of revenue), one 
fewer recall implies approximately $12 million in savings. Results suggest that political 
influence through lobbying might also bias the regulatory agency’s decisions. Firms with higher 
lobbying are likely to face fewer mandatory recalls; approximately $1.55 million more in 
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lobbying expenditures is associated with one less mandatory recall. These results seem to 
validate the concerns raised in the congressional report about lobbying influence on recalls. 
Results suggest that the recall decision process is susceptible to political influence, a channel not 
yet unexplored in this context. Importantly, this study finds that lobbying is an important 
(marketing) tool used by automotive companies to influence vehicle recalls. 
In essay 2, I further scrutinize the recall decision-making process by modeling the game-
theoretic structure of interaction between the automaker and the regulator agency. Specifically, I 
consider one player’s recall decision (e.g., automaker) an endogenous choice influenced by 
another player (the regulatory agency). In the automobile industry, the regulatory agency 
(NHTSA) also has the authority to initiate a recall besides the automaker. For example, an 
automaker may decide to initiate a recall (defined as a voluntary recall) based on the underlying 
factors (e.g., consumer complaints, fatality reports) and corresponding tradeoff. For example, a 
voluntary recall allows stakeholders to retain a positive impression of the firm (Souiden and Pons 
2009). Therefore, on the one hand, the desire to create/retain a positive image may motivate an 
automaker to initiate a voluntary recall. On the other hand, substantial recall costs (e.g., defect 
repair, loss of revenue) may prompt automakers to avoid a voluntary recall. However, if the 
automaker decides to take no action, the regulatory agency NHTSA may step in and recommend 
a recall if required. The possibility of a recall authorized by the regulator (defined as a 
mandatory recall) brings additional complexity to the automaker’s decision-making process 
because now the automaker’s strategic decision depends not only on consumers’ 
complaints/fatality reports but also on the expected action of another player (NHTSA). 
Incorporating the belief of one player’s expected action into another player’s decision-
making creates a strategic interaction (dependency) between players’ decisions. Such interaction 
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between an automaker and its supervising regulatory agency is of substantial managerial and 
policy import because this would help us understand whether one decision-maker changes its 
decision in the presence of another decision-maker. I model this strategic interaction as a discrete 
game and calibrates this model using rich datasets that include vehicle recalls of 15 automobile 
firms and defect complaints and death reports by vehicle owners during a fourteen-year period 
(2003–2016) in the US. 
Results suggest that automakers are more likely to initiate a voluntary recall in the 
presence of the regulatory agency. This change in automaker’s behavior impacts society because 
fewer recalls would result in more complaints and crashes and impose additional costs on 
society. I also consider that the automaker and the regulator might exchange relevant information 
(e.g., defect details) before making any decision. An information exchange could reduce a 
player’s uncertainty regarding the defect and thus affect recall decisions. Such common 
information, often not observed by the researcher, can lead to biases in the model if not 
considered. I use an exogenous variable, the distance between an automaker headquarter and the 
regulator office, as a proxy for this information exchange. Prior research in economics and 
finance literature (e.g., Giroud 2013; Lerner 1995; Petersen and Rajan 2002) has used 
geographical distance as a proxy for the information exchange and the ease of monitoring. 
Following this research, I use the geographical distance between an automaker’s headquarter and 
the regulator’s office to indicate the cost of information exchange and examine whether variation 
in common information through the exchange could significantly impact recall decisions. Results 
show that more effective information exchange could lead to additional voluntary recall actions. 
Several other characteristics (defect, product, and entity-level) also impact recall 
decisions. For example, an automaker with a wider dealership network, which highlights an 
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automaker’s recall handling capability, is more likely to initiate a voluntary recall. Among defect 
characteristics, I find that a greater geographical dispersion of complaints (denoted by the 
number of US states in complaints) increases the probability of a recall action. 
Recalls could significantly impact firms, both financially and non-financially; a plethora 
of studies have already examined various elements of this impact such as loss in sales (e.g., 
Freedman et al. 2012), change in advertising effectiveness (Liu and Shankar 2015), stock market 
(e.g., Chen et al. 2009), consumer loyalty (e.g., Souiden and Pons 2009), firm learning (e.g., 
Haunschild and Rhee 2004), and used product market (e.g., Che et al. 2020) among others. 
However, notably, these studies revolve around business-to-consumer (B2C) transactions. They 
do not examine transactions further upstream from the end-consumer involving business-to-
business (B2B) intermediaries (e.g., auto dealers in the automobile industry). As a result, few 
insights are available regarding the impact of product recalls on B2B markets. As described in 
Table 4.1, extant research on product recalls emphasizes markets with consumers as the end-
users, despite the significant value and size of B2B markets. Lilien (2016) notes that B2B 
transactions account for $10.7 trillion, i.e., 42% of all US revenues, and calls for rigorous 
empirical research of the B2B buying process. Recently, Cleeren et al. (2017) also assert the lack 
of empirical research on product recall effects in B2B markets. 
In essay 3, I examine the impact of recalls on the B2B used product market. Specifically, 
I study whether and how B2B buyers (e.g., auto dealers) alter their demand for recalled products 
in response to product recalls. What short-term changes do B2B buyers make in their product 
purchases? How do these B2B buyers adjust the prices they are willing to pay if the used product 
faces a recall? How do recalls influence buyers’ demand for non-recalled products? In particular, 
do B2B buyers switch to another non-recalled product offered by the same firm or a different 
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firm? Do they buy a non-recalled product within the same product segment or a different 
segment if they switch? Furthermore, do we observe any heterogeneity in these effects due to 
product or buyer characteristics? Answers to these managerial and policy-relevant questions 
would provide insights into product recall effects on B2B buyers’ transactions and corresponding 
inventory management. I propose a descriptive causal inference model and calibrate it with 
individual-level B2B sales data of used vehicles to establish causal effects.  
I find that, due to a recall, the demand for recalled products decreases, which in turn leads 
to about 10% (~ $1,043) lower prices in the B2B used vehicle market. Specifically, a 
government-mandated recall is associated with greater damage to recalled products (~ $1,098 
lower price). I also find that the adverse effect is more damaging for older vehicles than younger 
vehicles with fewer miles; an increment of 1000 more miles on the odometer reading is 
associated with a loss of about $21 in used vehicle’s transaction prices. Consistent with the 
contagion effect (Roehm and Tybout 2006), I also find that the demand for non-recalled vehicles 
that belong to the same vehicle segment (e.g., compact) as the recalled vehicle declines. 
Essentially, this negative spillover suggests a 5.54% (~$574) drop in prices of the non-recalled 
vehicles that belong to the focal automaker (which experiences the recall). In contrast, consistent 
with the competitive effect (Ozturk et al. 2019), demand for non-recalled vehicles that belong to 
a different vehicle segment (e.g., midsize) increases, which leads to 4.91% (~$509) higher prices. 
Such positive spillover highlights that B2B buyers adjust their planned product purchases by 
switching to non-recalled vehicles from a different segment but within the same focal automaker. 
Prices of other automakers’ vehicles that belong to the same segment as the recalled model also 
decrease, highlighting a broader negative spillover effect within the recalled product’s segment. 
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My dissertation contributes to three strands of literature on product recalls. The first 
contribution is to work on the decision-making process of recalls. Most studies in this literature 
have focused on the post-recall phase, which includes exploring the impact of product recalls on 
firms or consumers. In comparison, two essays in my dissertation focus on the pre-recall phase, 
which includes examining the recall decision-making process and exploring underlying factors 
that affect this process. Most importantly, many studies in the recall literature consider a product 
recall as an exogenous shock when investigating the impact of recalls on different elements (e.g., 
financial or non-financial). My research, however, considers a recall decision as an endogenous 
choice and examines the role of critical factors such as corporate lobbying and regulatory 
oversight in the recall decision-making process. 
The second contribution is to the marketing-politics interface, a critical but yet 
underdeveloped research area in marketing. With few exceptions, a handful of empirical studies 
exist in this domain, especially in the context of regulatory oversight over various industries, 
which many executives acknowledge to be a powerful political factor impacting their operations. 
Lobbying could create influence on the regulatory agency and thus lead to fewer corrective 
actions. Therefore, my research highlights the complexities involved in decisions due to a 
channel beyond typical marketing and financial indicators. These findings are highly relevant 
from a policy perspective. 
The third contribution is to the literature on business-to-business (B2B) markets. Recall 
literature has primarily studied markets with consumers as the end-users, despite the significant 
value and size of B2B markets. Consistent with prior research (Cleeren et al. 2017), I know of no 
studies that quantify the impact of product recalls in B2B buyers’ markets (primary or 
secondary). In response, I examine managerially relevant questions related to short-term changes 
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in B2B buyers’ product purchases in response to recalls. Specifically, focus on the used vehicle 
market provides pertinent insights into auto dealers’ inventory management. These findings are 
also timely and policy-relevant because this research can directly inform the ongoing policy 
debate surrounding the recently proposed Used Car Safety Recall Repair Act (Congress 2019). 
In today’s time, when adverse events, such as product recalls, keep causing significant 
damages to businesses and society, I believe that my dissertation essays explore some important 
elements regarding political influence, government regulation, and the B2B market in the 
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CHAPTER 2: LOBBYING AND PRODUCT RECALLS: A STUDY OF THE US 
AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY   
Introduction 
In 2009–2010, Toyota responded slowly to hundreds of reported accidents involving its 
vehicles, potentially linked to sudden acceleration flaws. A 2010 U.S. Congressional report, 
examining the case, openly alleged lobbying influences by automotive firms (Kirchhoff and 
Peterman 2010), citing an internal Toyota document (dated July 6, 2009), in which the chief 
operating officer highlighted several “wins,” such as delaying final safety rules by National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and persuading NHTSA officials to impose 
smaller sanctions. The internal document, for example, suggested that the negotiated equipment 
recall on its Camry model saved the company $100 million. The report raises important 
questions that motivate the current research: Does lobbying influence product 
(vehicle/automobile) recalls? Can we observe significant differences in voluntary recall by firms 
based on their lobbying expenditure levels? Does lobbying influence public agencies’ (i.e., 
regulators, NHSTA in the case of automobiles) mandatory recalls? The answer to these questions 
is not obvious. In an environment where objective product quality should be the only factor 
influencing product recall, lobbying should have no impact on recall decisions as lobbying does 
not alter product quality. However, the anecdotal evidence provided above suggests otherwise. 
Uncovering whether there is a relationship between lobbying and product recalls (voluntary and 
mandatory) is important from strategic marketing and public policy perspectives. 
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Product recalls are inevitable in many industries (e.g., medical equipment, consumer 
products). Examples of some of the prominent recalls include Johnson & Johnson’s Tylenol 
recall, Takata airbags recall, Pfizer’s Bextra recall, Volkswagen’s diesel emission recall, and 
Mattel’s toy recall. For the automotive industry, recalls are especially pervasive. In 2016, 919 
recalls due to defects and compliance issues affected 50.5 million vehicles and cost firms almost 
$22.1 billion (Jibrell 2018). Recalls have a direct (e.g., reduced sales) and indirect (e.g., brand 
reputation loss) cost prompting firms to try to avoid/reduce recalls.  
One strategy for reducing recalls relies on corporate lobbying, through which firms 
attempt to create political connections and alter the regulatory landscape (Bertrand, Bombardini, 
and Trebbi 2014). Blanes i Vidal, Draca, and Fons-Rosen (2012) refer to the U.S. lobbying 
industry as a market for political connections; firms invest and hire lobbyists to gain access to 
politicians, then extract returns in different forms (Alexander, Mazza, and Scholz 2009). For 
example, drug makers lobby intensely to avoid bills that aim to curb drug prices. In 2015, 
companies within the pharmaceuticals and health products sector spent $240 million on lobbying 
(Chon 2016). Table 2.1 provides examples of lobbying activities across diverse industries. It is 
important to understand whether and how political influence might bias critical policies, 
including recall decisions as they can lead to loss in revenue or reputational damage. We study 
the relationship between recall and lobbying in the automotive industry, which contributes 
almost 3% of U.S. gross domestic product and generates more manufacturing jobs than any other 
U.S. sector.1 Further, the automotive industry is subject to close regulatory supervision, making 
it an ideal setting for our study. 
                                                      
1 See http://www.americanautocouncil.org/us-economic-contributions, accessed February 2020. 
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A recall process (Figure 2.1) generally starts with consumer complaints about vehicle 
defects, but a firm’s own tests also might reveal defects. The firm analyzes complaints or 
potential issues and may decide to initiate a voluntary recall. The NHTSA also has access to 
consumer complaints, so the regulatory agency may recommend a mandatory recall if the firm 
does not initiate a voluntary recall. However, if firms can influence the NHTSA using lobbying 
connections, the firms could influence the recall process, as indicated by anecdotal evidence in 
the popular press.2  
As a government agency, the NHTSA functions in a politically active environment. The 
President of the United States nominates its chief, and oversight committees consist of members 
from the Senate and House of Representatives (Figure 2.2). With this structure, multiple political 
actors actively interact with the NHTSA, and accordingly, automotive firms can use lobbying as 
a political channel to build connections with various actors and potentially exert influence. These 
activities might lead the agency to make choices that favor the lobbying firm, such as limiting 
investigations into consumers’ complaints or not recommending recalls, as well as issuing lax 
regulations. These choices may favor the lobbying firms that may then adopt a passive response 
to vehicle defects. We investigate this dimension of influence in firms’ recall decision-making. 
(Please see Table 2.1, Figure 2.1, and Figure 2.2) 
To investigate the causal relationship between a firm’s lobbying expenditures and 
automotive recalls, we consider the U.S. passenger vehicle market. We gather recall and 
lobbying expenditure data for major automotive firms, which reveal that lobbying expenditures 
                                                      
2 For example, “GM Turns to Holland & Knight for Post-Recall Lobbying Push,” 
https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/almID/1202657819376/?slreturn=20190907230356, accessed June 2020; 
“Toyota’s Lobbying Power Primed for Test as Congressional Scrutiny Mounts,” 
https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2010/02/toyotas-lobbying-power-primed/, accessed June 2020; and “Takata’s 
Tab for U.S. Lobbying Rises 22% as Recall Scrutiny Intensifies,” 
https://www.autonews.com/article/20150805/OEM11/150809915/takata-s-tab-for-u-s-lobbying-rises-22-as-recall-
scrutiny-intensifies, accessed June 2020. 
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and recalls are negatively associated. It seems that a reduction in voluntary recalls drives this 
negative effect as increase in lobbying expenditures reduces voluntary recalls. This finding 
seems to suggest a change in firm’s recall behavior as it changes its lobbying expenditures. The 
recall process suggests that a reduction in voluntary recalls due to increase in lobbying 
expenditures should offer regulators more opportunities for mandatory recalls, but regulators do 
not compensate for change in firm recall behaviors. In fact, results suggest that regulator’s 
tendency to recommend mandatory recall also goes down as lobbying expenditures increase. 
Thus, benefits of increased lobbying expenditure for a firm seem to be two fold, reduced 
voluntary and reduced mandatory recalls. First, the lobbying firm itself reduces the number of 
recalls and second the regulator seems to issue fewer recalls. In deriving these findings, we also 
note an empirical challenge in the form of an omitted variable bias, in that an omitted variable 
influences both the decisions to lobby and to recall by a firm. To address this issue, we use an 
instrumental variable (IV) approach and affirm the robustness of the results with several alternate 
model specifications and robustness tests. 
With these findings, our study contributes to empirical literature on lobbying by 
addressing its influence on product recalls. We empirically establish the validity of lawmakers’ 
concerns about lobbying influences, especially for the automotive industry, in which vehicle 
defects can have severe consequences. More broadly, we highlight the regulatory dimension of 
recalls and study an extension beyond existing literature that mainly adopts a business 
orientation. The interface of marketing and politics is a critical but underdeveloped research 
domain (e.g., for exceptions, Han et al. 2019; Jung and Mittal 2020; Martin et al. 2018) 
especially in the context of regulatory oversight over various industries, which many executives 
acknowledge to be a powerful political factor impacting their operations (KPMG 2015).  By 
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combining research into recalls and lobbying expenditures, we specify how firms work to 
manage their regulatory environment.  
Institutional Background 
We detail critical institutional factors for automotive recalls and corporate lobbying 
activities, then note the mechanisms by which corporate lobbying expenditures can influence 
regulatory agencies. 
Automotive Recalls 
Recalls are common in the automobile industry; even a minor defect among the many 
vehicle components can trigger recalls. The NHTSA is responsible for oversight of vehicle safety 
in the United States, such that it can initiate recalls if necessary and is responsible to monitor the 
effectiveness of ongoing recalls. It also maintains multiple channels for consumers to submit 
complaints (e.g., phone, email, and website, among others), through which it receives 
approximately 4,000 complaints every month.3 Depending on the type of complaint, the NHTSA 
assigns any complaint to one of 37 categories (e.g., power train, suspension); a complaint about 
leaking engine oil belongs to the engine and engine cooling category for example. In this study, 
we consider the seven original equipment manufacturer (OEM) complaint categories:4 electrical 
systems, fuel systems (gasoline), power train, engine (engine cooling), suspension, exterior 
lighting, and structure, as we detail in the Data section. Complaints also may be specific to a 
specific manufacturer (e.g., Honda) or make (e.g., Lexus). In addition to consumer complaints, 
NHTSA collects and tracks automotive-related injuries, deaths, fires, and crashes; these data are 
                                                      
3 See https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/810552.pdf, accessed June 2020. 
4 Each of these seven complaint categories contribute at least 2% recalls to entire OEM categories recalls in our data 
set. Cumulatively, the seven included categories capture approximately 94% of OEM recalls. Each of the excluded 
categories captured less than 2% recalls (these included Engine (other), Equipment Adaptive, Forward Collision 
Avoidance, Fuel System (other), Hybrid Propulsion System, and Traction Control System). 
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available to manufacturers too. Using available information (e.g., complaints, deaths, private 
information such as firm’s financial health), the firm decides whether to recall or not (voluntary 
recall). Simultaneously, NHTSA also has the authority to recommend a mandatory recall (based 
on the available information such as consumer complaints and death reports). Note that NHTSA 
does not have access to the firm’s private information. This process (Figure 2.1) occurs in each 
decision interval, which usually is a calendar quarter, as is also reflected in the quarterly 
reporting of firms’ lobbying expenditures (see the Data section). 
Political Influence 
Political science literature discusses the “iron triangle” mechanism through which 
political capital influences regulatory agencies and bureaucracies (Adams 1981). The triangle 
reflects the aligned actions and interests of three key actors in public policy making: (1) the 
regulated industry (e.g., the automotive industry), (2) legislative oversight committees (e.g., 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Committee on Commerce, Science and 
Transportation), and (3) the regulatory agency (e.g., NHTSA). The resulting alliance aims to 
control government policy, within the agency’s jurisdiction, for the mutual benefit of the three 
sides of the triangle. For example, Freeman (1965) describes exchanges of favors among 
agencies, special interest groups, and congressional committees that earn the agencies more 
funding and power, if they cater to the interest groups, which then influence politicians, who 
ultimately exert pressure on the regulatory agency (Correia 2014).  
Legislative and executive bodies can exert political control over regulatory agency’s 
activities through mechanisms such as budget setting, appointments, and oversight. Weingast 
(1984) details how politicians use budgets to reward (or sanction) agency decisions that increase 
(decrease) their political support. For the NHTSA, the president nominates its head, and then 
Senate panel approve the nomination. The appointed administrators often enter lobbying careers 
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after leaving the agency (e.g., former head of the NHTSA David Strickland became a lobbyist at 
a law firm that deals with automobile regulations). To maximize their future career prospects in a 
regulated industry, regulatory agency administrators may act in accordance with congressional 
interests, but they also represent attractive candidates for lobbyist because of their inside 
knowledge of how agencies work that can help muster political support. As one lobbying firm 
founder notes: “People who are experienced in Washington tend to be better at doing this kind of 
work than people who have never worked in the government before” (Farnam 2011). Finally, 
Congressional committees have investigative oversight (Correia 2014), and their investigations 
may uncover and publicize agency abuses that in turn might prompt legislative responses or 
policy changes. During hearings, Congress also can clarify for the agency how they believe it 
should function. This mechanism also depends on institutional powers (Weingast and Moran 
1983), in that Congress delegates responsibilities to monitors, and appropriates budgets of 
agencies to create incentives for them to act in accordance with its goals (De Vault 2002). 
Research examining the link between political influence and regulatory agencies reveals 
several influences. For example, pertaining to tax benefits, Richter, Samphantharak, and 
Timmons (2009) find that firms that spend more on lobbying pay lower effective tax rates the 
next year. Among firms subject to class action lawsuits, those that lobby more achieve longer 
class-action periods, such that lobbying appears to delay fraud detection (Yu and Yu 2011). On 
average, politically connected firms also are less likely to be involved in enforcement actions and 
face lower penalties (Correia 2014). These empirical findings imply that lobbying expenditures 
may be associated with favorable treatment by regulatory agencies.  
Corporate Lobbying 
Lobbying Disclosure Act. The Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) (1995), which governs 
lobbying activities in the United States, requires firms to disclose lobbying expenses. The LDA 
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defines “lobbying activities” as contacts and efforts in support of such contacts, including 
preparation and planning activities, research and other background work, and coordination with 
others’ lobbying activities.5 It further defines a “lobbyist” as a person or entity that has one or 
more employees who (1) are employed or retained by a client for financial or other 
compensation, (2) offer services that include more than one lobbying contact, and (3) engage in 
lobbying activities for at least 20% of the services provided for that client over any three-month 
period. Lobbying firms must file separate reports for each client, containing substantial 
information about their lobbying activities, such as the revenue generated and the issues for 
which the firm lobbied on that client’s behalf during that period. The only exceptions are if a 
client does not spend more than $3,000 in a quarter for lobbying. If lobbying income is $5,000 or 
more, a lobbying firm also must provide a good faith estimate of actual amount, rounded to the 
nearest $10,000. Firms with in-house lobbyists may file a single registration; they must register if 
their total expenses for lobbying activities exceed $13,000 in a quarter.6 The Honest Leadership 
and Open Government Act of 2007 required firms to start report lobbying expenditures quarterly 
as of 2008; previously, they filed semi-annual reports to the Senate’s Office of Public Records. 
Lobbying Process. Firms might rely on internal (in-house) lobbyists or external, 
professional lobbying firms. Lobbyists usually are insiders with extended networks of political 
contacts, who interact with politicians and their appointees to further the interests of their client 
firms. In many cases, they have held positions in government agencies (revolving door 
phenomenon) which increases access to government and their lobbying effectiveness (Ridge, 
Ingram, and Hill 2017). Lobbying constitutes an investment that firms make in the political 
                                                      
5 See https://www.senate.gov/legislative/Lobbying/Lobby_Disclosure_Act/3_Definitions.htm, accessed June 2020. 
6 See https://lobbyingdisclosure.house.gov/ldaguidance.pdf, accessed June 2020. 
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arena, such that they hire lobbyists to support or contest specific legislative proposals, which in 
the United States mostly take the form of proposed bills. Because the resulting legislation 
determines the policy landscape and macro-environment for firms, they have an interest in 
lobbying for selected bills (Borghesi and Chang 2015). 
Even if firms fail to achieve their immediate policy goal, they may introduce novel ideas 
to the policy-making community, because lobbyists also help facilitate information transfers, 
particularly when they can claim special expertise (Bertrand, Bombardini, and Trebbi 2014). 
Lobbyists’ expertise can be valuable if legislators lack the technical background or resources to 
undertake an in-depth analysis of a proposed bill. In some cases, lobbyists even create draft 
versions of the bills for lawmakers to introduce (Chang 2013), in which case the client firms 
exert strong influences on policy changes, which can benefit the firms in myriad ways.  
Lobbying as Political Activity. We emphasize lobbying for this study, instead of other 
forms of political activities like campaign contributions, due to three key features of lobbying. 
First, legal limits constrain political contributions, whereas lobbying expenditures are not subject 
to any limits, leading them to become, in monetary terms, the largest form of corporate political 
activity in the United States (Milyo, Primo, and Groseclose 2000). In 2012, lobbying of the 
federal government accounted for $3.5 billion in expenditures, substantially more than the 
estimated $750 million spent on campaign contributions (De Figueiredo and Richter 2014). 
Second, lobbying exists to support or oppose legislative bills, and it takes place throughout the 
year. Firms also can hire as many lobbyists as they deem necessary. In contrast, campaign 
contributions usually go to a particular candidate during election seasons. Third, because laws 
limit the roles that corporations may play in supporting political candidates, firms establish 
political action committees to raise money from third-party sources (e.g., employees, 
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shareholders), such that most campaign contributions come from individuals, not corporations 
(Adelino and Dinc 2014; Ansolabehere, De Figueiredo, and Snyder 2003; Chen, Parsley, and 
Yang 2015).7 Therefore, we use lobbying to assess a firm’s political influence. 
Related Literature 
Product Recalls 
Marketing studies of product recalls span many different areas, as Table 2.2 summarizes. 
Some studies focus on tangible performance aspects, revealing that recalls negatively affect a 
firm’s value and performance indicators, such as sales and profits (e.g., Chu, Lin, and Prather 
2005; Dranove and Olsen 1994; Salin and Hooker 2001). Another set of studies explore strategic 
aspects, such as the effectiveness of advertising and other marketing mix variables following a 
recall (e.g., Van Heerde, Helsen, and Dekimpe 2007; Zhao, Zhao, and Helsen 2011). For 
example, in comparing proactive and passive recall response strategies, Chen, Ganesan, and Liu 
(2009) determine that the stock market responds negatively if a firm initiates a recall before 
receiving any reports of injuries. Studies also investigate intangible outcomes (e.g., loyalty, 
image, reputation) of a product recall. Cleeren, Dekimpe, and Helsen (2008) argue that brand 
advertising can counter the negative effects of a recall and enhance consumers’ first post-recall 
purchase decisions According to Souiden and Pons (2009), if manufacturers contest recalls, it 
negatively affects their image and consumer loyalty. Product recalls help firms learn though, and 
a greater recall magnitude can diminish the number of future recalls and injuries (e.g., 
Haunschild and Rhee 2004; Thirumalai and Sinha 2011).  
Recalls could also create spillover effects on different products produced by the same 
manufacturer, competitors in the category, and the industry as a whole (e.g., Bala et al. 2017; 
                                                      
7 In the 2010 elections, individual direct donations to Congressional candidates accounted for more than 60% of 
total funding. See https://www.opensecrets.org/resources/dollarocracy/04.php, accessed June 2020. 
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Jarrell and Peltzman 1985; Marsh et al. 2004). Liu and Shankar (2015) identify negative 
spillover effects on choices and market shares of other sub-brands with the same parent brand 
name as a recalled product, and Borah and Tellis (2016) observe that negative online chatter 
about a recalled car model increases negative chatter for others with the same brand. Freedman et 
al. (2012) establish sizable, negative impact of recall on entire industry sales. Studies have also 
explored factors (e.g., product scope, supply chain proximity, political spending, poor financial 
conditions), which could affect product quality and subsequent recalls (e.g., Bray et al. 2019; 
Kini et al. 2017; Rayfield and Unsal 2019; Thirumalai and Sinha 2011). Product recalls could 
also impact secondary markets. Hartman (1987) finds that safety recalls by General Motors 
(GM) diminish the resale value of the recalled products but do not affect the values of other GM 
products. Ater and Yosef (2018) and Strittmatter and Lechner (2020) study the supply-side 
implications of product recalls in secondary markets, using the Volkswagen emission scandal; 
they both find statistically significant negative impact of recalls on the supply of recalled 
products. We seek to build on this foundation by studying the effect of a political dimension on 
recall decisions. 
(Please see Table 2.2) 
Corporate Lobbying 
Firms use corporate lobbying as a strategic tool to create political connections and gain 
benefits, as demonstrated by various studies. De Figueiredo and Silverman (2006) identify large 
returns to lobbying by universities for academic earmarks, and Alexander, Mazza, and Scholz 
(2009) find that firms that lobbied for the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 earned returns of 
greater than $220 for every $1 spent lobbying. Studying the mortgage industry, Igan, Mishra, and 
Tressel (2012) determine that lenders that lobby more intensively engage in riskier lending 
practices ex ante, then benefit more from bailout programs. To determine if financial markets 
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value corporate lobbying, Borisov, Goldman, and Gupta (2016) analyze the impact of an 
exogenous event that influenced lobbying processes and discover that firms that lobby more 
experience losses after the event. Chen, Parsley, and Yang (2015) cite a positive association of 
lobbying with market measures of financial performance. 
Such influences likely stem from the access that corporate lobbyists offer to lawmakers. 
As Blanes i Vidal, Draca, and Fons-Rosen (2012) determine, lobbyists formerly employed by the 
federal government generate the most lobbying revenues; those who were formerly staff 
members of U.S. senators experience a 28% ($182,000 at the median) drop in lobbying revenues 
when that senator leaves office. But firms also seek private information, tips, and predictions 
from lobbyists (Mullins and Scannell 2006). As Gao and Huang (2016) find, hedge fund 
managers connected to lobbyists trade more heavily in politically sensitive stocks and thereby 
outperform the managers of unconnected funds. 
Data Description 
The data for this study come from multiple sources. For information about recalls and 
consumer complaints, we refer to the NHTSA database.8 For firms’ lobbying expenditures and 
categorizations across lobbied issues, we rely on the U.S. Senate database.9 We use Compustat to 
obtain financial indicators (e.g., capital expenditures, liability), Automotive News data (sales), 
and Consumer Reports to determine vehicle quality ratings (Table 2.3). 
(Please see Table 2.3) 
                                                      
8 See https://www.nhtsa.gov/recalls#vehicle, accessed July 2021. 




The automotive industry regulator NHTSA maintains records of recall data and makes 
them accessible for public reference. The NHTSA website provides detailed information about 
both consumer complaints and vehicle recalls, including the name of the firm, make, and model; 
the number of affected units; and a brief description of the defect.10 Our balanced panel over a 
nine-year period (2008–2016, with the starting year determined by when quarterly lobbying 
expenditure data are available) features data related to 14 automotive firms (BMW, Daimler, 
Ford, General Motors, Honda, Hyundai, Jaguar, Kia, Mazda, Nissan, Porsche, Tesla, Toyota, and 
Volkswagen). These firms were involved in 636 vehicle recalls,11 and over the nine-year period, 
General Motors faced the highest number of recalls (97), as well as the highest number of 
incidents linked to deaths (19) in a quarter. The complaint data set also identifies consumer 
complaints received by the NHTSA, according to the automobile firm’s name; the make, model, 
and model year; and a brief description of the complaint. We obtain the number of complaints 
and reported deaths from this data, with the descriptive statistics listed in Table 2.4 (panel A). 
(Please see Table 2.4) 
In this data set, the number of quarterly voluntary recalls ranges from 0 to 15 per firm; 
the number of quarterly mandatory recall ranges from 0 to 5 per firm. The mean quarterly 
number of complaints is 437 per firm. We observe 556 voluntary recalls and 80 mandatory 
recalls during nine-year period. In Figure 2.3, we highlight some notable data distributions. The 
bar graphs of the frequency distribution of voluntary and mandatory recalls indicate that, on an 
                                                      
10 We also verify the recall event details from other two sources (https://www.kbb.com/ and https://www.cars.com/). 
Examples are provided in Figure WB 2.2 (Appendix). 
11 We consider unique recalls to establish this count. For example, different makes of the same firm (e.g., Honda, 
Acura) could have recalls at different times for the same reason in the same recall campaign. We use unique recall 
campaign numbers to avoid double counting. 
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aggregate firm level, voluntary recalls span 53.37% of the total data points. On the aggregate 
firm level, mandatory recall events are sparse and occur for 12.30% of the total data points. The 
line graph also indicates variation in lobbying expenditures and voluntary recalls, aggregated 
over firms for 36 quarters (nine-year period). 
(Please see Figure 2.3) 
The complaint data set reveals 37 complaint categories12 (e.g., airbag, suspension, 
steering), which we classify into issues attributed to the original equipment manufacturer (OEM; 
e.g., powertrain) or not (e.g., air bags), with the assistance of automotive industry experts (not 
associated with this study). Each third-party–supplied part (i.e., non-OEM group) could be 
present in several car makes, so a defect in a non-OEM part would likely trigger recalls for 
multiple firms, thereby creating an indirect correlation. We instead focus on the OEM group, 
which represents 44% of the total recalls, and thereby avoid this co-dependency. Specifically, we 
consider seven OEM complaint categories, each of which represent at least 2% of all OEM 
recalls in our data set (electrical system, fuel system [gasoline], powertrain, engine [engine 
cooling], suspension, exterior lighting, and structure), and together these seven categories 
account for more than 94% of all OEM recalls. 
The number of complaints and deaths are primary determinants of recalls; they indicate 
the defect’s severity and thus the seriousness of the consequences from a consumer safety 
standpoint. Accordingly, severe recalls attract more negative responses from stakeholders, with a 
stronger impact on sales (e.g., Hoffer, Pruitt, and Reilly 1988; Liu and Shankar 2015). Ni, Flynn, 
                                                      
12 These categories are: Air bags; Back over prevention; Child seat; Communications; Electrical system; Electronic 
stability control; Engine; Engine and engine cooling; Equipment; Equipment adaptive; Exterior lighting; Forward 
collision avoidance; Fuel system diesel; Fuel system gasoline; Fuel system; other; Hybrid propulsion system; 
Interior lighting; Latches/locks/ linkages; Other; Parking brake; Power train; Seat belts; Seats; Service brakes; 
Service brakes air; Service brakes electric; Service brakes hydraulic; Steering; Structure; Suspension; Tires; Traction 
control system; Trailer hitches; Vehicle speed control; Visibility; Visibility/wiper; Wheels. 
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and Jacobs (2014) also find that severity of recalls relates positively to financial penalties by the 
stock market, and Thomsen and McKenzie (2001) find that recall severity negatively influences 
a firm’s financial value. To represent severity, we use the reported number of complaints and 
deaths as key covariates. More reported deaths represent personal losses to consumers; more 
complaints indicate a widespread vehicle defect (Eilert et al. 2017). Injuries leading to deaths, 
even if associated with relatively few complaints, can trigger a product harm crisis and recalls. 
These complaint characteristics control for recall size and defect severity, which inform our 
assessment of the direct and indirect costs of the recall. 
Lobbying Expenditures  
We collect corporate lobbying expenditures from the U.S. Senate website, including 
spending by firms and their subsidiaries through internal (in-house) lobbyists and external, 
professional lobbying firms. As we noted previously, the LDA of 1995 offers definitions and 
requirements for lobbyists and lobbying activities; it mandates that each lobbyist indicate for 
which issues it lobbied in any period. The resulting reports reveal that firms invest in lobbying to 
address diverse issues (e.g., Accounting, Aerospace, Automotive Industry, Energy/Nuclear, 
Homeland Security, Immigration, Tobacco, Transportation). Table WB 2.1 (Appendix) contains 
a complete list of these lobbying issues.13 Figure WB 2.1 (Appendix) depicts a section of the 
lobbying report submitted by BMW for its lobbying expenditures for October–December 2016. 
Senate records contain lobbying expenditures at the parent firm or holding company level, so we 
only observe firm-level lobbying expenditures. 
Since 2008, cumulative U.S. lobbying expenditures have exceeded $3 billion, with a peak 
of $3.51 billion in 2009. In our study, the 14 focal automotive firms spent $338.55 million over 
                                                      
13 See https://lda.congress.gov/LD/help/default.htm?turl=Documents%2FAppCodes.htm, accessed June 2020.  
 
 26 
nine-year period (2008–2016). Median value of quarterly lobbying spending is $250,000. 
General Motors ranked highest during this period, with $99.95 million in spending. 2008 marked 
the year these firms spent the most ($44.90 million). Ford Motors spent highest quarterly 
expenditures in the fourth quarter of 2013 ($7.86 million). The issue category that attracted the 
most investments, or 11.5% of spending, was the broad “automotive industry,” followed by 
“taxation” (10.4%). 
In the 36 quarters we study, Subaru did not incur any lobbying expenditure, and for 
Mitsubishi, we observe only one non-zero observation, so we exclude these firms. We also 
exclude Chrysler, which underwent multiple, different mergers (Daimler, Fiat); the management 
changes and corresponding regulatory exposure make it a potentially unstable data point for our 
study. 
Lobbying expenditures below some reasonable threshold appear as zero values in the 
Senate data, but we expect this data limitation to have minimal impact. Firms primarily employ 
external lobbying firms, for which the reporting threshold is low ($3,000). In our data, the mean 
and median values of quarterly lobbying expenditures are $671,739 and $250,000, respectively, 
and 99% of firm-quarter observations with positive lobbying expenditures include amounts 
greater than $20,000. Similar to Kerr, Lincoln, and Mishra (2014), we also do not observe any 
clustering around the thresholds. Therefore, the potential measurement error due to reporting 
requirements should be minimal. 
Control Variables 
We include control variables to capture factors that might affect the firm’s recall decision 
and the effectiveness of lobbying. First, we consider the geographical dispersion of defect 
complaints. We count the unique number of US states where the defect complaints were 
registered. This variable would help us control for how widespread potential defect is beyond its 
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sheer magnitude (number of complaints and deaths). Second, we note the firm’s liabilities, 
measured as its total liabilities normalized by sales. Kini, Shenoy, and Subramaniam (2017) 
show that firms with higher leverage experience greater recall probabilities; if they struggle with 
weak financial conditions, firms may lower their discretionary investments in quality, leading to 
more risk of subsequent recalls. A lack of resources also may limit the firm’s tendency to 
provide remedy and encourage it to avoid initiating recalls. Moreover, such liabilities may affect 
the extent of lobbying activities and determine the firm’s political activity. 
Third, we control for capital intensity, or a firm’s capital expenditures (CAPEX) (Steven, 
Dong, and Corsi 2014). These expenditures include investments for purchases, improvements to, 
or maintenance of long-term assets to enhance the firm’s efficiency or capacity. For example, if a 
firm introduces a new product or builds a new plant, its capital expenditures rise. Investing in 
fixed assets should enhance the firm’s product quality and reduce the number of defective 
products, so it may be associated with fewer recalls. We normalize this by firm sales. 
Fourth, we control for potential agency issues that may arise. The firm aims to maximize 
its market value, but that goal might not align with managers’ (agents’) preference to maximize 
their own personal interests, potentially at the expense of firm owners. Misaligned interests can 
create value losses for shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976). For example, self-interest 
might drive a top manager to pursue political actions for private gain. Because we cannot 
observe all lobbying activity and all its outcomes completely (Richter, Samphantharak, and 
Timmons 2009), we account for potential agency issues, using a measure of the agency costs of 
free cash flows. That is, if a firm has excess cash flows to finance projects efficiently, firm 
managers should be more likely to invest in projects that enhance their personal utility (Jensen 
1986). Such concerns may be more prevalent in low growth firms, which generally have 
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substantial free cash flows for managers to invest. Following Jensen (1986) and Doukas, Kim, 
and Pantzalis (2000), we proxy for agency costs with the interaction of a poor growth 
opportunities indicator and free cash flows (FCF) standardized by total assets (TA). The FCF 
equals operating income before depreciation minus the sum of taxes, interest expense, and 
dividends paid (Lehn and Poulsen 1989). The growth indicator variable equals 1 if the firm’s 
Tobin’s q is less than 1 (poorly managed firm or poor growth opportunities) and 0 otherwise. 
Fifth, we also control for firm size, measured as the number of vehicle units sold. The 
number of sold products may affect recall, because more vehicles on the road mean more 
potentially defective vehicles. Larger firms usually feature a more diversified, complex product 
base, which also could be associated with more recalls (Steven, Dong, and Corsi 2014). Firm 
size may determine lobbying and political power too (Kerr, Lincoln, and Mishra 2014); politics 
likely is more important to larger, more visible firms that must represent themselves on multiple 
fronts (Agrawal and Knoeber 2001). We control for the vehicle quality by using Consumer 
reports rating data. High/low quality of vehicles could be associated with high/low number of 
recalls. Thus, this variable would allow us to control for potential impact of vehicle quality on 
number of recalls. Since it may take some time for defects to appear, we use ratings with one lag 
(quarter) in the analysis. 
Model Specifications 
We estimate the recall process (Figure 2.1) with instrumental variable (IV) model and 
simultaneous equation system (specifically 3SLS). We run additional specifications including a 
non-linear model to ensure the robustness of our results. 
Instrumental Variable Model 
We could use ordinary least squares and exploit the between- and within-data dimensions 
to establish the link between recalls decisions and lobbying (Wooldridge 2002). However, this 
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empirical model would potentially suffer from endogeneity bias. Endogeneity concerns arises 
from the firm-level, time-varying variables that correlate with both lobbying and product recalls. 
Studies have shown that failure to address endogeneity could lead to statistically inconsistent 
parameter estimates. Few solutions to address endogeneity could include field experiments (e.g., 
Johnson et al. 2017), natural experiments (e.g., Shapiro 2018), or instrumental variables (e.g., 
Pattabhiramaiah et al. 2018).  We rely on an instrumental variable strategy. We consider two-
stage least squares model (2SLS; Wooldridge 2012) in an attempt to identify a valid instrument 
that meets relevance and exclusion restriction conditions (with conceptual justification). 
Time-Varying Omitted Variable Bias. Lobbying activities and expenditures are strategic 
decisions for firms, and investments in lobbying result from their beliefs about the potential 
benefits for recall episodes. An omitted variable bias, or endogeneity, might arise if a time-
varying omitted variable influences both the decisions to lobby and to recall, such as the firm’s 
strategic philosophy about regulatory risk management. That is, the prominence and dynamism 
of regulations across markets creates a situation in which the regulatory environment is a primary 
risk for business (Ernst & Young 2011; Ross 2005). Consulting agencies thus offer regulatory 
risk management products (e.g., Dannemiller et al. 2017). In the automotive industry, dynamic 
factors such as product safety disputes (e.g., orders for unrepaired recalls),14 societal 
developments (e.g., reducing greenhouse gas emissions),15 or politically induced scenarios (e.g., 
appointment of new administrators)16 all can drive regulatory changes. In turn, the link between 
                                                      
14 See https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/03/ftc-approves-final-orders-settling-charges-used-auto-
dealers, accessed June 2020. 
15 See https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/08/28/obama-administration-finalizes-historic-
545-mpg-fuel-efficiency-standard, accessed June 2020.  
16 See https://www.detroitnews.com/story/business/autos/2019/04/03/trumps-pick-nhtsa-chief-clears-u-s-senate-
panel/3353494002/ accessed June 2020.  
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a firm’s regulatory risk management strategy and its lobbying is likely. Firms prefer to avoid 
recalls and harsher regulatory actions; a firm with political clout could potentially exert this 
influence on the NHTSA and thereby reap undue benefits.17 In anticipation of future recalls, 
firms also might invest proactively in lobbying to influence key stakeholders and create a 
potential safeguard. For example, more than 30 lobbyists worked for Toyota in 2009 (one year 
before its unintended acceleration recall) to represent its interests before Congress and federal 
agencies (Krumholz and Levinthal 2010). In 2014 (during an ongoing ignition switch recall 
debate), General Motors hired two new lobbying firms to assist with its “product and safety 
recall issues” (Tau 2014). Other industries also observe similar lobbying ramp up practice when 
regulatory scrutiny grows (Tracy 2019). 
Such a strategy flow from organizational mindset and likely embed throughout the 
organization, such as in managerial experience and business knowledge, which makes it difficult 
to quantify. The absence of a measure of regulatory risk management, which correlates with both 
recalls and lobbying, thus creates an omitted variable bias that also raises endogeneity concerns 
(Wooldridge 2002). Using 2SLS, we seek to identify an IV that meets the relevance and 
exclusion restrictions to address this concern. 
Instrumental Variable (IV). The quarterly aggregated political contributions of residents 
living in counties where a firm has its headquarters or production facilities provide a potential 
IV. In the United States, individual contributors may donate to any political candidate or 
committee; the Federal Election Commission (FEC) maintains a database of all contributions. 
For example, Toyota has a presence in seven counties (headquarters in Los Angeles County, 
                                                      
17 Many reports assert that former regulators hired by Toyota helped halt the probes. See 
https://www.denverpost.com/2010/02/12/regulators-hired-by-toyota-helped-halt-probes/, accessed June 2020.  
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Calif.; plants in Madison County, Ala.; Gibson County, Ind.; Scott County, Kent.; Union County, 
Miss.; Bexar County, Tex.; and Putnam County, W.V.).18 We sum individual contributions from 
these counties. With the prediction that a firm with a larger geographical footprint is more likely 
to be active in lobbying at both its headquarters location and in areas where its plants are located, 
we gather headquarters and plant information for each firm from various sources (e.g., company 
website, annual reports). Then we search websites maintained by the Office of Policy 
Development and Research and Department of Agriculture to find county codes and 
corresponding ZIP codes for each county. We enter these ZIP codes into the FEC website to 
identify individual contribution data over the nine-year study period.  
Instrument Relevance. To satisfy the relevance criterion, the IV should correlate with the 
endogenous regressor, which is lobbying expenditures. We anticipate that they correlate 
negatively: If individuals, i.e., residents living in counties where a firm has its headquarters or 
production facilities, contributions increase (decrease), firms’ lobbying expenditures should 
decrease (increase). In general, an individual might make political donations to signal her 
political engagement and share her views on various issues, related to local policies, jobs, 
infrastructure development, and so on; those issues also are relevant to firms with a presence in 
those local counties. When political donations increase, firms may be motivated to dedicate less 
money to lobbying activities, because they know their interests already are being represented by 
individual contributions in the political system. Donations also fund the political ambitions of 
elected officials, so those officials likely account for the signaled interests of contributors in their 
legislative decisions. As Hill et al. (2013) determine, if more politicians already represent the 
interests of the citizens of a state in which a firm is present, the firm’s need to hire lobbyists’ 
                                                      
18 For the firms in our sample, county-level overlap across firms is minimal: Out of 49 counties (observed across all 
firms), 6 counties host more than one firm. See Table WB 2.3 (Appendix) for location details. 
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decreases. If instead individual donations decrease, firms may be motivated to allocate more 
money to lobbying to ensure adequate representation of their interests. Thus, conceptually, this 
instrument appears to meet the instrument relevance criterion. 
Exclusion Restriction. The proposed instrument should not correlate with the omitted 
variable absorbed by the error term (Wooldridge 2010). Individual political contributions should 
not exhibit any association with variables (e.g., vehicle quality) that determine the recall 
decisions by a firm or regulator; rather, reasons to donate likely vary substantially across 
individual contributors (Powell 2012). For example, an individual might use political 
contributions to express her personal political orientation and ideology (Ansolabehere, de 
Figueiredo, and Snyder 2003) or out of a sense of civic duty; an environmentally conscious voter 
might contribute to a committee that is raising support for an environmental bill. Others might 
donate to align with the norms of their networks of friends or professional relationships. In all 
these cases, individual contributions are unlikely to be directly associated with variables that 
determine automotive recalls, so we conceptually argue that it meets the exclusion restriction 
criterion too. 
Empirical Validity. We assess the empirical validity of the IV by examining its strength 
and exogeneity through different tests. Before doing so, we remove any contributions from 
individuals associated with any automotive firms, using employer information included in the 
FEC data. We consider many variations of firm names (e.g., General Motor, General Motor Co., 
General Motor Company, General Motors Corp., General Motors; see firms’ names table in 
Table WB 2.2 (Appendix) to identify firms’ employees. We observe significant heterogeneity in 
individuals’ contributions across firms’ locations. In our data, county-level median and 
maximum values of quarterly contributions are $81,912 and $74.90 million USD, respectively. 
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Over nine-year period (2008-2016), sum of all individuals’ contributions is $2.73 billion. 
California’s contribution, aggregated across its all locations, was the largest (48.9% of the total 
amount). West Virginia recorded the lowest aggregated contributions. Over nine-year period, 
Los Angeles County (California) was the biggest contributor among all counties ($845.77 
million USD). 
In Table 2.5, we report the first-stage results of the two-stage estimator, which show that 
our IVs are significant predictor of firm lobbying. For both set of equations, IV coefficients are 
significant and empirically support the proposed relationship with the endogenous variable. IV 
negative sign indicates that a greater (lower) degree of individual contributions lowers 
(increases) firms’ need to hire lobbyists. For voluntary recalls, an F-test on the instruments 
rejects the null hypothesis of weak instruments (statistic = 5.34 (df = 2;  469),𝑝𝑝 < .05). The 
first-stage equation also controls for other exogenous variables, including firm-, year-, and 
quarter-level fixed effects. A Wu-Hausman test suggests the presence of endogeneity in the 
system, in that it rejects the null hypothesis (statistic = 6.10 (df = 1;  469),𝑝𝑝 < .05). 
Furthermore, a Sargan-Hansen test ensures the validity of the instruments; it does not reject the 
null hypothesis that the instruments are exogenous and thus valid (statistic = .010 (df =
1), n. s.). We find similar statistics for mandatory recalls. An F-test on the instruments rejects the 
null hypothesis of weak instruments (statistic = 5.27 (df = 2;  473),𝑝𝑝 < .05). A Wu-Hausman 
test suggests the presence of endogeneity in the system (statistic = 4.97(df = 1;  473),𝑝𝑝 <
.05). A Sargan-Hansen test does not reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are exogenous 
(statistic = .46 (df = 1), n. s.). 
Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS). After identifying a valid instrument that meets the 
relevance and exclusion restrictions, we can apply 2SLS. We first estimate lobbying 
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expenditures as function of the instrument (individual contributions) and the other exogenous 
variables, then use the estimated value of lobbying expenditures in the second-stage regression 
for recalls. The 2SLS includes the following specification for the firm: 
Lobbyingiyq  =  γ0 +  γ1Ziyq + γ2 XViyq +  εiyq.      (2a) 
Vol_recalliyq  =  β0 +  β1Predicted_lobbyingiyq + β2 XViyq +  ϑiyq.    (2b) 
Equation 2a represents the first stage of the 2SLS. Lobbyingiyq is the lobbying expenditures by 
firm i in quarter q of year y. Ziyq is the instrument, which is exogenous in nature. To satisfy 
instrument relevance, the coefficient γ1 must be significant and nonzero. Equation 2b represents 
the second stage of the 2SLS. Here, Ziyq does not appear. To meet the exclusion restriction 
condition, Ziyq must not correlate with the error term (E�Ziyq ∗ ϑiyq� = 0). Vol_recalliyq is the 
number of voluntary recalls of firm i in quarter q of year y. XV includes covariates for voluntary 
recalls, namely, recall-specific covariates (number of consumer complaints, reported deaths, and 
number of states where the complaints were registered), firm-specific variables (liabilities and 
capex normalized by quarterly values of sales, agency costs, quality rating, and sales), and time-
invariant factors (firm, quarter, and year fixed effects). Firm-level fixed effects capture firm-
level time-invariant unobserved factors (e.g., organizational culture, managers’ risk preferences). 
It corrects for the omission of time-invariant firm-level factors. Year-level and quarter-level 
fixed effects account for unobserved factors that vary over time and are common to all firms. 
Thus we can tease out any year-level fluctuations (e.g., economic cycles that influence all firms). 
Controlling for time-invariant factors removes time-invariant between-level variation; it relies 
only on within-level variation in the data. Similarly, the 2SLS specification for the regulator is as 
follows. 
Lobbyingiyq  =  λ0 +  λ1Ziyq + λ2 XMiyq +  ϵiyq.      (2c) 
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Mand_recalliyq = α0 + α1Predicted_lobbyingiyq + α2 XMiyq +  uiyq.   (2d) 
Equation 2c and 2d represent the first stage and second stage of the 2SLS model, respectively. 
Mand_recalliyq is the number of mandatory recalls of firm i in quarter q of year y. XM includes 
covariates for mandatory recalls (number of consumer complaints, reported deaths, number of 
states where the complaints were registered, quality rating), and several time-invariant factors 
(firm, year, and quarter fixed effects). As stated above, Ziyq is the instrument and it must not 
correlate with the error term (E�Ziyq ∗ uiyq� = 0), to meet the exclusion restriction condition. 
Simultaneous-Equation System 
With previous model, we estimate the relationship between lobbying and recalls while 
addressing econometric issues such as endogeneity. We reinforce this analysis by incorporating 
two further considerations in the model specification. 
Correlation between Decision Makers. The previous models assume that the recall 
decision-making process of each entity, firm and regulator, is independent (conditional on 
observed covariates and time-invariant factors), with no correlation between errors. When we 
relax this assumption, we consider whether exogenous factors not included in the model might 
shock both model specifications simultaneously. For example, more media coverage after 
consumer complaints might influence the decision making of both firms and the regulator. We 
thus allow for correlation between the error terms in Equations 2b and 2d, then perform an 
estimate with a simultaneous equation model, to gain an asymptotic efficiency advantage over 
2SLS (Zellner and Theil 1962). This specification estimates the firm and regulator models 
simultaneously, correlating their errors, while correcting for the endogenous nature of the 
lobbying variable with 2SLS. The resulting specifications for the firm and the regulator are: 




Mand_recalliyq = α0 +  α1 Lobbyingiyq + α2 XMiyq +  uiyq ,    (3b) 
 
where (ϑ, u) ~ N(0, Σ), and the other variables are as previously defined. At an aggregated level, 
this model is identified, as long as we have at least one exogenous variable that appears in one 
equation but not the other. Similar to the IV model, XV and XM contain different covariates. 
Therefore, this condition is satisfied, and we consider our model as being identified. 
Beliefs. In the recall process, both firm and regulator have authority to initiate a recall. 
Before any decision, the firm likely develops a rational expectation of the regulator’s probable 
action (recall/no recall), which it incorporates into its own decision making. In addition to the 
previously noted correlational link between entities, this effect may create a structural link in the 
model. Incorporating the belief is consistent with the simultaneous process in Figure 2.1. To 
denote this expectation, we need a variable equal to the number of mandatory recalls in the firm 
specification. According to a rational expectation assumption, the regulator’s recall outcomes 
should not differ systematically from what the firm would expect (Muth 1961). That is, an 
outcome prediction by a rational entity does not differ systematically from the resulting market 
equilibrium. We also incorporate the number of voluntary recalls as a covariate for the 
regulator’s specification, to reflect the regulator’s rational expectation of a firm’s possible action. 
This belief may help the regulator allocate its scarce resources more efficiently. Therefore, the 
revised specifications are: 
Vol_recalliyq  = β0 +  β1 Lobbyingiyq  +  β2 XViyq +  β3 Mand_recalliyq  +  ϑiyq , and  (4a) 
Mand_recalliyq = α0 +  α1 Lobbyingiyq  + α2 XMiyq +  α3 Vol_recalliyq +  uiyq     (4b) 




Table 2.5 contains the results for IV 2SLS model, with the number of recalls (voluntary 
and mandatory) as the dependent variable. We have predicted that automotive firms with more 
lobbying expenditures are less likely to initiate voluntary recalls. In Panel 1, we provide the 
second-stage results for the IV model. In the voluntary recall equation, the coefficient for the 
predicted value of lobbying expenditures is negative and significant (βLobbying = -2.398, p < .05). 
The firm, year, and quarter fixed effects control for unobserved heterogeneity. Furthermore, the 
severity variable (number of death reports) has a significant and positive coefficient (βDeaths = 
.072, p < .05), indicating that more reported deaths due to defective vehicles increase the number 
of voluntary recalls. The complaints variable (number of consumer complaints) has a positive 
coefficient. In the mandatory recall specification (Panel 2), the coefficient of the lobbying 
variable is significant and negative (βLobbying = -.644, p < .05) indicating that firms with higher 
lobbying are less likely to experience mandatory recalls. The magnitude of this effect is smaller 
than the voluntary recall equation. The coefficient on severity variable (complaints) is positive 
and significant (βComplaints = .0005, p < .05); logically, more complaints trigger mandatory recalls. 
(Please see Table 2.5 and Table 2.6)  
Next, we move to examine the simultaneous equation system in Table 2.6. We consider 
the correlation of the model errors for the firm and the regulator, while also correcting for 
endogeneity. Wooldridge (2010, sec. 9.6) recommends the GMM 3SLS estimator, which extends 
a traditional 3SLS estimator by allowing for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent 
standard errors. With a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator, we obtain parameter 
estimates based on the initial weight matrix, compute a new weight matrix based on them, and 
then reestimate the parameters using the new weight matrix. We select a heteroskedasticity- and 
autocorrelation-consistent weight matrix with a Bartlett (Newey-West) kernel. Panel 1 of Table 
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2.6 includes these results (Equations 3a and 3b). The voluntary recall results are consistent with 
the IV model results (βLobbying = -2.637, p < .05), and the magnitude of the coefficient is similar. 
Thus, a firm’s lobbying and voluntary recalls are negatively associated. Lobbying investments 
appear to influence and diminish a firm’s tendency to initiate voluntary recalls. Severity indicator 
(complaints) is positive and significant (βComplaints = .002, p < .05); the extent and severity of the 
defect positively influences the number of voluntary recalls. Capital expenditures variable 
displays significant and negative relationship with voluntary recalls. The mandatory recall results 
are also consistent with the IV model results (βLobbying = -.668, p < .05). Recall severity 
(complaints) has a positive effect on the number of mandatory recalls (βComplaints =. 0006, p < 
.05). Panel 2 of Table 2.6 presents the results from 3SLS model (Equations 4a and 4b), which 
adds beliefs into the specifications. The main results (voluntary βLobbying = -3.468, p < .05; 
mandatory βLobbying = -1.215, p < .05) are consistent with Panel 1 and the IV model results. All 
these models control for unobserved heterogeneity with time-invariant fixed effects. 
Robustness Assessment 
The empirical results highlight that firms’ lobbying is significantly associated with the 
likelihood of their voluntary and mandatory recalls. We examine the robustness of these results 
with various alternative models. 
Nonlinear Specification 
As a robustness check, we run an ordered Probit model to take into account the discrete 
and ordered nature of our outcome variable. Number of recalls is likely to go up as the value of 
key variables such as complaints and deaths would cross a specific threshold. Thus, we define 
this outcome variable as an ordered categorical variable representing specific recall decisions for 
firm i in period t (i.e., Recallit = 0 if there is no recall, Recallit = 1 if there is one recall, Recallit = 
2 if there are two recalls, and so on). Probability of an outcome variable falling in one of the 
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categories is then a linear function of key covariates and error. Based on the frequency 
distribution of voluntary recalls (panel A of Figure 2.3), we categorize quarterly voluntary recall 
observations into six groups. Group 1 – 6 correspond to number of recalls varying from 0 to 5 (0, 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5 consecutively). These six groups comprise 98.21% values of the outcome variable. 
Percentage share of remaining observations (with recall frequency greater than 5) is only 1.79%, 
and thus, we collapse these observations into group 6. Similarly, we create three groups for 
mandatory recall variable based on its frequency distribution (panel B of Figure 2.3). Mandatory 
recall observations with values 0 and 1 belong to in group 1 and 2, respectively. Percentage share 
of remaining observations (with recall frequency equal or greater than 2) is only 2.58%, and 
therefore, we collapse these observations into group 3. An additional model (linear) for the 
endogenous variable (lobbying) also accompanies each model. Such a specification is similar to 
the first-stage of 2SLS, which consists of regressing lobbying variable on instrumental variables 
and other covariates. 
We use a maximum likelihood estimator, named as conditional mixed-process (CMP), to 
analyze each ordered Probit model. CMP model uses simulated maximum likelihood algorithm 
(Geweke 1989; Hajivassiliou and McFadden 1998) to jointly estimate two or more equations 
with linkages among their errors. Joint estimation of two equations using maximum likelihood 
approach provides potential efficiency gains relative to the more traditional two-stage least 
squares estimation. CMP, developed by (Roodman 2009), is widely used in marketing (e.g., 
Kashyap, Antia, and Frazier 2012) and economics studies (e.g., Ferreira et al. 2012). Table 2.7 
shows the results, which are consistent with our key findings (voluntary βLobbying = -1.323, p < 
.05; mandatory βLobbying = -.1.55, p < .05).19  
                                                      
19 We could formulate our decision problem as whether there is one or more voluntary/mandatory recall in a quarter 
or not. Such a formulation would lead to a binary Probit model specification for voluntary and mandatory recalls 
 
 40 
(Please see Table 2.7 and Table 2.8)  
Log Specification 
In a linear model, we include the natural log transformations of the dependent variable 
(number of recalls). A log transformation can handle situations in which variables have nonlinear 
relationships. It transforms skewed data into approximately normal data, so we can run a linear 
model. Panel 1 in Table 2.8 presents 2SLS results using transformed dependent variable; they are 
consistent with our previously reported findings (voluntary βLobbying = -.785, p < .05; mandatory 
βLobbying = -.407, p < .05). 
Campaign Contributions 
We also control for firm’s campaign contributions as another potential channel of 
influence. As discussed earlier, role of firms’ campaign contributions is generally limited to the 
election seasons. In addition, estimated money spent on campaign contributions is significantly 
smaller than money spent on lobbying. Despite these key differences, we run another robustness 
check to ensure that our results are not sensitive to the presence of this potential channel. 
We collect firms’ campaign contributions data from Center for Responsive Politics 
(CRP) 20 and add this as an additional covariate in the analysis. The CRP website contains the 
Federal Election Commission data, and has been extensively used in the literature (e.g., Adelino 
and Dinc 2014; Fremeth, Richter, and Schaufele 2013). This public online database enables us to 
search individual firms’ contribution records. As this contributions value appears at the annual 
level, we divide this by four to obtain the quarterly value. This variable is significantly correlated 
with the firm’s lobbying expenditures (𝜌𝜌 = .44,𝑝𝑝 < .05). In order to avoid collinearity, we first 
                                                      
(0/1; 0 when there is no quarterly recall otherwise 1).  We present results from such a specification in Table WB 2.4 
(Appendix), and these results are consistent with others in terms of statistical inference. 
20 See https://www.opensecrets.org/, accessed June 2020. 
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regress this variable on lobbying amount, firm dummies, and time dummies. We retain the 
residual of this regression and use it as an additional variable in the 2SLS second-stage equation. 
Results of this analysis (see panel 2 of Table 2.8) support our key findings (voluntary βLobbying = -
2.025, p < .05; mandatory βLobbying = -.583, p < .05). 
Concluding Remarks 
Each year, the automobile industry incurs millions of dollars of costs due to recalls 
(Jibrell 2018). Studies have explored various recall-related topics, but most of them focus on 
post-recall elements (e.g., impact on financial performance) rather than the pre-recall phase 
(Eilert et al. 2017). We study the role of corporate lobbying in this context. Firms use lobbying to 
build political connections and further their business interests (e.g., Bertrand et al. 2014); we 
propose that it may have direct, meaningful implications for automotive recalls too. Therefore, 
our study combines both research streams to uncover an interesting underlying mechanism 
related to a product recall. 
Allegations of lobbying’s influence in the recall decision-making to obtain favors from 
the NHTSA exist, but there is no systematic research on this allegation. Thus, our study 
investigates whether firms with higher lobbying expenditures have a lower number of recalls. 
The inspiration for our research began with a congressional report, which highlighted 
lawmakers’ concerns about lobbying influences on recalls (Kirchhoff and Peterman 2010). 
Product defects have severe societal impacts (e.g., economic loss, loss of lives), so any element 
that might bias potential actions to correct these defects needs scrutiny. With an empirical 
investigation, we reveal that automotive firms that engage in lobbying are less likely to initiate a 
recall voluntarily. They appear to extract benefits from lax regulatory supervision, potentially 
resulting from their political influence. In particular, approximately $417,014 more in lobbying 
expenditures is associated with one fewer voluntary recall, on average. A back-of-the-envelope 
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calculation indicates potential benefits to the firm: An average recall in our data involves 
247,305 vehicle units. If we assume an average conservative cost of $50 per vehicle (e.g., repair 
or replacement, loss of revenue), one fewer recall implies approximately $12 million in savings. 
Results also suggest that political influence might bias the regulatory agency’s recall 
decisions. Firms with higher lobbying are likely to face fewer mandatory recalls; approximately 
$1.55 million more in lobbying expenditures is associated with one less mandatory recall. These 
results validate the concerns raised in the congressional report about lobbying influence on 
recalls (Kirchhoff and Peterman 2010). Firms’ political capital could provide justification for a 
lower number of agency’s corrective actions (mandatory recalls). Lobbying creates political 
capital (e.g., connections with bureaucrats or politicians), and this capital could result in 
increased influence on the agency, leading to fewer corrective actions. In a nutshell, this study 
captures a bias in the recall decision-making processes of firms and the regulatory agency. 
This research has implications for policymakers, managers, and academics. From a policy 
perspective, these findings are relevant for the supervisory framework regarding automotive 
recalls in the US. The design and implementation of an effective public policy require a deeper 
understanding of various stakeholders’ (e.g., firms, regulatory agencies) behavior and responses. 
Consistent with the previous studies (e.g., Peltzman 1976; Stigler 1971), our findings suggest 
that the recall decision process is susceptible to political influence. Importantly, these findings 
should not be interpreted as evidence for supporting or banning lobbying activities. However, 
these findings highlight the need for stricter rules and more transparency regarding the lobbying 
influence in recall decisions. Policymakers should be mindful of the potential dominance of the 
automotive industry and their lobbyists in recall decisions. Findings also advocate for greater 
transparency with checks and balances in the recall decision-making process. Given that 
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regulations are intended to protect consumers from harmful product exposure, more may need to 
be done to ensure that the regulatory enforcement takes place without any bias. This research 
also highlights a future research opportunity to understand the role of the revolving door 
phenomenon in regulatory decision-making processes. As discussed earlier, personal incentives 
of regulatory officials (e.g., seeking corporate careers after leaving the regulatory agency) may 
drive preferential treatment of regulated firms (Laffont and Tirole 1991). Therefore, due to the 
possibility of maximizing future career prospects (part of the revolving door), officials may act 
according to the industry’s interests. Our study advocates for greater checks and balances, which 
could diminish the possibility of any such bias in the decision-making process. 
For academia, this research adds to our understanding of links among marketing, politics, 
and recalls. By highlighting an unexplored channel of influence, we contribute to efforts in 
understanding why specific recall decisions are taken. As stated earlier, since most studies in the 
recall literature investigate post-recall elements (e.g., financial performance), our study adds to 
the handful of studies (e.g., Eilert et al. 2017) that focus on elements associated with the pre-
recall phase (i.e., recall decision-making). The study highlights the complexities involved in 
recall decisions due to a channel beyond typical marketing and financial indicators. Importantly, 
given that many executives already consider regulatory oversight as one of the powerful factors 
that impact business (KPMG 2015), this study should encourage other researchers to explore the 
role of politics in several other marketing contexts. This study also contributes to the research 
stream within the political science literature that focuses on the returns to lobbying influence.  
From the automotive industry perspective, our research furthers understanding of the 
industry’s lobbying effect. We explore an instrument used by the firms to manage their 
regulatory environment. As stated earlier, findings do not suggest that firms should spend more 
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or less money on lobbying to reduce recalls. However, managers should also be aware of the 
potential consumer welfare losses ascribed to decision-making distortion. Not initiating a recall 
could lead to short-term benefits (e.g., avoiding recall costs), but it could create long-term costs 
in terms of reputational damage and consumer lawsuits for the firm. Most importantly, delaying 
or refusing to undertake necessary recall actions could lead to more personnel harm (e.g., 
accidents, injuries, or deaths) for the consumers. 
Managers should recognize the effect of lobbying as a barrier to equity in the regulatory 
environment. A preferential treatment due to lobbying hinders the rightful voice of other 
stakeholders, such as common citizens who are calling for a recall, in the decision process. Such 
preferential treatment could also motivate smaller non-lobbying firms to engage in lobbying 
practices and prompt them to move their limited resources away from activities such as research 
and innovation. As discussed in the conceptual framework, one of the positives of firms’ 
lobbying channel is to share information with policymakers and regulators regarding its stand. 
Therefore, our study emphasizes on taking a balanced approach to its lobbying presence while 
ensuring that such presence does not lead to any bias in the decision-making process, if any. 
Indeed, future research may identify and measure the role of other less visible channels in 
the recall context. Future research may also address some of our study limitations. Notably, we 
do not observe individual firms’ indirect lobbying efforts. Industrial organizations may lobby on 
firms’ behalf but generally do not disclose the source of their funding. Collecting information on 
indirect lobbying spending remains challenging; we acknowledge that we may have 
underestimated some firms’ actual lobbying intensity. Any method or data set that might provide 
such information would be useful. We also do not observe make-level lobbying expenditures. 
Changes in US lobbying data policies in this regard could open the door to many additional 
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research efforts. It is critical for researchers, policymakers, and consumers to understand the 
regulatory implications and determinants of product recalls. Further research could help establish 
an even more comprehensive understanding of how political mechanisms interact with firms’ 
marketing and financial objectives during a product-harm crisis. 
Currently, the focus of the study is limited to the automotive industry. These results could 
be extended to the pharmaceutical context as well. The automotive industry and the 
pharmaceutical industry carry certain similar institutional features regarding lobbying and recall 
dimensions. For example, pharmaceutical companies also actively engage in lobbying activities. 
In 2018, the pharmaceutical companies (including Pfizer and Amgen) spent about $27.5 million 
on lobbying activities amid pressure to lower drug prices21. Such lobbying presence could allow 
pharmaceutical companies to obtain political influence and get special treatment during 
regulatory processes such as faster product approval by the agency (Mundy 2009)22. Such 
preferential regulatory treatment is similar to what we have discussed in the automobile industry 
context. Similarly, both industries also carry few similar institutional features regarding recall 
process. Like the NHTSA process, the FDA has discretion along the supervisory process (e.g., 
determining the severity, the decision to initiate a recall). Regulatory agencies’ deliberations are 
also confidential by nature. Due to such discretion, firms could potentially exert influence on the 
regulatory agency to extract undue benefits. Hence, this empirical context could be studied on 
the pharmaceutical industry in future research. 
  
                                                      
21 See https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/23/health/phrma-lobbying-costs-bn/index.html, accessed July 2021. 
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Table 2.1: Examples of Lobbying Influences across Industries 
 
Industry Context Source 
Pharmaceutical 
To avoid legislative proposals to curb rising prescription 
prices, drug makers spent up to $2.3 billion lobbying over a 
decade. During the debate, big pharmaceutical companies 




In mergers, lobbying before deal announcements is associated 
with favorable review outcomes. In 2016, Bayer AG 
announced a deal to buy Monsanto for a mere $66 billion. 
Bayer then started lobbying on various issues related to this 





With their lobbying power, Lockheed Martin and Boeing (in 
the joint venture ULA) maintain a monopoly over military 
launch contracts. In 2014, SpaceX sued the Air Force, in order 




Tesla invested in lobbying to open new retail stores in New 
Jersey. Finally, a 2015 law allowed Tesla to operate four 






Table 2.2: Overview of Recall Literature 
 







Peltzman (1985) Firm value 
Product recalls affect shareholders’ wealth 
negatively. Such costs are higher than the costs of 
the recall itself. 
Dawar and 
Pillutla (2000) Brand equity 
Consumers interpret firms’ responses to recalls using 
their prior expectations. Existing consumers and 
potential future consumers expect different 
assurances from the recalling firm. 
Freedman et al. 
(2012) Sales 
For firms with recalls, unit sales of the types of toys 
involved in the recall fall relative to sales of toys in 
other categories. No evidence of within-
manufacturer spillover to dissimilar toys. 
Haunschild and 
Rhee (2004) Learning 
Learning takes place within firms due to recalls. 
Greater learning takes place for firms that recall 
voluntarily rather than mandatorily. 





The impact of CSR practices on a firm’s financial 
value indicate that U.S. investors punished non-CSR 
firms during a recall, but U.K. investors rewarded 









Supply of used Volkswagen diesel vehicles increased 
after the emission scandal. The positive supply-side 
effects increase with the probability of manipulation. 
Marketing 
instrument 








Post-recall advertisements and price changes affect 
the product’s brand share and category purchase, 
moderated by the extent of negative publicity 
surrounding the recall and the brand’s public 
acknowledgement of it. 




When recalls are associated with greater media 
attention and severe consequences, consumers’ 
responses are more negative. Parent brand 
advertising and sub-brand advertising effectiveness 




types of firm-level 
decisions) 
Chen, Ganesan, 
and Liu (2009) Recall strategy  
A comparison of the impact of proactive and passive 
recall strategies shows that the proactive strategy has 
a stronger negative effect on firm value. 
Liu, Liu, and Luo 
(2016) Recall remedy 
Companies are more likely to provide full remedy 
for more severe product hazards. The CEO’s 
personal interests interfere with remedy decisions; 
full remedy is less likely when the CEO receives 
greater cash compensation. 
Eilert et al. (2017) Recall timing 
Authors find that markets punish recall delays. 
Severity increases time to recall, but the relationship 
is weaker when the brand has a strong reputation for 
reliability and has experienced severe recalls in past. 
This study Political influence 
Corporate lobbying influences the recall behavior of 
the firm and the regulator such that as lobbing 
expenditures increase firms initiate fewer voluntary 




Table 2.3: Definition of Variables 
 
Variable Operationalization (measured quarterly at the firm level) Data Sources 
Voluntary recalls Number of recalls initiated by the firm NHTSA 
Mandatory recalls Number of recalls initiated by the regulator NHTSA 
Lobbying amount Spending by firms in lobbying activities USA Senate 
Complaints Number of complaints associated with firm’s vehicles NHTSA 
Deaths Number of deaths associated with firm’s vehicles NHTSA 
States Number of states where consumer complaints were registered NHTSA 
Contributions Contributions made by individuals in a given county FEC 
Sales Accumulative sales of the firm’s vehicles Automotive News 
Liabilities_std Liabilities / Sales Compustat 
Capex_std CAPEX / Sales Compustat 
Agency costs 
(Free Cash Flow/Total Assets) × Growth indicator, where Growth 
indicator = 1 when Tobin’s q < 1 
Compustat 




Table 2.4: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Panel A - Descriptive Statistics Panel B - Correlation Table 
 Variables Min Max Median Mean Stdev 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Lobbying amount 0 7.86 .25 .67 .91 1           
2 Voluntary recalls 0 15 1 1.1 1.59 0.29 1          
3 Mandatory recalls 0 5 0 0.16 .49 0.21 0.24 1         
4 Complaints 0 4078 176 437.42 585.43 0.78 0.49 0.29 1        
5 Deaths 0 19 0 .47 1.77 0.34 0.39 0.22 0.56 1       
6 Rating 1.7 5 2.65 2.90 .9 -0.23 -0.22 -0.13 -0.23 -0.06 1      
7 Sales 0 .83 .08 .15 .17 0.76 0.2 0.25 0.72 0.24 -0.25 1     
8 States 6 57 43.5 38.81 14.4 0.57 0.34 0.22 0.62 0.21 -0.6 0.68 1    
9 Liabilities_std 0 110.97 1 3.15 13.57 -0.11 -0.1 -0.05 -0.11 -0.04 0.34 -0.14 -0.27 1   
10 Capex_std 0 2143.8 .06 27.05 208.16 -0.09 -0.05 -0.04 -0.1 -0.01 0.29 -0.11 -0.21 0.32 1  
11 Agency costs -1.51 .14 .05 .03 .15 0.09 0.1 0.05 0.11 0.02 -0.34 0.14 0.37 -0.11 -0.04 1 
Notes: Liabilities_std and Capex_std refer to the ratios of the firm’s liabilities and CAPEX to its sales. Lobbying amount is in millions of USDs. Sales is 





Table 2.5: Two Stage Least Squares Regression Results 
 
IV 2SLS Model Panel 1 - Voluntary Recall Panel 2 - Mandatory Recall 
 First-stage Second-stage First-stage Second-stage 
 Estimate Std. error Estimate Std. error Estimate Std. error Estimate Std. error 
Intercept .243 (.625) 2.574* (1.293) .268 (.619) .245 (.555) 
Contribution_hq -.001 (.003)   -.001 (.003)   
Contribution_plant -.017** (.005)   -.017** (.005)   
Lobbying   -2.398** (.780)   -.644* (.292) 
Complaints .00001 (.0001) .002 (.001) 3.9X10-6 (.0001) .0005** (.0002) 
Deaths -.007 (.015) .072** (.025) -.007 (.015) .006 (.009) 
States .003 (.013) .018 (.031) .662* (.322) .009 (.010) 
Rating -.107 (.142) -0.895 (.600) .003 (.013) -.157 (.208) 
Liabilities_std .0004 (.002) .001 (.002)     
Capex_std -.00003 (.0001) -.0002 (.0001)     
Agency costs .076 (.160) -.113 (.255)     
Sales .669* (.326) -.376 (3.757)     
Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 504 504 504 504 
R2 .79 .43 .79 .16 
F-statistic 51.95*** (df = 34; 469) -  57.29*** (df = 31; 472) - 
Notes: Lobbying amount is the dependent variable in the first-stage equation. Lobbying amount is in millions of USD. Contribution_hq and 
Contribution_plant are instrumental variables and represent aggregated individual contributions at the firm’s headquarters and plant locations, 
respectively. We cluster second-stage errors at the firm level, and all standard errors appear in parenthesis. 




Table 2.6: Simultaneous Equation System Results 
 
 Panel 1 - Correlating Errors Panel 2 - Incorporating Beliefs 
 Voluntary Recall Mandatory Recall Voluntary Recall Mandatory Recall 
Constant 2.212 (1.191) -.050 (.457) 2.20 (1.351) .598 (.884) 
Lobbying -2.637*** (.716) -.668* (.267) -3.468* (1.455) -1.215* (.559) 
Complaints .002* (.001) .0006*** (.0001) .002* (.001) .0009** (.0003) 
Deaths .066 (.037) .0084 (.009) .096* (.047) .032 (.025) 
States .023 (.026) .014 (.008) .0361 (.039) .0181 (.011) 
Rating -.827 (.553) -.121 (.196) -.872 (.717) -.299 (.337) 
Liabilities_std .002 (.002)   .002 (.002)   
Capex_std -.0003* (.0001)   -.0002 (.0001)   
Agency costs -.014 (.251)   -.015 (.162)   
Sales .591 (3.34)   .989 (4.033)   
Mand_unique     -2.043 (1.664)   
Vol_unique       -.348 (.193) 
Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 504 504 504 504 
Notes: Lobbying amount is in millions of USD. Mand_unique and Vol_unique represent the number of 
unique mandatory and voluntary recalls, respectively. Heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent 
standard errors are in parenthesis. 




Table 2.7: Non-linear Estimates 
 
Recall equation Voluntary recall Mandatory recall 
Lobbying -1.323*** (.250) -1.55*** (.315) 
Complaints .001 (.0004) .001 (.0004) 
Deaths -.030 (.028) -.051 (.035) 
States .038 (.030) .031 (.030) 
Rating -.766* (.361) -.014 (.471) 
Sales .008 (1.894)   
Liabilities_std -.016*** (.002)   
Capex_std .0001 (.0001)   
Agency_costs -.267 (.456)   
Fixed effects Yes Yes 
Endogenous variable equation     
Contribution_hq -.0002 (.003) -.0008 (.002) 
Contribution_plant -.017*** (.003) -.017*** (.003) 
Complaints 8.1X10-6 (.0003) -.00001 (.0003) 
Deaths -.007 (.018) -.010 (.023) 
States .003 (.005) .005 (.008) 
Rating -.107 (.211) -.191 (.148) 
Sales .667 (.995)   
Liabilities_std .0004 (.0004)   
Capex_std -.00003 (.00003)   
Agency_costs .076 (.089)   
Fixed effects Yes Yes 
Notes: Lobbying amount is in millions of USDs. Number of voluntary and mandatory recalls are 
dependent variables. Fixed effects include firm, year, and quarter level effects. Errors are clustered at 
the firm level and shown in parenthesis. 





Table 2.8: Robustness Assessment 
 
 Panel 1 - Log transformation Panel 2 – Campaign contribution 
 Voluntary Recall Mandatory Recall Voluntary Recall Mandatory Recall 
Intercept 1.014 (.563) .129 (.321) 2.489* (1.244) .223 (.530) 
Lobbying -.785*** (.145) -.407** (.132) -2.025*** (.298) -.583** (.183) 
Complaints .0004 (.0003) .0002* (.0001) .002 (.001) .0005** (.0001) 
Deaths -.011 (.017) -.009 (.006) .075*** (.015) .006 (.010) 
States .014 (.013) .006 (.007) .016 (.030) .009 (.010) 
Rating -.381* (.182) -.087 (.123) -.848 (.602) -.146 (.194) 
Liabilities_std -.001 (.001)   .001 (.002)   
Capex_std -.0001 (.000)   -.0002 (.0001)   
Agency costs -.08 (.099)   -.162 (.194)   
Sales -.113 (1.101)   -.547 (3.187)   
Campaign     .001 (.001) .0001 (.0002) 
Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 504 504 504 504 
Notes: Results are from the second stage of 2SLS regressions. Lobbying amount is in millions of USD. In panel 
1, dependent variable is Log (number of recalls + 1). Panel 2 includes firm’s campaign contributions as an 
additional covariate. We cluster errors at the firm level, and these errors appear in parenthesis. 
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Notes: Panel A shows the frequency distribution of voluntary recalls (quarterly observation per firm) in 
the data. Panel B represents the frequency distribution of mandatory recalls (quarterly observation per 
firm) in the data. Panel C shows variation in the quarterly lobbying expenditures (million USD) variable 
(aggregated across firms) for our nine-year study period. Panel D indicates variation in the total number 
of voluntary recalls (aggregated across firms) at the quarter level for the nine-year study period. 
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CHAPTER 3: PRODUCT RECALL AND STRATEGIC INTERACTIONS BETWEEN 
FIRM AND REGULATOR: A DISCRETE GAME MODEL 
Introduction 
Product recalls are inevitable events across many industries, such as automobiles, 
medical equipment, and consumer products. Examples of some of the biggest recalls include 
Johnson & Johnson’s Tylenol recall, Volkswagen Emissions recall, and Pfizer’s Bextra recall. 
The number of product recalls has been increasing over the past two decades and is likely to rise 
in the future (Borah and Tellis 2016). Notably, recalls are so pervasive in the automobile 
industry that all major firms encounter recalls frequently. In 2016, vehicle recalls affected 50.5 
million vehicles and cost firms almost $22.1 billion (Jibrell 2018). Due to their economic 
significance, product recall events are of considerable interest to academics, practitioners, and 
policymakers (Cleeren, Dekimpe, and Heerde 2017). Extant empirical research, however, has 
primarily focused on the impact of recalls on the firm’s financial and non-financial performance 
(e.g., Jarrell and Peltzman 1985; Thirumalai and Sinha 2011); it is mostly silent on the 
automaker’s strategic decision-making to initiate a recall. For example, underlying mechanisms 
(e.g., complaints negativity) determine the tradeoff associated with every recall decision 
(recall/no recall) a firm may take after receiving consumer complaints. However, systematic 
empirical research of these mechanisms has received scant attention in the recall literature. In 
particular, the tradeoff would decide whether firms should opt for a voluntary recall (which firm 
initiates) or a mandatory recall (which the regulator initiates). This decision is not 
straightforward because every decision may lead to both positive and negative outcomes. 
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On the one hand, a voluntary recall would indicate a proactive action by the firm. It 
would enable consumers to take necessary steps to prevent further potential harmful exposure to 
defective products. Literature finds that voluntary recalls allow stakeholders to retain a positive 
impression of the firm (Souiden and Pons 2009). Failing to act quickly could also lead to a 
higher number of injuries/deaths in the future. On the other hand, substantial recall costs (e.g., 
defect repair and replacement, loss of revenue) may prompt firms to avoid a voluntary recall. A 
hasty recall might lend credibility to an unsubstantiated defect claim. Alternatively, if the firm 
decides to take no action, the regulatory agency National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(NHTSA) may step in and recommend a recall if required. The regulator, which is also 
authorized to initiate a recall (defined as a mandatory recall) if the firm does not take any action, 
brings additional complexity to the tradeoff in a firm’s decision-making process. On the one 
hand, the absence of any voluntary recall action could lead to a defect investigation and a 
mandatory recall by the regulator if the regulator’s analysis also finds a defect. A mandatory 
recall may lead to potentially more significant economic and reputation damage, such as 
penalties and potential lawsuits for firms (relative to the voluntary recall). On the other hand, 
NHTSA’s investigation may find products to be safe and thus require no recall actions. Such 
possible outcomes would prompt firms to incorporate a belief of the regulator’s expected action 
in its decision. Figure 3.1 depicts this decision-making process. In other terms, the firm’s 
equilibrium choice would be conditional on its belief of NHTSA’s expected decision. Such 
dependence would create a strategic interaction between the regulator and the firm’s recall 
decision-making. 
NHTSA’s decision-making process also involves complications. The regulatory agency 
would like to keep consumers safe and recommend a mandatory recall if required. However, 
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before any recall recommendation, NHTSA needs to complete a thorough defect analysis, which 
is costly and requires resources. Resource constraints affect public agencies’ functional 
capabilities (Kedia and Rajgopal 2011). Limited resources and budget constraints may also 
influence NHTSA’s actions. An audit by the Office of Inspector General (2015) reveals that the 
agency ignores 90% of consumer complaints to prioritize specific incident types. During a 2015 
interview, Mark Rosekind (former NHTSA Administrator) admitted that the agency only had 
seven to nine people to look through 77,000 safety complaints (Consumer Reports 2015). Thus, 
resource constraints may prevent NHTSA from investigating vehicle defects and drive the 
regulator to rely on a firm’s voluntary actions. Therefore, the regulator’s decision-making would 
be a function of the firm’s expected decision. Such strategic interaction between a firm and its 
supervising agency is of substantial importance and needs comprehensive scrutiny. 
Considering these arguments, one could infer that decision to initiate a recall is not a 
straightforward process. Consumers’ defect complaints may prompt entities (firm and the 
regulator) to go through this decision-making process and choose the best possible option (i.e., 
maximizing their corresponding utility). Lack of insights on this decision-making process raises 
relevant policy-oriented questions: Therefore, we research the following questions: Does the 
presence of a regulatory agency affect a firm’s recall decisions? Does the firm’s expected 
voluntary action affect the regulatory agency’s possible decision? Which other key determinants 
(e.g., defect and product-level characteristics) could also affect these recall decisions? We 
develop a discrete game model that we calibrate with automotive recalls and consumer 
complaints data set over 14 years (2003–2016) to investigate these questions. We also account 
for the potential correlation in recall decisions by allowing for common information in the model 
created through information exchange. Players (automakers and the regulator) may communicate 
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with each other and provide relevant information (e.g., complaints analysis, vehicle test results). 
We estimate each entity’s choice of recall strategy as a discrete game of incomplete information, 
thus capturing the strategic interaction and its impact on recall decisions. 
Related Literature 
Product Recalls  
Marketing studies of product recalls span several areas. Some studies focus on tangible 
performance aspects, revealing that recalls negatively affect a firm’s value and performance 
indicators, such as sales and profits (e.g., Chu, Lin, and Prather 2005; Salin and Hooker 2001). 
Another set of studies explores strategic aspects, such as the effectiveness of advertising and 
other marketing mix variables following a recall (e.g., Van Heerde, Helsen, and Dekimpe 2007; 
Zhao, Zhao, and Helsen 2011). For example, in comparing proactive and passive recall response 
strategies, Chen, Ganesan, and Liu (2009) determine that the stock market responds negatively if 
a firm initiates a recall before receiving any reports of injuries. Studies also investigate intangible 
outcomes (e.g., loyalty, image, reputation) of a product recall. Cleeren, Dekimpe, and Helsen 
(2008) argue that brand advertising can counter the adverse effects of a recall and enhance 
consumers’ first post-recall purchase decisions. According to Souiden and Pons (2009), if 
manufacturers contest recalls, it negatively affects their image and consumer loyalty. Product 
recalls help firms learn, though, and a greater recall magnitude can diminish the number of future 
recalls or and injuries (Haunschild and Rhee 2004). 
Secondary markets could also face adverse outcomes due to product recalls. Hartman 
(1987) finds that General Motors’ safety recalls diminished the resale value of its recalled 
products but did not affect the value of other GM products. Ater and Yosef (2018) and 
Strittmatter and Lechner (2020) study the supply-side implications of recalls in secondary 
markets, using the Volkswagen emission scandal. Some studies (e.g., Bala et al. 2017; Cleeren et 
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al. 2013; Marsh et al. 2004) find spillover effects on products produced by the same 
manufacturer, competitors in the category, and the industry. Similarly, Borah and Tellis (2016) 
observe that negative online chatter about a recalled car model increases negative chatter for 
others with the same brand. 
We contribute to this literature on the following fronts. Extant recall literature has 
primarily focused on the post-recall elements (e.g., consequences of recall on financial 
performance and marketing mix elements). In contrast, our research focuses on the pre-recall 
phase (decision to initiate a recall). Firm’s strategic decision-making before starting a recall is 
crucially important, and only a few studies have looked into it (Colak and Bray 2016; Eilert et al. 
2017). Eilert et al. (2017), with a reduced model approach, focus on the timing of product recalls 
and its effect on stock markets. Authors find that problem severity increases time to recall, and 
brand characteristics moderate this relationship. A working paper by Colak and Bray (2016), 
who study why do automotive firms initiate recalls, displays resemblance to our study. We note 
that few dimensions differentiate our study. The first dimension is a key institutional feature. We 
distinguish between original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and non-OEM parts recall. This 
differentiation is extremely important because it highlights the recall’s key decision-maker, who 
is the primary player in the study. Each third-party–supplied part (i.e., non-OEM group) could be 
present in several cars makes, so a defect in a non-OEM part is likely to trigger recalls for 
multiple firms. One such example is Takata airbag recall, which affected 19 different 
automakers.23 Non-OEM part recall creates an indirect dependency among multiple firms. In 
such cases, recall decision-making takes place outside the firm, therefore examining the decision 
choice of such recalls with two players discrete game might not reflect a correct estimation 
                                                      
23 See https://www.consumerreports.org/car-recalls-defects/takata-airbag-recall-everything-you-need-to-know/, 
accessed July 2020. 
 
 70 
approach. Between 2003-2016, 66% of recalls were non-OEM recalls, so any assumption 
regarding considering both OEM and non-OEM recalls similar is very strong. Our study 
acknowledges this key feature and aims to address this co-dependency issue accordingly.24 
Second, we consider the possibility that automakers and the regulator might exchange relevant 
information, which could affect recall decisions, with each other. This common information 
would be known to both players but not observed by the researcher. Such information, when not 
considered, may bias the estimates. The model also incorporates researcher uncertainty arising 
from make-level common information. This feature allows for potential correlation among 
players’ recall decisions by incorporating unobserved common factors that could affect both 
automakers and the regulator’s recall decisions. We rely on various institutional features to 
identify the interaction parameters. Table 3.1 presents a brief overview of the previous research 
on product recalls. It also highlights that the topic of a firm’s strategic decision-making during 
product harm-crisis remains largely unexplored. 
(Please see Table 3.1) 
Discrete Games 
Literature has studied a wide range of settings (e.g., pricing formats, firm’s entry, product 
quality, and store format) with the discrete game framework. Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) were 
the first to represent the econometric analysis of such discrete games and model the relationship 
between the number of firms in a market, market size, and competition with a simultaneous-
move game with a linear system of endogenous variables. Berry (1992), another early paper on 
firm entry, analyzed entry of airlines into specific city-pair markets. Other discrete game studies 
such as Mazzeo (2002), Seim (2006), Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), Ellickson and Misra 
                                                      
24 We intend to build on this and consider a three-player model study to address co-dependency issue. 
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(2008), Bajari et al. (2010) tackle a wide range of issues. For example, Mazzeo (2002) 
investigates the relationship between prices and market structure in the motel industry, shedding 
light on why the number of firms in a market affects entry threshold. Ellickson and Misra (2008) 
focus on pricing as the primary decision variable in the context of discrete games. With 
supermarkets data, the authors investigate the choice of pricing strategy (EDLP vs. HiLo) under 
a static discrete game setting. Zhu et al. (2009) examine the store presence and format decisions 
of Wal-Mart, Kmart, and Target in local markets as a function of competitors’ decisions and 
market characteristics. Bajari et al. (2010) apply a discrete game setting to investigate the factors 
that govern the assignment of stock recommendations by equity analysts. Aguirregabiria and Ho 
(2012) study the role of demand, costs, and strategic factors to the adoption of hub-and-spoke 
networks in the US airline industry. Vitorino (2012) examines a strategic model of entry that 
allows for positive and negative spillovers among firms. We seek to build on this discrete game 
foundation by studying the effect of strategic interaction in the context of product-harm crises. 
Theoretical Framework 
This study consists of two players, automaker25 and the regulator (NHTSA) and models 
the behavior displayed by these two players under a discrete game setting. Game theory models 
investigate a broad range of economic problems (e.g., entry decision, pricing format, store 
location). However, the estimation could be involved. The computational burden of estimating a 
structural model is one big hurdle in the estimation. For example, nested fixed-point algorithm 
(Rust 1987) used for estimating games, is computationally demanding because it repeatedly 
takes a guess for structural parameters and then solves the corresponding endogenous economic 
variables. Furthermore, the presence of many equilibrium points can exacerbate this problem, as 
                                                      
25 We consider MAKE (e.g., Acura, Honda, Lexus) as the decision maker. Therefore, we use the term “automaker”.  
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a researcher should find all of the equilibria for each vector of parameters to calculate the 
corresponding likelihood value. Such computational burden of implementing the estimation 
algorithm has led to the development of computationally light estimators.  
Estimator 
The two-step estimators (e.g., Bajari et al. 2010) can help us stay clear from the 
computational burden. The first step of the two-step estimator uses a flexible method to estimate 
the reduced form to the game. The reduced form is an econometric model of how an agent’s 
choice depends on exogenous or predetermined variables. The second step recovers the model’s 
structural parameters; how payoffs depend on actions and control variables. This approach 
allows us to build the game’s specification in the data rather than on our prior beliefs. 
Additionally, two-step estimators do not require researchers to solve the fixed-point problem 
when evaluating the corresponding likelihood function (Bajari et al. 2010). This can help avoid 
multiple equilibria. Two-step estimators assume that there is only one equilibrium in the data 
(e.g., Aguirregabiria and Mira 2007, Bajari et al. 2010). These estimators rely on the data for the 
payoffs that best explain the observed behavior. It assumes that the observed data originates from 
the plays of a game and covariates that influence payoffs. We can then specify payoffs as a 
parametric or non-parametric function of other players’ actions and payoff relevant covariates. 
Formulation of a discrete game requires specifying each player’s information set, 
meaning what a player can observe about other players. There are two approaches in reference to 
the players’ information sets: complete information (Bresnahan and Reiss 1991) and incomplete 
information (Ellickson and Misra 2011). The information structure is an essential guide for 
econometric analysis. Under the complete information setting, the researcher assumes that every 
player can observe everything about others’ payoffs. This enables us to infer that players do not 
face any uncertainty regarding the payoffs of their rivals. In contrast, under incomplete 
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information setting, the researcher assumes that the players do not observe everything about 
others’ payoffs, which leads to uncertainty about other players’ actions. Such unobservables 
could be incorporated as private information in the discrete game framework. 
We consider incomplete information as a reasonable approach for our setting, as players 
may not have full information about other players’ payoffs. Ellickson and Misra (2012) state that 
the incomplete information assumption also enables breaking a system of equations into a 
collection of single-agent problems in which selection can be addressed directly. Players form 
expectations about others’ actions and thus decide their own actions to maximize the payoffs. 
This private information is assumed independent across players; therefore, we do not need to 
estimate the joint probability of actions of all players. Estimating the choice probability for each 
player one at a time is sufficient to provide consistent estimates in the second stage. We model 
private information in the form of ε, an additive separable component of payoffs, which is 
unobserved to the researcher. Player f has information about its payoff and εfmt , however, only 
knows the distribution of other players εrmt. Every player can now calculate its payoff after 
including expectation of its rivals’ actions and then choose the option with the maximum payoff. 
Yfmt = 1[βfmtXfmt + γ1ρ�rmt + εfmt ≥ 0]                     Yrmt = 1[βrmtXrmt + γ2ρ�fmt + εrmt ≥ 0]  
Where, f represents the automaker and r represents the regulator. X represent the 
covariates influencing the player’s payoffs and β are corresponding parameters. Y is an indicator 
representing the choice of the player (automaker or regulator) at time t. Y equal to one indicates a 
recall decision by the player. These choices depend on the payoff function written within the 
parenthesis. Value of the payoff function depends on various exogenous covariates X. Most 
importantly, each equation contains other player’s choice probability. The probability ρ�−f is 
player f’s beliefs about other players’ action. 
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The two-step approach – based on Hotz and Miller (1993) – captures the strategic 
interplay in our study. The first-stage estimates of the predicted choice probability enable us to 
estimate the equilibrium choice beliefs/probabilities, conditional on the covariates. The second 
step involves estimating the random utility model using these equilibrium beliefs about others’ 
behavior from the first step (Bajari et al. 2010).  
Data Description  
The empirical context for this study is the U.S. passenger car market. As a regulated 
industry, the automobile industry has well-maintained data records, which we use for our 
empirical setting. Most importantly, the regulator’s supervision over the recall process provides 
the right setting for our research questions. This industry has a substantial recall frequency, 
which provides a good number of observations for analysis. Furthermore, this industry represents 
considerable economic significance as it contributes almost 3% of the U.S. GDP. No other 
manufacturing sector generates as many jobs.26 
We use multiple datasets for our analysis. The first dataset contains information 
regarding automotive firms’ recalls. This dataset important details of each recall such as name of 
the recalled make and date of the recall. Data also indicates whether it was a voluntary recall or 
mandatory recall depending on who initiated the recall. The second dataset includes details on 
consumer complaints regarding their vehicle defects. Following sections describe these datasets 
in detail. We refer to Compustat for different financial indicators (sales, liability, capex). 
Automotive News and Ward’s Automotive provide firms’ dealers network and firms’ sales 
information, respectively. 
                                                      
26 See http://www.americanautocouncil.org/us-economic-contributions, accessed July 2020. 
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We source consumer complaints, and vehicle recalls data from the NHTSA website.27 
The recall data set contains details of passenger vehicle recalls with key variables such as the 
name of the firm, make, brief description of the vehicle defect, and initiator of the recall. This 
dataset provides our dependent variable (number of voluntary and mandatory recalls). We 
consider a balanced panel of 14-year data (2003– 2016). It covers a total of 23 makes (e.g., 
Acura, Audi, BMW, Buick, Cadillac, Chevrolet) and corresponding parent firms (BMW, 
Daimler, Ford, General, Honda, Hyundai, Kia, Mazda, Mitsubishi, Nissan, Porsche, Subaru, 
Toyota, Volkswagen, and Volvo). Figure 3.2 highlights the variation in the number of voluntary 
and mandatory recalls over different quarters (values aggregated over all makes). Figure 3.3 
highlights the number of voluntary and mandatory recalls or each make aggregated over the 
entire period. 
(Please see Figure 3.2, Figure 3.3) 
Complaint dataset comprises of consumers’ complaints received by the NHTSA for 
vehicle defects. Relevant details in this dataset include the automobile firm’s name, make, 
model, model-year, and a brief description of the complaint. In our dataset, we observe 37 
consumer complaints28 (e.g., airbag, suspension, steering) and the corresponding group. We 
broadly categorize these complaints into OEM (Original equipment manufacturer) vs non-OEM 
group and then continue with the OEM group. Automobile industry experts (not associated with 
this study) were interviewed to help us with this categorization. The key idea behind this step is 
that a third party supplied part (non-OEM) could be present in several makes from different 
                                                      
27 See: https://www.nhtsa.gov/recalls#vehicle, accessed September 17, 2020  
28 These categories are: Air bags; Back over prevention; Child seat; Communications; Electrical system; Electronic 
stability control; Engine; Engine and engine cooling; Equipment; Equipment adaptive; Exterior lighting; Forward 
collision avoidance; Fuel system diesel; Fuel system gasoline; Fuel system; other; Hybrid propulsion system; 
Interior lighting; Latches/locks/ linkages; Other; Parking brake; Power train; Seat belts; Seats; Service brakes; 
Service brakes air; Service brakes electric; Service brakes hydraulic; Steering; Structure; Suspension; Tires; Traction 
control system; Trailer hitches; Vehicle speed control; Visibility; Visibility/wiper; Wheels. 
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firms. Thus, a defect in such third party vehicle part would trigger the possibility of recall over 
multiple firms, and create an indirect correlation among these firms. Focusing on the OEM 
recalls would allow us to avoid co-dependency of one firm’s recall with another firm’s recalls. 
We consider seven OEM complaint categories, each of which represent at least 2% of all OEM 
recalls (make-level) in our data set (electrical system, fuel system [gasoline], powertrain, engine 
[engine cooling], suspension, exterior lighting, and structure), and together these seven 
categories account for 96% of all OEM recalls (Table 3.2). 
We observe 891 recall decisions29 during this period for OEM categories. Table 3.3 
highlights the distribution of voluntary and mandatory recalls for chosen seven categories. 
General Motors faced the highest number of recalls30(132). Among defect categories, the highest 
number of voluntary recalls belonged to the “Fuel system (gasoline)” category (192). “Exterior 
lighting” defect category represented the highest ratio of mandatory recalls over total recalls 
(22.1%). In contrast, the lowest ratio (11.7%) belonged to the “Power train” defect category, 
where automakers seem to engage in more voluntary recalls. Chevrolet make received up to 
1,251 consumer complaints in one quarter for potential defects in its electrical system. The mean 
quarterly value of consumer complaints and death reports is 31 and .9 (make-component level). 
Furthermore, we refer to Ward’s automotive data for makes’ quarterly sales. Automotive news 
data provides dealership network information for each firm. 
(Please see Table 3.2, Table 3.3) 
                                                      
29 If firms start multiple recalls in a defect category in a given time period (quarter), we consider this as one recall 
decision. Recalls belonging to the same defect category are more likely to be correlated. 
30 We consider seven complaint categories for recalls, and explain this further in next section. 
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Determinants of Recall Decisions 
Beyond the strategic interaction effect, we note several payoff-relevant elements 
(complaint characteristics such as number of complaints, number of crashes, and geographical 
dispersion of complaints), which could also affect recall decisions of automakers and the 
regulator. The number of complaints and crashes can help determine how severe the issue is. 
Recall severity has been discussed extensively in the literature. For automobile recalls, studies 
find that severe recalls attract more negativity from stakeholders and impact sales (e.g., Hoffer, 
Pruitt and Reilly, 1988; Liu and Shankar, 2015). The number of crashes represents the economic 
and personal loss of society. Eilert et al. (2017) use information associated with the number of 
complaints and crashes for analysis. A higher number of complaints could indicate a widespread 
vehicle defect. Beyond just the sheer number of accumulated complaints, the severity of 
complaints would also play an important role as more crashes would draw automaker's attention 
and trigger a product-harm crisis.  
Figure 3.4 indicates the variation in number of consumers’ complaints over different 
quarters. In our data, we observe that, on average, one voluntary recall is associated with 
approximately 24 fewer complaints and .22 less number of crashes (Figure 3.5). Hence, broadly, 
one could argue that if motivators such as regulatory actions are prompting automakers to initiate 
more voluntary actions, it could possibly lead to a lower personal and economic loss to society. 
We also create a Geodispersion variable, which denotes how consumers’ complaints are 
geographically dispersed (denoted by the number of states). In data, we observe the geographical 
state of each complaint. We use this information to derive how many states did these injury 
reports belong to. More geographically dispersed complaints (e.g., reported in several different 
states) are likely to create more negative social buzz and attract more public attention, and affect 
automaker’s reputation. Geographically dispersed complaints are also likely to create more 
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dispersed personal injury/class action lawsuits, which is likely to be costlier for automakers than 
the scenario when all the lawsuits were filed in the same state. Managing multiple cases would 
require dealing with multiple state courts and thus could lead to more billable hours for 
automakers. 
Product features that could affect recall decisions could include whether the reported 
vehicle is a current year model. A recent vehicle model represents more revenue opportunities 
(also revenue loss) for the automaker. The impact on reputation may also be higher if a new 
vehicle model contains defects (Rupp 2001). Hence, an automaker might be more likely to take 
corrective action for the current year model. We create this variable by capturing the model-year 
value for the defective vehicles in the complaints dataset. Component specific characteristics, 
such as the complexity level of the vehicle component, which contains the potential defect, could 
also affect the recall decisions. For example, powertrain as a component is likely to be more 
complex than an external lighting component. Such complexity generally is expected to be 
associated with higher repair and maintenance costs if a recall is initiated. Complex components 
(e.g., engine) also tend to be more critical for the vehicle. Hence, firms may display different 
responses as per the component involved in defects. We refer to the NHTSA website to capture 
average complexity level of the recalled vehicle components. We also take into account the make 
reliability rating in the analysis. We obtain the reliability rating from consumer reports data. 
Consumer Reports - a nonprofit organization - collects survey information regarding consumers’ 
issues with a particular vehicle model and then aggregates this information into problem rates. 
Reliability is measured using a 5-point scale of problem rates. Higher scores reflect higher 
reliability for the models (Eilert et al. 2017). In line with prior research, we aggregate model 
level reliability information to the make-level.  
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The automaker’s resource capability of handing recalls could also affect their actions. An 
automaker, which is not well-equipped to handle a recall process, may be hesitant to initiate a 
recall. We incorporate this capability by incorporating automaker’s dealership information. A 
bigger dealership network would enable the automaker to handle the recall process, which 
includes repair and maintenance of vehicles, more effectively. Similarly, resource constraints 
could also play a role in the regulator’s decision-making. The process to determine whether a 
mandatory recall is required is costly as the regulator has to conduct a robust defect-analysis 
before recommending a mandatory recall action. Furthermore, the regulator already faces 
resource constraints, which have been discussed in government documents (Office of Inspector 
General 2015). Hence, the regulator’s resource constraint could play a role in its recall decision-
making. We consider regulator’s administrative expenses to indicate this constraint. Higher 
administrative expenses would indicate a lower level of financial resources available for the 
recall process. Such constraints could affect the number of complaints reviewed by the regulator 
to detect potential recalls (Office of Inspector General 2015), which could affect the number of 
mandatory recalls initiated by the regulator. Table 3.4 highlights payoff relevant covariates. 
Role of Information Exchange 
Common Information: Before taking any recall decision, the automaker and the regulator 
might communicate with each other and exchange relevant information (e.g., vehicle test results, 
complaints analysis). Such information, which is common in information sets of these two 
players, could potentially affect recall decisions. For example, both automaker and regulator 
might conduct their complaints tests. Let’s assume that the automaker’s analysis does not lead to 
a certain conclusion regarding recall decisions. After information exchange, the regulator might 
provide some new information (e.g., vehicle tests), which may reduce the automaker’s 
uncertainty regarding vehicle defects. Lower uncertainty could lead to a voluntary recall. This 
 
 80 
common information, created through information exchange and often not observed by the 
researcher, can affect recall decisions. Such unobserved information can lead to biases in 
strategic recall decisions if not considered in the model. 
This two-way information exchange may also affect the belief creation process. Every 
player’s payoff function includes belief (variable ρ�) about other player’s possible actions. 
Depending on how effective the information exchange is, a player’s belief might change; a 
better(worse) exchange could lead to a better(worse) belief creation. For example, if this process 
contains costs, it could hinder the information exchange process and make it less effective. This 
hindrance would not only affect the level of common information available with both automaker 
and the regulator but also affect the resulting beliefs of each player. 
The researcher may not observe such common information. We use an exogenous 
variable, the distance between the automaker’s headquarter and the regulator’s office, to 
incorporate the extent of this common information (and corresponding potential cost). 
Geographical distance as a proxy for the information exchange and the ease of monitoring 
between two entities has been used in several studies (e.g., Lerner 1995; Petersen and Rajan 
2002). Research shows that proximity facilitates access to information and monitoring (e.g., 
Giroud 2013). For example, banks located closer to their borrowers are more likely to lend to 
informationally difficult borrowers, which are borrowers without any financial records (Petersen 
and Rajan 2002). In lobbying literature, the distance between a firm’s headquarter and Capitol 
Hill has been used as an instrumental variable to indicate the firm’s corporate lobbying costs 
(Unsal, Hassan, and Zire 2016). Following this literature, we use the geographical distance, an 
exogenous variable, between an automaker’s headquarter and the regulator’s office to indicate 
the cost of information exchange and the extent of this common information between these two 
 
 81 
players. For example, a greater distance would indicate a higher cost of information exchange. A 
higher cost could adversely affect the information exchange process (shared common 
information), which may not help with decision-making uncertainty. We empirically examine 
whether such variation in common information through information exchange could play any 
significant role in recall decision-making process. 
(Please see Table 3.4, Figure 3.4, Figure 3.5) 
Empirical Implementation 
We model the decision process of two players, an automaker and the regulator (NHTSA), 
as a simultaneous move game. We begin this section with the model setup and a brief discussion 
of different aspects of observed data for the aforementioned model. Then, we describe payoff-
relevant variables and players’ utility functions. Then, we move to the identification section. 
Information Structure 
As discussed in section 3.1, we consider an incomplete information approach for our 
setting, as players may not have full information about other players’ payoffs. There are multiple 
factors which could affect the choice selection and may not be observable to other players. For 
example, sometimes, firms may recall products with minor defects, to signal consumers that it is 
paying attention to the quality of their products (Haunschild and Rhee 2004). Such information 
would not be observable to the external entities. Not knowing an actual cause of the potential 
defect could be another example. Similarly, NHTSA has severe budget constraints, making it 
difficult to focus on all complaints in a timely manner. In 2014, the agency only had seven to 
nine people to look through 77,000 safety complaints (Consumer Reports 2015). Such 
constraints could lead to the regulator prioritizing some specific types of complaints over other 
complaints as the regulator does not have sufficient resources to analyze all complaints and 
complete defect analysis in time for recommending required recalls. Such constraints and 
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subsequent prioritization is the regulatory agency’s private information, and outside automakers 
do not observe this. Given such incomplete information case, players form expectations about 
others’ actions and then choose their actions to maximize the payoffs. Private information is 
assumed to be independent across players; therefore, we do not need to estimate the joint 
probability of all players’ actions. Estimating the choice probability for each player one at a time 
is sufficient to provide consistent estimates in the second stage. 
Unit of Analysis 
Our unit of analysis is the combination of Make and Component. (e.g., Acura-
Suspension, Acura-Power Train, BMW-Suspension). Following recall literature (e.g., 
Haunschild and Rhee 2004), we focus on Make (e.g., Acura, Lexus) as the decision-making 
entity. In the automobile industry, each vehicle manufacturer typically offers multiple cars 
makes. For example, as a parent firm, Honda offers different makes (e.g., Honda, Acura). These 
makes (termed as automakers here) assume responsibility for decisions on the recall process 
rather than being managed by their parent brand (Haunschild and Rhee 2004). In addition, recall 
decisions could vary significantly depending on the vehicle component. Hence, this make-
component combination allows us to capture the heterogeneity in observed behavior. Players’ 
(automaker and the regulator) decision making is considered independent across different units 
(make-component). Quarter represents the unit for this analysis. 
Model Formulation 
Following previous research (e.g., Bajari et al. 2005; Ellickson and Misra 2008; Zhou et 
el. 2020), we use a two-step conditional choice probability estimator to obtain parameter 
vectors (β and γ). We begin by stating some key assumptions associated with the model before 
discussing the model. For example, ideally an automaker’s payoff should consist of both revenue 
and cost. However, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to observe information on revenue 
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and costs for each recall/no recall decision by each player (automakers or the regulator). 
Therefore, following previous research (e.g., Ellickson and Misra 2008; Zhou et el. 2020), we 
assume that observed recall decisions reflect player’s payoffs, which means that a player take the 
recall decision that results in the highest payoffs. A player (automaker or the regulator) does not 
observe the recall choices of other players, instead creates a rational expectation about other 
player’s choice. Unobserved factors (e.g., strategic motives to initiate/not initiate a recall) could 
also influence recall choices. We assume that these unobserved factors follow a known 
distribution (e.g., extreme value). Hence, the choice probability of recall decisions is computed 
by integrating over the unobserved error. 
An automaker f takes a decision for a unit m in each time period t = 1, 2, …T. As stated 
before, make-component combination (e.g., Acura-Suspension, Acura-Power Train) represents a 
unit for the analysis. Similarly, the regulator (NHTSA), indicated by r also takes decision for 
each unit separately. Every player chooses among two decisions: recall or no recall. For every 
unit m and time 𝑡𝑡, an automaker’s state vector is denoted sfmt. The state vector sfmt is observed 
by other players and the researcher. It includes different payoff-relevant covariates (e.g., 
complaint characteristics), which we assume to be exogenous. For each automaker 𝑓𝑓 and 
regulator, unobserved state variables are modeled as private information for each automaker. 
These unobserved state variables are εfmt and εrmtrepresent player-specific shocks to the payoffs 
associated with each choice. Unobserved state variables are drawn from a distribution that is 
known to the researcher and all the players. Due to private information assumption, simultaneous 
decision represents an incomplete information, with a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. 
Payoff specification for an automaker f in time t is as follows:  
Ufmt = 𝑓𝑓(sfmt, afmt, a−fmt) +  εfmt,                        (1) 
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where 𝑓𝑓 is a known and deterministic function of state variables and actions (automaker and the 
regulator) and error term εfmt represents the private information available to the automaker f for 
unit m in time t. sfmt represents the state variable vector, which corresponds to automaker f for 
unit m at time t. Each entity’s decision would only depend on its own private information and 
other player’s private information would not be a part of this. The following expression gives us 
a probability of an automaker choosing action k conditional on the state vector and private 
information: 
ρ(afmt = k ) =  ∫ 1 � 𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓(sfmt, εfmt) = k �g(ε)dεfmt,     (2) 
where 1 � 𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓(sfmt, εfmt) = k � is an indicator equal to 1 if player f chooses action k and 0 
otherwise at time t for unit m. These probabilities represent the expected action of a given player 
choosing a certain action from the perspective of other players. ρf  is defined as the set of these 
probabilities for an automaker f. As stated earlier, since the automaker does not observe 
regulator’s actions prior to choosing its own action, the automaker takes decision based on its 
expectation of regulator’s possible action. Hence, the expected payoff for a player f from 
choosing an action afmt at time t is then: 
U�fmt (afmt, sfmt, εfmt, ρf) =  ∑ f(sfmt, afmt, a−fmt) ρ−fmt +afmt εfmt,    (3) 
where ρ−fmt =  ∏ ρjmt�ajmt �sjmt)j≠f  .  
Given these expected payoffs, the optimal action for a player is: 
ψa,fmt = Pr � U�fmt (afmt, sfmt) + εfmt(afmt) > U�fmt (bfmt, sfmt) + εfmt(bfmt) ⩝ bfmt ≠ afmt�  
(4) 
With errors ε following a type1 extreme, the underlined Bayesian Nash equation would follow a 
system of logit equations. Payoffs are assumed to be a linear function of the state variables 




U�fmt (afmt = k, sfmt, εfmt, ρf) = β sfmt +  γ ρ−fmt + εfmt(k),    (5) 
where ρ−fmt represents the regulator’s choice probability of taking mandatory recall decision for 
unit m at time t. Other variables are defined as before. With this specification, the optimal choice 
probabilities for the automaker f: 
ψfmt(afmt = k|ρmt, sfmt, εfmt,β, γ) =
exp(β sfmt+γ ρ−fmt)
∑  k′ϵ {recall,   no recall} exp�β sfmt +γ ρ−fmt,k′�
   (6) 
Similar equation could be written for the regulator r for unit m at time t.  Using choice 
probabilities of both automaker and the regulator, likelihood can be constructed as:  
�  ∏  t  ∏  m   ∏  iϵ{f,r}  �ψimt(aimt = k|ρmt, simt, εimt,β, γ)�
δimt(k) �     (7) 
such that    ψmt =  ρmt   
We first obtain estimates of ρmt (choice probabilities that are implicitly included in 
equation 6). Using these probabilities and and state variables, equation 6 provides the beliefs 
ψmt of players (automaker and regulator) taking recall decisions. These ψmt are then used in the 
likelihood function. Second stage of the estimation involves maximization of this likelihood 
function to provide parameters β and γ. Using these parameters, we update players’ beliefs about 
other players’ recall probabilities and perform the maximum likelihood estimation with these 
updated beliefs. We update parameters and beliefs iteratively until we achieve convergence and 
consistent parameter estimates. Likelihood formulation includes a system of discrete choice 
equations that must satisfy a fixed-point constraint ρmt =  ψmt. We use bootstrap approach to 
obtain standard errors for the parameters. 
Identification 
We briefly discuss a set of assumptions that helps identify discrete games with 
incomplete information.  Identification requires that different values of the primitives generate 
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different choice probabilities; violation of this condition would not allow recovery of unique 
structural parameters. First, private information is assumed to be independently distributed 
across actions and players (Bajari et al. 2010). We also normalize the payoffs and only determine 
payoffs relative to the payoff under no recall decision (Vitorino 2012). Another important 
assumption is the exclusion restriction. Identification of the structural payoff parameters depends 
on the covariation between the explanatory variables and the revealed choice data (Ellickson and 
Misra 2012). In this model, we observe that the player’s beliefs and corresponding payoff are 
both a function of X variables, leading to collinearity and the identification issue. Therefore, we 
need covariates that will directly affect one player’s payoff but not the payoff of other players. 
Such unique covariates would help us identify parameters in the payoff function. For example, 
Zhu and Singh (2009) and Vitorino (2012) use variations in distances from the market to firms’ 
headquarters and the nearest distribution centers, as exclusion restrictions for model 
identification. Ellickson and Misra (2008) fulfill the exclusion restriction condition using private 
information, which influences firm’s own payoff, but would not influence other firms’ payoffs. 
In the current recall setting, the automaker’s dealership information and the regulator’s 
administrative expenses help with the exclusion restriction condition. The dealership network, 
which denotes the automaker’s potential capability of handling recalls, is specific to the 
automaker and only appears in the automaker’s payoff specification. Similarly, the regulator’s 
administrative expenses appear only in the regulator’s specification.  
Common Information Structure 
We enrich the current model by incorporating correlated decisions structure through the 
inclusion of make specific common information in the decision-making process (Orhun 2013).31 
                                                      
31 This analysis is currently in the process and has not been included in this draft. 
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Since the model considers the component level analysis, we observe seven make-
component combinations (e.g., Acura-electrical system, Acura-fuel system, Acura-powertrain, 
Acura-engine, Acura-suspension, Acura-lighting, and Acura-structure) for every automaker. 
Presence of a common factor (e.g., decision-making team) among these combinations could 
create correlation among these decisions. For example, for every automaker there could be a 
designated team of decision-makers, who take a recall/no recall decision for every complaint 
case. Presence of such common designated team could create the possibility of correlation 
among these seven decisions (e.g., Acura-powertrain, Acura-engine). For example, conditional 
on an automaker (e.g., Acura) deciding to initiate a recall for a potential defect case (e.g., Acura-
powertrain) not likely to be recalled based on observables, our expectations that the automaker 
also decides to initiate a recall for another potential defect (e.g., Acura-engine) is higher. 
Similarly, conditional on the automaker not deciding to initiate a recall for a potential defect case 
that is likely to be chosen based on observables, our expectations that the automaker decides to 
not initiate a recall for another potential defect is higher. Presence of any such correlation in 
decisions could bias the parameters if ignored. We define such common information at the make 
level k. This could be incorporated in the payoff as follows: 
Automaker:  Ufmt =  θ1X1 +  ξf + εfmt           
Regulator:    Urmt =  θ2X2 + ξf +  εrmt 
ξf represents the automaker f’s specific unobserved factor, which affects both automaker and 
regulator recall decisions. X1 and X2 consist of automaker and regulator specific payoff relevant 
variables, respectively. As previously discussed, private information ε is assumed independent 
across players and units. Hence, we then express the probability of observing a unit outcome am 
conditional on the common information ξf across makes: 
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Since the researcher does not observe the common information, the likelihood of an outcome is 
estimated by integrating out 𝜉𝜉𝑘𝑘. 








The scalar σ is the distributional parameter indicating the standard error of the make-specific 
common information 𝜉𝜉. Since, the integration over 𝜉𝜉 does not have a closed form, we use the 
numerical approach to approximate it. We take R draws of 𝜉𝜉 from N(0, σ2) to construct the 
numerical likelihood of a a recall decision. 







Given R = 400 draws of N(0,1) for unobserved common information, we can use these simulated 
probabilities of unit decisions to calculate the log-likelihood function. 
Text Analysis of Consumer Complaints 
We supplement this current set of analysis by examining consumers’ defect complaints 
through text analysis. In our dataset, we can observe the content of consumers’ complaints. To 
the best of my knowledge, no study in the automobile recall literature has examined consumer 
complaints to extract relevant insights regarding recall decisions. 
First, we underline the reasons to conduct complaints’ text analysis. Conditional on 
different covariates (e.g., complaints, crashes, product features, etc.), why would complaints’ 
text characteristics be important in the recall decisions? The underlying rationale for this 
question links back to the regulator’s resource constraints (previously discussed). For example, 
 
 89 
in 2014, the regulator received almost 77,000 complaints, but the regulator only had 7 to 9 
analysts to screen those complaints and decide whether complaints need further analysis 
(Consumer Reports 2015). Because these analysts screen thousands of complaints, the 
determination of whether complaints warrant further review (or ignored) is made within a matter 
of seconds (Office of Inspector General 2015). Since the decision to analyze complaints is taken 
within a matter of seconds, one could imagine that the way complaints are written could 
potentially impact whether these complaints are considered for further analysis. Therefore, we 
would like to know whether certain complaint characteristics (e.g., brevity of complaints) could 
influence the probability of complaints’ analysis (which would subsequently affect recall 
decisions)? A text analysis would provide some insights into these questions. 
Figure 3.6 presents a few examples of customer complaints about the Acura make and 
power train component. These complaints differ on various text dimensions (e.g., length, 
content). We use the natural language processing methods to explore the following dimensions in 
the text. First, we use the average number of words to consider a complaint's size. Length of the 
text can affect the text's content as the need to generate shorter content could encourage users to 
focus on the overall gist of their experience (Melumad et al. 2019). The length of the complaints’ 
text could also affect the probability of a complaint being considered for further analysis. If an 
analyst has to screen an overwhelming number of complaints in a very limited timeframe, the 
analyst is more likely to screen shorter complaints with fewer words. Hence, conditional on other 
factors (e.g., defect severity, number of complaints), does complaint size associate with a recall 
decision? We observe that the average number of words per complaint is marginally higher for 
voluntary recalls (49.43) than mandatory recalls (Figure 3.7, Panel A). In terms of variation, 
values for the average number of words per mandatory recall complaint display higher dispersion 
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than values for the average number of words per voluntary recall complaint (Figure 3.8, Panel A 
and B). 
We also explore complaints’ sentiment. We use a dictionary-based approach (Harvard IV 
dictionary) to calculate complaints’ sentiment. Sentiment originating from user-generated 
content can be used to predict mindset metrics such as satisfaction (Kübler, Colicev, and Pauwels 
2020). In this current setting, sentiment could be used to understand the type of text used to write 
complaints. If a complaint includes more technical description (e.g., low horsepower, engine, 
brake), the text sentiment is likely to be closer to neutral. However, if the complaint consists of 
more emotionally appealing words (e.g., “people are dying”, “vehicle is dangerous”), the 
sentiment is likely to be more negative. This analysis may help us understand whether analysts 
are likely to pay more attention to complaints with more technical components or with more 
emotional appeal. In this data, we observe that complaints associated with a mandatory recall 
express more negative sentiment than complaints associated with a voluntary recall (Figure 3.7, 
Panel B). Average negative sentiment values for mandatory recall complaints also display less 
clustering than voluntary recall complaints (Figure 3.8, Panel C and Panel D). 
We also consider the dimension of message consistency among consumer complaints.32 
Similarity/dissimilarity of messages in complaints could affect the probability of complaint being 
considered/ignored for further analysis. Let's assume an analyst observes ten vehicle complaints 
during a specific time period. Suppose most of these (or all) these complaints give consistent 
messages about the defect (e.g., engine heats up, engine is warm, engine temperature is very 
high). In that case, it may be easier for an analyst to process these complaints cognitively and 
spot the developing defect trend; this may increase the probability of these complaints being 
                                                      
32 This analysis is currently in the process and has not been included in this draft. 
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considered for further analysis (thus affecting the recall probability). However, if these 
complaints give inconsistent messages, the analyst may find it difficult to process these 
complaints (combined with time-constraint) and may not spot the developing defect trend. This 
may reduce the probability of these complaints being considered for further analysis, affecting 
the recall probability. This rationale is consistent with a finding in Anand and Sternthal (1990), 
who discuss that time available for message processing and the time required for that task affect 
message effectiveness. Hence, if an analyst has less time to process complaints, inconsistent 
messages provided by complaints may motivate the analyst to ignore these complaints. 
To define message consistency, we explore the underlined topics of complaints with the 
topic modeling approach. Topic modeling is an unsupervised machine learning technique, which 
could be used to identify patterns in the data (e.g., Berger et al. 2019). Topics are word 
distributions that commonly co-occur with a certain probability of appearing in a topic. Topic 
modeling could help understand the topics consumers write about and choose the words to 
express these topics (Netzer et al. 2019). 
(Please see Figure 3.7, Figure 3.8) 
Results and Discussion 
This study aims to provide insight into the recall decision-making process. Specifically, it 
investigates the strategic interplay between an automaker and the regulator during their decision-
making and how this interplay influences their choices. We employ a static discrete game 
approach, a framework frequently used in marketing and economics literature (e.g., Orhun 2013; 
Zhu et al. 2009) to model discrete decisions (e.g., whether to initiate a recall). We model our 
context as a simultaneous one-move game that consists of two players, the automaker and the 
regulator, making decision choices simultaneously. 
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Results show that players choose decisions suitable for the characteristics of the specific 
unit types (e.g., complaints level, product type). The impact of different payoff covariates 
corresponds closely to existing empirical studies of recalls and conventional wisdom. For 
example, we find that voluntary recall is favored by automakers that own a larger dealership 
network, possibly due to the advantage dealership network may provide in handling recalls. The 
regulator’s resource constraint (indicated by administrative expenses) also affects the recall 
decision-making process. This finding is in line with the government sources (Office of Inspector 
General 2015), which discuss that resource constraint may hamper the recall process at NHTSA. 
Finally, with regard to strategic interaction, we find that the strategic interplay between an 
automaker and the regulators exists. Automakers are more likely to initiate recalls voluntarily 
when they anticipate that the regulator might recommend a mandatory recall. We do not find any 
such effect for the regulator, indicating that the regulator decision-making is indifferent to the 
automaker’s possible action. 
Our main empirical results are presented in Table 3.5. The coefficients, which represent 
the parameters of the payoff functions represented in Equation (6), are interpreted as follows: 
positive values indicate a positive impact on recall decision, increasing the probability that the 
recall action is selected relative to the outside option (no recall). 
Characteristics 
All three characteristics (complaints, crashes, and geodispersion) play a significant role in 
the recall decision-making process (Table 3.5). 
Focusing more closely on the parameters, we find that, consumer complaints positively 
affect both voluntary (𝛽𝛽 = .002,𝑝𝑝 < .01) and mandatory recall (𝛽𝛽 = .001,𝑝𝑝 < .01) decisions. 
Complaints indicate how widespread the potential defect is. Controlling for complaints number, 
severity of the defect (number of reported crashes) have a positive effect on automakers 
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voluntary recall action (𝛽𝛽 = .017,𝑝𝑝 < .01). Interestingly this variable, however, is not 
significant for the regulator (𝛽𝛽 = −.011,𝑛𝑛. 𝑠𝑠.). Regulator’s resource constraint could be the 
possible reason behind this result. Because it is costly for the regulator to determine whether a 
vehicle should have a mandatory recall, the regulator optimally uses its limited resources by 
leaving the more obvious recall candidates with more serious defects for the automakers. Hence, 
the regulator tends to initiate more recalls involving less serious defects. Complaints’ 
geographical dispersion positively impacts both automaker (𝛽𝛽 = .016,𝑝𝑝 < .01) and regulator 
(𝛽𝛽 = .017,𝑝𝑝 < .01) recall decisions. As stated earlier, more geographical dispersion could create 
more negative buzz (e.g., more news coverage) around the potential defect and could affect 
automaker’s reputation. It appears that more geographical dispersion also affects regulator’s 
decisions as regulator might be motivated to act to allay public concerns. 
Complexity of the component with defect is negatively associated with the regulator’s 
action (𝛽𝛽 = −.65,𝑝𝑝 < .001). Conditional on other observables, regulator is less likely to take a 
mandatory recall action for components that are more complex in nature. As discussed before, 
regulator faces resource constraint. In addition, conducting a robust defect analysis is costly. 
Hence, regulator might prefer to avoid defect analysis of a complex component (e.g., engine), 
which might be costlier than defect analysis of a less complex component (e.g., lighting). This 
may affect regulator’s recall decisions. Results also show that automakers are more likely to a 
voluntary recall action when a current year model is involved with the potential defect (𝛽𝛽 =
.114,𝑝𝑝 < .001). Since the reputation loss or revenue loss is likely to be higher for a new vehicle 
model in comparison to an older model, automakers might be more proactive in initiating 
voluntary corrective actions when new models are involved. Entity specific covariates also 
influence recall decisions of automaker and the regulator. Conditional on observables, 
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automaker’s dealership network is positively associated with voluntary recall decision (𝛽𝛽 =
.002,𝑝𝑝 < .001). Regulator’s administrative expenses is negatively associated with mandatory 
recall decision (𝛽𝛽 = −.031,𝑝𝑝 < .01), supporting the idea that as expenses rise, lack of financial 
resources may prompt lower number of mandatory recall decisions. 
Strategic Interaction 
By constructing a formal model of strategic interaction, we are able to address the central 
question posed in this paper. Table 3.5 presents the result for strategic interaction analysis. 
𝛾𝛾𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 coefficient represents an automaker’s belief of the regulator’s mandatory action, and this 
is significant (𝛽𝛽 = 6.722,𝑝𝑝 < .01), which suggests that the automaker is more likely to initiate 
voluntary recalls when they anticipate that the regulator might recommend a mandatory recall. 
This result indicates that some part of automakers’ recall decisions is driven by the regulatory 
dimension (regulator’ presence); managers not only think about the cost associated with 
complaints and adverse reports, but they also think about the regulator’s potential action and its 
associated cost. This result suggests that the automaker might see more value in initiating a 
voluntary recall than a mandatory recall. A voluntary recall may demonstrate that automakers are 
accepting responsibility for defects and are striving to provide safe products for their customers, 
despite facing substantial recall costs (Souiden and Pons 2009). A voluntary recall may also 
allow automakers to control their message during the recall, which could help manage reputation 
loss due to vehicle defects. 
Importantly, results show an asymmetry in the strategic interaction. 𝛾𝛾𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 coefficient 
represents the regulator’s belief regarding the automaker’s voluntary recall action, and this is not 
significant (𝛽𝛽 = −.622,𝑛𝑛. 𝑠𝑠.); this suggests that regulator decision-making is indifferent to the 




Results suggest that the information exchange plays a significant role in the recall 
decision, even when a rich set of variables are employed in the model. Following previous 
research (e.g., Giroud 2013; Petersen and Rajan 2002), we use the geographical distance between 
these two entities as a proxy to indicate the cost of information exchange and coordination 
between an automaker and the regulator. Negative and significant coefficient for the automaker 
(𝛽𝛽 = −.073,𝑝𝑝 < .01) suggests that better information exchange between an automaker and the 
regulator (which could potentially lower the uncertainty around defect complaints) appears to 
lead to more voluntary corrective actions. 
In contrast, a higher cost of monitoring and information exchange (a greater geographical 
distance) negatively affects the information exchange and is more likely to lead to mandatory 
actions (𝛽𝛽 = .036,𝑝𝑝 < .01). We also study the counterfactuals under changing levels of 
information exchange. 
(Please see Table 3.5) 
Complaints Text Analysis 
Table 3.6 presents the results for this section. We add two additional covariates in the 
original discrete game model. Results indicate that the length variable (average number of words 
in a complaint) is negative and significantly associated with mandatory recall decisions (𝛽𝛽 =
−.0006,𝑝𝑝 < .01). This result suggests that, conditional on other factors, shorter complaints are 
more likely to be associated with a mandatory recall outcome. The rationale for this result could 
be explained by the earlier discussion, which highlights that analysts at the regulatory agency are 
inundated with defect complaints. An analyst’s decision to consider complaints for a further 
analysis is taken within seconds (Office of Inspector General 2015). Hence, after controlling for 
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other observables (e.g., severity), an analyst may prioritize shorter complaints due to resource 
constraints. Such prioritization may affect final recall decisions. 
Results also indicate that the negative sentiment variable is significantly (𝛽𝛽 = .0205,𝑝𝑝 <
.01) associated with mandatory recall decisions. This result suggests that complaints with more 
negative sentiment (more emotional appeal) are more likely to be associated with a mandatory 
recall decision. Complaints containing words such as “someone may die while making a turn”, 
“this vehicle is dangerous”, “people may die in accidents” etc. are more likely to grab analyst’s 
attention and, hence, more likely to be associated with a mandatory recall decision. 
(Please see Table 3.6) 
Varying Conditions and Equilibrium Responses 
The model parameters can be used to predict the equilibrium recall responses for 
different sets of conditions and provide insights on how these recall decisions might differ 
among different automakers. For instance, we evaluate recall decisions of the automaker and the 
regulator under different scenarios: 1) changes in underlying recall costs; (2) changes in 
automaker’s recall handing capability; and (3) changes in information exchange costs. 
Underlying recall costs: This analysis is inspired by the idea that reputation loss is one of 
the primary factors considered by the automakers in recall decision-making (e.g., Chen et al. 
2009). As discussed earlier, the geographical dispersion of complaints is used as a proxy for 
potential reputation loss (and potential legal costs) associated with defect complaints. More 
geographically dispersed complaints could create more negative social buzz about the automaker 
and could lead to greater reputation loss. The negative social buzz regarding the potential defect 




We reduce complaints’ geographical dispersion by 10% and observe changes in 
automakers’ recall behavior. Estimation results (Table 3.5) show that complaints’ geographical 
dispersion is associated with recall probabilities of automaker and the regulator. Conceptually, 
when geographical dispersion reduces, the negative social buzz and adverse public attention are 
also likely to decline. Lower negative buzz would lead to less reputation loss for the automakers, 
lowering the automaker’s recall choice probability. We consider a 10% reduction in complaints’ 
geographical dispersion. With this change, we note down the top three vehicle makes (average 
rating = 3.27) with the highest drop in recall probabilities and the bottom 3 make (average rating 
= 2.38) with the lowest drop in recall probabilities. Results (Figure 3.9) indicate that, for a 10% 
drop in dispersion, automakers with lower quality are more likely to initiate a voluntary recall 
than the higher quality automakers. Since a stronger reputation can work as a buffer against the 
reputation loss, automakers with a higher quality rating can afford to drop their recall 
probabilities by a larger extent (hence less likely to initiate voluntary recalls). However, 
automakers with a lower quality rating don’t enjoy a similar level of buffer, and hence they are 
more likely to initiate a recall when defects appear. This result highlights how changes in 
underlying reputation loss costs associated with geographical dispersion could lead to different 
recall responses by the automakers with different quality ratings. 
Underlying information exchange: Since better information exchange and coordination 
between an automaker and the regulator could help reduce information asymmetry and 
uncertainty, the associated cost in such exchange process could affect recall decisions. We use 
the geographical distance, an exogenous variable, between the automaker and the regulator as a 
proxy to consider such costs. Estimation (Table 3.5) shows that, conditional on all the other 
observables, when the geographical distance reduces, we are likely to see more voluntary recalls 
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and less number of mandatory recalls. Therefore, we run a counterfactual analysis to understand 
the effect of change in information exchange costs on the number of recalls initiated by 
automakers and the regulator. 
We consider two scenarios with changes in geographical distance and observe 
automakers’ recall behavior (Figure 3.10). When the distance goes down by a factor of .9, the 
mean voluntary recall choice probability goes up by 1.69% and mean mandatory recall choice 
probability goes down by .8%. This change is likely to lead to 12 additional voluntary recalls and 
one less mandatory recall. When the distance reduces by a factor of .7, we are likely to observe 
38 additional voluntary recalls and four less mandatory recalls. This analysis suggests that efforts 
to make the information exchange more effective between an automaker and the regulator 
(lowering the potential cost) could lead to more net corrective actions. 
Automaker’s recall handing capability: We also evaluate the automaker’s recall decision 
with respect to its dealership network size. The dealership network indicates an automaker’s 
capability of handling recall repair and maintenance process. Estimation results (Table 3.5) show 
that dealership network positively associates with the automaker’s voluntary recall probability. 
This analysis (Figure 3.11) shows that, when the dealership network increases by 6%, 
equilibrium response is likely to contain an additional voluntary recall. 
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Table 3.1: Selected Product Recall Literature 
 
Authors Focus Key points 
Jarrell and Peltzman 
(1985) 
Firm value Product recall affects shareholder wealth negatively. Such costs are higher than costs emanating from recall. 
Dawar and Pillutla (2000) Brand Equity 
Consumers interpret firm’s responses to recall based on prior expectations with the firm. The study shows that 
existing consumers and potential future consumers expect different assurance from the recalling firm.  
Haunschild and Rhee 
(2004) 
Learning 
Learning takes place within firms due to recalls. The study shows that greater learning takes place for firms, 
which recall voluntarily rather than mandatorily.  Results also establish the difference in learning curve 
generalist and specialist automakers. 
Marsh et al. (2004) 
Category 
Demand 
Meat recall events significantly affect category demand, with favorable effects on demand for meat 
substitutes, offset by more negative effects on meat demand. 
Chen, Ganesan, and Liu 
(2009) 
Recall strategy 
The impact of proactive vs passive recall strategy on firm value. Results show that, regardless of the firm and 
product characteristics, proactive strategy has a stronger negative effect on firm value.  
Freedman et al. (2012) Sales 
For firms with recalls, unit sales of the types of toys involved in the recall fall relative to sales of toys in other 
categories. The study does not find any evidence of within-manufacturer spillovers to dissimilar toys. 





Study analyses the effect of post recall advertisement and price changes on product’s brand share and category 
purchase. The study also analyses the degree of moderation by two characteristics: extent of negative publicity 
surrounding recall and brand’s public acknowledgement of recall.  
Liu and Shankar (2015) 
Brand and 
advertisement 
When recalls are associated with greater media attention and severe consequences, consumer’s response is 
more negative. Results also show that parent-brand advertising and sub-brand advertising effectiveness 
declines due to recall but the decline in latter is greater. 
Bala et al. (2017) 
Competitor 
Response 
The authors focus on competitor reaction to product recalls where the competitor participates in multiple 
product categories that exhibit (dis)economies of scope in sales effort across them. 
Eilert et al. (2017) Recall timing 
The authors test the effect of problem severity on time to recall, the role of brand characteristics in moderating 




Ater and Yosef (2018) Price (listing) 
Volkswagen’s emissions scandal had a statistically significant, negative effect on the number of transactions 
involving vehicles made by Volkswagen and their resale prices. 




Supply of used Volkswagen diesel vehicles increased after the emission scandal. The positive supply-side 
effects increase with the probability of manipulation. The negative impacts on the asking prices of used cars 





This study examines the underlying mechanism of the recall decision-making process. Using a discrete game 





Table 3.2: Complaint Categories 
 
OEM Categories Percentage of OEM recalls 
Electrical System 20.75% 
Fuel system, Gasoline 20.68% 
Power Train 15.82% 
Engine and Engine Cooling 11.23% 
Suspension 10.62% 
Exterior Lighting 9.52% 
Structure 7.47% 
Fuel System, Other 1.64% 
Hybrid Propulsion System 1.03% 
Engine 0.62% 
Forward Collision Avoidance 0.41% 
Traction Control System 0.21% 
 
 
Table 3.3: Recall Decisions 
 





Suspension 80 17 17.5% 
Structure 66 14 17.5% 
Power Train 121 16 11.7% 
Fuel System, Gasoline 164 28 14.6% 
Exterior Lighting 81 23 22.1% 
Engine and Engine Cooling 94 20 17.5% 




Table 3.4: Key Data Sources 
 
1 Consumer complaints NHTSA 
2 Vehicle recalls NHTSA 
3 Make sales Ward’s automotive 
4 Dealership network (number of dealers) Automotive News  
5 Number of crashes NHTSA 
6 Geodispersion (number of states where 
complaints are reported) 
NHTSA 
7 Current year model dummy NHTSA 
8 Quality rating Consumer reports 
9 Component complexity data NHTSA 
10 Geographical distance between locations Annual reports, Google 
11 Quality rating Consumer reports 
12 Administrative expenses NHTSA 
 
 
Table 3.5: Estimation Results 
 
 Automaker Regulator 
   Intercept -1.484*** -1.231*** 
Defect characteristics   
   Complaints .002*** .001*** 
   Crashes .017*** -.011 
   Geographic complaint dispersion .016*** .017*** 
Product feature   
   Complexity -.087 -.650*** 
   Current model .114*** .118 
   Quality rating -.011 -.193*** 
Entity specific   
   Number of dealers .002***  
   Administrative expenses  -.031** 
Information exchange   
   Geographical distance -.073*** .036*** 
Strategic interaction   
   𝛾𝛾𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 6.722***  
   𝛾𝛾𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚  -.622 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.  
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Table 3.6: Results with Text Analysis 
 
 Automaker Regulator 
Defect characteristics Yes 
Product feature Yes 
Entity specific Yes 
Complaint characteristics Yes 
   Length -.0002*** -.0006*** 
   Negative sentiment -.004 .0205** 
Information exchange   
   Geographical distance -.073*** .040*** 
Strategic interaction   
   𝛾𝛾𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 8.27***  
   𝛾𝛾𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚  -.621 











Figure 3.2: Aggregated Recalls per Quarter 
 
 
Note: These values are aggregated over vehicle makes. 
  
Automaker Regulator (NHTSA) 
Strategic interaction 
Voluntary recall Mandatory recall 
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Figure 3.3: Aggregated Recalls per Vehicle Make 
 
 
Note: These values are aggregated over all periods (quarters). 
 
Figure 3.4: Aggregated Complaints per Quarter 
 












Figure 3.5: Defect Characteristics per Recall Type 
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Mandatory recalls Voluntary recalls
Average number of crashes
I BOUGHT MY 2016 MDX ON 02/01/2016 AND WAS 
QUITE HAPPY WITH THE INITIAL PURCHASE.  AFTER 
DRIVING FOR TWO DAYS I STARTED SETTING UP 
THE CAR'S OPTIONS, I REALIZED THAT THE CARS 
DRIVE SYSTEM WAS SET TO START IN SPORT MODE.  
I CHANGED THE OPTION TO ALLOW THE CAR TO 
START IN 'NORMAL' MODE PERMANENTLY AND 
THAT'S WHEN I STARTED TO FEEL THE PROBLEM.   
THERE IS A NOTICEABLE 2 - 3 SECOND LAG AT TAKE 
OFF OR WHEN ATTEMPTED TO ACCELERATE FROM 
A REDUCED SPEED IN LOWER GEARS.  A VERY 
UNCOMFORTABLE FEELING WHEN ATTEMPTING TO 
MAKE A LEFT TURN WHEN YOU HAVE ONCOMING 
TRAFFIC AND THE CAR FALLS TO ENGAGE AFTER 
YOU MAKE THE COMMITMENT TO DRIVE.  I 
WAITED A FEW DAYS TO SEE IF THIS WAS JUST A 
KINK THAT WOULD GO AWAY SINCE THE CAR WAS 
NEW.  NO SUCH LUCK.  I TOOK THE CAR TO THE 
DEALER AND THEY SAID EVERYTHING WAS FINE.  I 
ASKED ABOUT THE LAG AND THEY SAID IT IS 
NORMAL OPERATIONAL PART OF THE CAR.  
APPARENTLY THIS IS A KNOWN ISSUE WITH THE 
CAR FOR WHICH THEY DON'T THINK IT IS WORTH 
       
TRANSMISSION SLIPS FROM BETWEEN SHIFT 1-2 AND 
2-3.  CAR ALSO AT TIMES LUNGES FORWARD WHILE 
COMING TO A STOP 
I GOT MY 2016 ACURA MDX IN JULY. SINCE THEN, I AM 
HAVING TRANSMISSION PROBLEMS. OFF-THE-LINE SHIFTS ARE 
ERRATIC, DEPENDING ON HOW MUCH THROTTLE I GIVE THE 
ENGINE. GIVE IT 3/4 THROTTLE AND ACCELERATION IS GREAT, 
BUT MILEAGE SUFFERS BADLY. GIVE IT ANY LESS THROTTLE 
AND ACCELERATION IS MEAGER, PLUS THE ENGINE REVS VERY 
HIGH BETWEEN SHIFTS.    ONE TIME, I WAS PULLING AWAY 
FROM A STOPLIGHT AFTER SLOWING TO NEARLY A FULL STOP 
(THE LIGHT JUST CHANGED AS I APPROACHED), I PRESSED 1/2 
WAY ON THE ACCELERATOR AND THE ENGINE BOGGED TO 
NEARLY ZERO RPMS. I THOUGHT IT DIED. I LET UP AND 
PRESSED DOWN AGAIN AND IT RETURNED TO NORMAL.    
MERGING ON THE HIGHWAY IS ALSO VERY DANGEROUS AND 
SCARY. AS I HIT THE GAS TO ACCELERATE ON THE ON-RAMP, 
THE ENGINE HESITATES SO BADLY, I NEARLY RUN OUT OF 
RAMP. PASSING ON THE HIGHWAY IS THE SAME, UNLESS I 
PRESS THE THROTTLE TO THE FLOORBOARD.    ANOTHER TIME, 
          
ROUGH GEAR SHIFT AND CARS SEEMS TO BE REV-UP 
AT  LOW GEARS . THIS CAN CREATE  A DANGEROUS 
CONDITION WHILE ACCELERATING FROM STOPS  
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Figure 3.7: Descriptive Statistics of Complaints Text Characteristics 
 
                               Panel A                                                                 Panel B 
    
Note: Panel A displays average value of number of words in complaints associated with 
corresponding recalls. Panel B displays average value of negative sentiment in complaints 
associated with corresponding recalls. 
 
 
Figure 3.8: Frequency Plot of Complaints Text Characteristics 
 



















Note: Panel A and Panel B display frequency plot of average number of words in complaints for 
corresponding recalls. Panel C and Panel D display frequency plot of average negative sentiment 
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Figure 3.10: Changes in Recall Responses with Geographic Distance 
 
 




CHAPTER 4: DIRECT AND SPILLOVER EFFECTS OF PRODUCT RECALLS IN 
BUSINESS-TO-BUSINESS SECONDARY MARKETS: A STUDY OF THE US 
AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY  
Introduction 
Many product markets (e.g., apparel, automobile, medical device, etc.) exhibits three 
noteworthy features that intersect to raise critical yet unaddressed research questions. First, the 
volume and the profitability from used products can be greater than new products. For example, 
in the U.S. used automobiles account for more than 70% of all automobile transactions.33 The 
average gross profit for auto dealers from selling used vehicles is $2,354 compared to $1,944 for 
a new vehicle (NADA 2018).34 Similarly, the resale market for apparel is projected to reach $64 
billion by 2025 from $28 billion in 2019; this market grew 25 times faster than the overall retail 
market in 2019, with sixty-four million shoppers making a secondhand purchase.35 Yet, used 
product markets receive limited academic attention. Consider, for example, the robust literature 
in marketing on the automobile industry (the empirical context of our study). Studies like 
Albuquerque and Bronnenberg (2012), Bucklin et al. (2008), Busse et al. (2006), Cachon et al. 
(2019), Fischer (2019), Morton et al. (2001), and Ozturk et al. (2016, 2019) focus on new 
vehicles. The economic significance of used product markets is now leading to growing 
                                                      
33 In 2017, used vehicles comprised 39.3 million transactions (approximately worth $470 billion). See 
https://publish.manheim.com/content/dam/consulting/2018-Manheim-Used-Car-Market-Report.pdf, accessed July 
2021. 
34 Similarly, in the used video games industry, pre-owned games represent about half of gross profit of GameStop, 
which is the largest retailer of new and used video games. See https://www.cnbc.com/2014/03/17/wal-mart-unveils-
video-game-trade-in-program.html, accessed July 2021.  
35 See https://www.thredup.com/resale/, accessed July 2021. 
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academic scrutiny (e.g., Biglaiser et al. 2020; Bennett et al. 2015; Ishihara and Ching 2019; 
Shiller 2013; Yin et al. 2010), but many substantive questions pertaining to used product markets 
remain unexplored in marketing. We seek to add to this research. 
Second, used product markets involve important interactions among B2B intermediaries 
(e.g., auto dealers) that are absent or less prevalent in new product markets. For example, auto 
dealers acquire their new vehicle inventory directly from auto manufacturers, which they then 
sell to the end-consumer (e.g., Lafontaine and Morton 2010; Cachon and Olivares 2009).36 In 
contrast, auto dealers acquire and replenish their used product inventories by transacting with 
other dealers. These used vehicle trades among dealers are facilitated via business-to-business 
(B2B) wholesale auctions (Genesove 1995; Lacetera et al. 2012; Larsen 2020). In 2017, 83.8% 
of auto dealers availed of B2B wholesale auto auctions to acquire their used vehicles (NADA 
2018). Gaming retailers also use online auctions to buy/sell second-hand games (Shiller 2013). 
Nonetheless, the so-called B2B knowledge gap is persistent across used product research (Lilien 
2016). For example, in the case of automobiles, though some studies (e.g., Genesove 1993; 
Grether et al. 2009; Murry and Zhou 2020) provide B2B market insights, extant research 
primarily examines auto dealers’ transactions with end-consumers in the used vehicle markets 
(e.g., Biglaiser et al. 2020; Gavazza et al. 2014). This consumer-focused research explores 
several elements including adverse selection, product search, and product quality (e.g., 
Kuruzovich et al. 2010; Peterson and Schneider 2014). Similarly, empirical research in other 
used product industries (e.g., used books, concert tickets) largely explores questions that revolve 
around B2C transactions such as cannibalization of new product sales or impact on primary 
market due to search frictions in secondary market (e.g., Bennett et al. 2015; Ghose et al. 2006; 
                                                      
36 Influential studies in marketing like Purohit (1997), Albuquerque and Bronnenberg (2012), Busse et al. (2010), 
and Xu et al. (2014) advance insights on the interplay between auto manufacturers, auto dealers, and end-consumers. 
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Yin et al. 2010). As a result, there is a need for more empirical research on B2B transactions 
whereby intermediaries such as auto dealers acquire used products that they subsequently sell to 
end-consumers. Investigating this interplay among B2B intermediaries would augment the extant 
marketing literature focused on industries with a robust used products market. 
Third, product recalls plague some of these industries (e.g., Borah and Tellis 2016, 
Thirumalai and Sinha 2011). For example, the auto industry faced 5,930 defect related recalls 
from 2012 to 2019. Likewise, medical device recalls have increased from 650 in 2003 to 1190 in 
2012, with Class I recalls, in which serious adverse health consequences or deaths are possible, 
increased from 7 in 2003 to 57 in 2012.37 While extant product recalls research advances 
valuable insights on consumer-side reactions (e.g., Barber and Darrough 1996; Chen et al. 2009; 
Liu and Shankar 2015; Zhao et al. 2011), managerially relevant research on B2B buyers’ 
responses to product recalls and subsequent implications for their B2B transactions of these 
intermediaries remains untouched (e.g., Cleeren et al. 2017). 
Many important and interrelated research questions that concern the impact of product 
recalls for intermediary B2B transactions arise. For example, the extant literature is silent on 
intermediary B2B buyers (e.g., auto dealers) response to product recalls (e.g., Cleeren et al. 
2017). How do B2B buyers adjust the prices they are willing to pay if the used product faces a 
recall (direct effect)? What changes, if any, do B2B buyers make to replenish used product 
inventories in response to a recall? How do recalls influence these buyers’ demand for non-
recalled products (spillover effect)? Do B2B buyers switch to another non-recalled product, 
offered by the same manufacturer or a different manufacturer, in place of the recalled product? 
                                                      
37 For automobile example see (accessed April 2021): 
https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/documents/2019_recall_annual_count_final-031620-v1-tag.pdf. For 




Do B2B buyers buy non-recalled products within the same product segment or a different 
segment? Answers to these managerial and policy-relevant questions would provide insights into 
product recalls’ effects on intermediaries’ B2B transactions and inventory management. 
We investigate the aforementioned B2B-product-recall pertinent questions in the context 
of the US automobile market. We develop a descriptive, causal model that we calibrate with a 
unique database containing detailed information on the dealers’ used vehicle purchases through a 
B2B auction. Our auction database span four years (2005–2008) and include several vehicle-
level details including transaction price (price at which the dealer acquired the vehicle at the 
auction), vehicle condition report, and vehicle odometer reading. We augment these data with 
vehicle recall information from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). 
We exploit a narrow time window before and after recall announcement and then apply a 
difference-in-differences (DiD) identification strategy to estimate the causal impact of recall 
events. Our identification strategy involves comparing the difference in B2B transacted prices of 
vehicles pre- and post-recall in the recalled product category (i.e., passenger vehicles) with the 
difference in B2B transacted prices of vehicles pre- and post-recall in another product category 
(i.e., cargo vans) that is unlikely to be affected by the focal recall, to quantify the direct effect (on 
the recalled product). We leverage a similar identification strategy to quantify the spillover effect 
of product recalls on other products of the same automaker38 and other automakers who are not 
simultaneously subject to recalls of their own products. 
B2B transactions directly affect dealer’s used vehicle purchases (stock management), 
which carries substantial economic significance. The used vehicles business contributes a higher 
                                                      
38 Consistent with automotive recall studies (e.g., Haunschild and Rhee 2004), our unit of analysis is the 
“automaker” (e.g., Acura, Lexus), rather than the “auto firm” (e.g., Honda Motor Company) or the “model” (e.g., 
Accord, Civic). We use the term automaker to indicate this. 
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gross profit per used vehicle retailed ($2,354) than gross profit per new vehicle retailed ($1,944) 
(NADA 2018). Dealers use these B2B transactions to bolster and reshuffle their vehicle 
purchases to meet their appropriate retail needs (Genesove 1993). Dealers also use B2B used 
vehicle transactions to purchase substitutes for their new models when new models are too costly 
for customers. Therefore, any adverse marketplace event (e.g., vehicle recall) that could cause 
impromptu adjustments (e.g., changes in dealer’s willingness to pay, deferring purchases, or 
switching to substitutes) in dealers’ B2B purchases would directly affect dealer’s stock 
management. Our study provides insights on these economically significant B2B transactions. 
Several key findings emerge from our analysis. On average, recalls reduce the transaction 
prices for recalled products by about 10% (nearly $1,043) in the used vehicle market. The 
adverse direct effect on the recalled product is greater when it is a government-mandated recall 
(approximately $1,098 lower prices). A recall, which involves multiple models by the same 
automaker, causes approximately $1,819 drop in prices. The direct effect of product recalls is 
more damaging for older vehicles than younger vehicles with fewer miles. Specifically, a recall 
reduces the transaction price by about $21 for every 1000 miles accrued by the used vehicle. 
Beyond the direct effect, we also find significant spillover effects on unaffected products both 
for the recalled automaker and its competitors. For example, non-recalled products that belong to 
the same segment39 as the recalled product and manufactured by the recalled product’s 
automaker experience a price reduction of about 5.54%.40 This suggests a negative within-
segment spillover effect spanning recalled automaker’s non-recalled vehicles. In addition, prices 
                                                      
39 In line with Albuquerque and Bronnenberg (2012), we consider vehicle types (compact car, full-size car, luxury 
car, midsize car, minivan, sports car, sport utility vehicle, subcompact car, and wagon) to define segments. 
40 Any non-recalled vehicle model, which also belongs to the Honda make and compact segment would fall under 
this group. For example, if Honda Civic 2008 (compact segment) faces a recall and Honda Civic 2010 does not, then 
spillover would be considered on Honda Civic 2010 
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for non-recalled products that do not overlap segment with the recalled product but belong to the 
same automaker rise by about 4.91% following a recall notice.41 This suggests that B2B buyers 
switch from a recalled product to a non-recalled product that belongs to a different segment but 
manufactured by the same automaker. Other automakers’ non-recalled products that belong to 
the same product segment as the recalled product also suffer a price reduction of about 
5.63%.42,43 Results show that used vehicles sale benefit from franchise relationships. Dealers, 
which are affiliated with the recalled vehicle automaker, pay higher transaction prices (about 
3.45% higher) for non-recalled models of the same make than the non-franchise dealers. These 
B2B findings are also relevant for the auctioneer, whose revenue is tied with vehicles’ auction 
sale prices. 
Our study also provides insights relevant for the current policy landscape of the used 
vehicle market in the US. On June 25, 2019, Senator Richard Blumenthal (D-CT) proposed the 
The Used Car Safety Recall Repair Act (116th Congress) that would require repairs on used 
vehicles subject to safety recalls before they are sold, leased, or loaned to consumers (Congress 
2019). Although the legislation would reduce consumers’ exposure to defective vehicles, it has 
evoked strong criticism from the NADA (2020), which asserted that this Act would increase 
dealers’ cost of owning a recalled vehicle. Findings from our study can inform the ongoing 
policy debate on this Act. Specifically, the study advances empirical evidence on how dealers 
adjust their used vehicle purchases (both the direct- and spillover-effects) in the absence of the 
                                                      
41 For example, if Honda Civic (compact segment) faces a recall, then any non-recalled Honda make vehicle such as 
Honda Accord, which does not belong to the compact segment, would fall under this group. 
42 For example, if Honda Civic faces a recall, then any non-recalled vehicle, which also belongs to the same segment 
as the Civic but different automaker (e.g., Acura, Lexus) would fall under this group.  
43 T test shows that the negative spillover coefficient for other automakers group (corresponding to 5.63%) is 
statistically different from the spillover coefficient for the same automaker group (corresponding to 5.54%). 
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proposed regulatory intervention. As stated earlier, used vehicles are a robust source of profits 
for dealers. Any policy intervention that could make the recalled vehicle a less attractive option, 
may further dampen dealers demand for the recalled product in the B2B and in doing so may 
have the unintended consequence of helping increase the price for other non-recalled vehicles. 
We organize the rest of this paper as follows: In Section 2 we present the relevant 
literature; in Section 3 we describe the used vehicle market with a brief description of B2B 
vehicle sales and automotive recalls data; in Section 4 we detail the estimation approach with 
key model and identification considerations; in Sections 5 and 6 we describe the results and 
robustness checks respectively; and we conclude in Section 7. 
Related Literature  
Our research builds on the extant product recall literature and the literature on used 
products. We summarize the product recall literature in Table 4.1, and extend this research in 
three meaningful directions. First, we contribute to the literature stream that measures the direct 
effect of product recalls on financial outcomes. Jarrell and Peltzman (1985) and Hendricks and 
Singhal (2003) describe routes by which product recalls cause capital market losses for a 
manufacturer, including remedial costs (e.g., refund, repair), inventory losses, and lost sales. 
Others highlight direct negative impact of recalls on several other elements such as stock market 
returns (e.g., Barber and Darrough 1996; Chen et al. 2009) and marketing mix effectiveness 
(e.g., Liu and Shankar 2015; Zhao et al. 2011). 
Second, we contribute to the literature on the spillover effects of a product recall on non-
recalled products. An emerging literature studies how recalls may cause spillover effects on non-
recalled products of the same manufacturer, non-recalled competitors in the category, or the 
industry as a whole (e.g., Bala et al. 2017; Borah and Tellis 2016; Freedman et al. 2012). For 
example, Borah and Tellis (2016) observe that negative online chatter about a recalled car model 
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increases negative chatter for others with the same brand, while Freedman et al. (2012) find 
negative spillover effects of a large-scale toy recall on competing manufacturers’ sales. 
Third, our research contributes to the literature on the impact of recalls in secondary 
markets. In the automobile industry, the context for this study, the used vehicle market dwarfs 
the primary new-product market in terms of sales transactions, so understanding the impact of 
recalls on used vehicle markets is economically and managerially important. To the best of our 
knowledge, only five studies consider the effects of product recalls on the used vehicle markets, 
i.e., Ater and Yosef (2018), Che et al. (2020), Hammond (2013), Hartman (1987), and 
Strittmatter and Lechner (2020). These studies, however, explore B2C transactions and do not 
examine transactions further upstream from the end-consumer involving B2B intermediaries. For 
example, Hartman (1987) finds that safety recalls by General Motors (GM) diminish the resale 
value of the recalled products but do not affect the values of other GM products. In studying a 
2010 Toyota safety recall, Hammond (2013) instead asserts that the effect on the resale prices of 
recalled products was null and short lived. Ater and Yosef (2018) and Strittmatter and Lechner 
(2020) study the supply-side implications of recalls in secondary markets, using the Volkswagen 
emission scandal; they both find statistically significant negative impacts on the supply of 
recalled products. Che et al. (2020) study changes in car prices due to the Volkswagen scandal to 
measure consumers’ willingness to pay for brand reputation. 
As stated previously and is clearly explicated in Table 4.1, extant research on product 
recalls emphasizes markets with consumers as the end-users, despite the significant value and 
size of B2B markets. Lilien (2016) notes that B2B transactions account for $10.7 trillion, i.e., 
42% of all U.S. revenues and calls for rigorous empirical research of the B2B buying process. 
Recently, Cleeren et al. (2017) also assert the lack of empirical research on the effect of product 
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recall effects in B2B markets. In response, we investigate the impact of product recalls on a used 
vehicle market with B2B buyers. 
Our research also adds to the growing literature on used vehicle markets (e.g., Biglaiser 
et al. 2020; Che et al. 2020). Automobile is one of the prominent categories of the used product 
industry in the US.44 Different features of this differentiated product, such as durability and 
lower prices than new product, have helped fuel the used vehicle market. Entry of new players 
(e.g., Carvana, Vroom), which are disrupting the used vehicle market with digital platform 
capabilities and big data analytics, has further boosted this market.45 Empirical researchers have 
studied the used vehicle market across different dimensions such as allocative and welfare 
effects (Gavazza et al. 2014), consumer’s myopic behavior (Busse et al. 2013), fuel economy 
(Sallee et al. 2016), and vehicle scrappage (Jacobsen and Benthem 2015), among others. 
Finally, we also add to research that focuses on auto dealers and explores associated key 
dimensions such as dealers’ colocation decision (Murry and Zhou 2020), price reactions of 
incumbent dealers due to another dealer exit (Ozturk et al. 2016), and quality pattern of cars sold 
through dealers (Biglaiser et al. 2020), among others. We contribute to the empirical strand of 
this literature by examining changes in B2B transactions of used vehicles among auto dealers, in 
response to product recalls. 
Empirical Setting 
The empirical setting for our study is based on B2B transactions in which new and used 
vehicle dealers buy vehicles from other dealers or from companies selling their fleets. The 
                                                      
44 In 2017, approximate $470 billion worth used vehicle transactions took place in the US (an average $12,000 price 
per vehicle). In comparison, eBay, one of the leading platforms for used consumer durables, generated $89.82 
billion in gross merchandise volume in 2018 (eBay annual report 2019). 
45 See https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/automotive-and-assembly/our-insights/used-cars-new-platforms-
accelerating-sales-in-a-digitally-disrupted-market, accessed December 2020. 
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wholesale used auto auction industry provides the largest source of inventory of used vehicles for 
car dealers. National Independent Automobile Dealers Association survey reported that up to 
83.38% of dealers use auctions to acquire their used vehicles (NIADA 2018). Each year 
approximately 40 million used cars transactions occur the United States, 15 million of which 
pass through a wholesale auction house (Larsen 2020). The fragmented wholesale auction 
industry includes around 320 auction houses scattered across the country.  
Data Description 
The B2B transactions data that we use comes from one of the largest of auction operators 
that maintains 125 traditional (brick-and-mortar) and mobile auction sites and realizes $3 billion 
in revenues, mainly earned from fees paid by the buyers and sellers following a successful 
transaction. The B2B sellers mostly are automobile dealers selling their used vehicles in English-
style auctions, and the B2B buyers are fellow dealers. Auto manufacturers also rely on wholesale 
auction houses to sell cars returned by consumers. Further, car rental agencies turn to auctions to 
sell used vehicles from their fleets, before the vehicles factory warranty expires. Financial 
institutions also use wholesale auctions to deal with their car inventories. Sellers bring the cars to 
the auction house, usually several days before the sale, and establish a secret reserve price. In the 
days preceding the sale, potential buyers may view car details and pictures online, including 
condition reports by fleet and lease sellers; they can visit the auction house to inspect and test-
drive cars. The auction takes place in a large, warehouse-like space with multiple lanes. An 
auctioneer runs each lane, and simultaneously, vehicles move to the front of each lane. The 
auctioneers call out bids, raising the price until one bidder remains. If the final price falls short of 
the secret reservation price, the vehicle remains unsold. Auctioneers might try to sell unsold 
vehicles later, and might attempt to sell some vehicles several times over several days before 
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successful transactions; sellers also have the option to pull vehicles from the auction. Genesove 
(1993) provides a detailed description of a typical wholesale used auto auction. 
We obtain detailed information about more than 7.83 million successful transactions that 
occurred between January 2005 and November 2008, for the total sales value of about $97.66 
billion; these transactions involved 26 automobile makes.46 The average transaction prices in the 
broad passenger vehicle category (comprising compact, full-size, luxury, midsize, minivan, 
sports, sports utility vehicle, and subcompact) is $12,599, and an average of 1,236 vehicles sell 
in each auction region in a given day. The auctioneer prominently displays vehicle details on the 
windshield of each vehicle; we provide a condition report in Table WB 4.1 (Appendix).  
The wholesale auction operator uses a proprietary, internet-based technology to allow 
sellers and buyers to participate in live physical auctions via real-time audio and video. Video 
cameras in auction lanes allow online users to view the vehicle, observe the physical bidding 
activity, and place their bids, which then appear on a screen located in the physical lane. Table 
4.2 provides the summary statistics for key variables. For each automobile presented at auction, 
we observe its make (e.g., Audi, BMW, Ford, Honda), model (e.g., Accord, Altima, Civic, 
Sentra), and model year (year 2000 to 2008 include 94.31% of total observations). The wholesale 
auction house categorizes each vehicle into a segment (i.e., compact, full-size, luxury, midsize, 
minivan, sports, pickup, sport utility vehicle, subcompact, and wagon). We obtain the odometer 
reading for each vehicle, certified by the auctioneer; the mean and median odometer values 
(miles) for presented vehicles were 42,916 and 29,830, respectively. Vehicles with a 2005 
                                                      
46 These makes include Acura, Audi, BMW, Buick, Cadillac, Chevrolet, Chrysler, Dodge, Ford, Honda, Hyundai, 
Infiniti, Jaguar, Kia, Lexus, Lincoln, Mazda, Mercedes, Mini, Mitsubishi, Nissan, Porsche, Subaru, Toyota, 
Volkswagen, and Volvo. 
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model-year represent the largest year group in our data (20.57%). Vehicles with condition level47 
3 were the most frequent group (58%). We also observe the vehicle source; majority were either 
leased vehicles (45.9%) or factory vehicle (29.3%). Approximately 87% of vehicles were 
registered to sell on the auction company owned proprietary online platform. Other key variables 
include the number of times a vehicle appeared in the auction before it was sold or removed from 
the auction, vehicle’s sequence number in the auction (order in which it was presented), and 
whether the seller or buyer represents a large dealer group. 
(Please see Table 4.2) 
We augment our auction database with product recall data from the U.S. Department of 
Transportation (e.g., Eilert et al. 2017; Haunschild and Rhee 2004; Liu and Shankar 2015). A 
product recall occurs if an automaker or the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(NHTSA) identifies a safety defect or violation in an automobile. The process generally starts 
with consumer complaints, though the automaker’s own tests also might reveal defects. 
Consumers can submit complaints through multiple channels (e.g., phone, email, website, and 
questionnaires). Regardless of their source, the NHTSA is responsible for reviewing vehicle 
safety, initiating recalls (if necessary), and monitoring the effectiveness of ongoing recalls. 
NHTSA receives approximately 4,000 complaints about potential safety issues every month.48 If 
an automaker initiates a recall on its own, it represents a voluntary recall, but if it occurs 
following the NHTSA’s recommendation, it is a mandatory recall (Rupp and Taylor 2002). 
Vehicle recalls information includes the name of the recalling vehicle make, model, number of 
affected units, and a brief description of the defect. For a four-year period (2005–2008), 625 
                                                      
47 Vehicle’s condition score, as reported in the condition report (Table WB 4.1; Appendix) varies from 0 (worst 
condition) to 5 (best condition). 
48 See https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/810552.pdf, accessed December 2020. 
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recalls appear in the recall database and these recalls span different vehicle categories such as 
cars, trucks, and motorbikes. Figure 4.1 displays the number of recalls per week over this period. 
(Please see Figure 4.1) 
Empirical Model and Identification Strategy 
We exploit a quasi-natural experimental setting and employ a difference-in-difference 
estimation strategy (DiD) to estimate the impact of product recalls on the recalled product and 
non-recalled products. Specifically, our quasi-experimental design leverages the as-if random 
variation in the timing of product recalls to clearly delineate treatment and control groups pre- 
and post-recall, to obtain an appropriate counterfactual to estimate our causal treatment effect. In 
particular, DiD can estimate the effect of a specific intervention or treatment (e.g., recall) by 
comparing changes in outcomes over time between a treatment population and a control 
population that is not exposed to the treatment.  
Our DiD empirical strategy is not subject to endogenous sorting concerns that often 
plague other DiD designs. This is because product recalls are issued by the NHTSA or 
voluntarily exercised by the automaker and therefore exogenous to our B2B buyers. 
Furthermore, these recalls are unforeseen until announced by the NHTSA or the automaker, so 
the systematic selection of vehicles into the treatment and control group should not occur within 
a tight time-window pre- and post the recall announcement (1-day pre- and 1-day post recall in 
our setting). Given these unique institutional features of our empirical setting, our DiD can 
credibly estimate the causal impact of a product recall. We do so by comparing the price 
differential (post-treatment – pretreatment) of observationally identical vehicles in the treatment 
group with the price differential (post-treatment – pretreatment) of observationally identical 
vehicles in the control group, within a narrow time window pre- and post the product recall 
announcement. Formally,  
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𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3(𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 × 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖) + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖       (1) 
where Pij  is the used vehicle’s transaction price in group i in j period, and 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a random error 
that given our quasi-experimental design is assumed to be uncorrelated with our treatment 
indicator variable Tj. The data set contains two groups i (treatment and control) and two time-
periods j (pre- and post-recall). The indicator variable Ti reflects the mean differences in prices 
between the treatment and control groups, indicated by the coefficient β1. The indicator variable 
Rj captures naturally occurring mean differences in the post-recall period price, relative to the 
pre-recall period price, captured by β2. Finally, β3, the estimate of the treatment effect, indicates 
the difference in price (DiD) between treatment and control groups, after controlling for 
differences across groups and time shocks common to both, given as: 
 𝛽𝛽3 = [𝐸𝐸�𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�𝑖𝑖 = 1, 𝑗𝑗 = 1� − 𝐸𝐸�𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�𝑖𝑖 = 1, 𝑗𝑗 = 0�] − [𝐸𝐸�𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�𝑖𝑖 = 0, 𝑗𝑗 = 1� −
                                                                                                    𝐸𝐸�𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�𝑖𝑖 = 0, 𝑗𝑗 = 0�]     (2) 
Any deviation in differences in prices for the treatment versus control group provides a causal 
estimate of the treatment effect. The choice of the control group is critical to support a credible 
imputation of the counterfactual outcomes for the treated group. Passenger vehicle category 
(which includes segments of compact car, full-size car, luxury car, midsize car, minivan, sports 
car, sport utility vehicle, subcompact car, and wagon) represents our treatment group. In this 
context, one option is to use non-recalled models of the same make (e.g., non-recalled Honda 
Accord could be the control group for a recalled Honda Civic). 
However, if buyers were to switch to Honda Accord following a Honda Civic recall, this 
control group would also be subject to a treatment and would bias the estimation. Considering 
the non-recalled passenger vehicles of a different automaker (e.g., Toyota) as a control group 
may also lead to bias if buyers were to switch to passenger vehicles of other makes. Therefore, 
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we use vehicles from a different vehicle category (cargo van) as a control group. We believe 
such an identifying assumption is justified because B2B buyers are not likely to switch purchases 
between passenger vehicles and cargo vans following a product recall, due to their different uses, 
customer segments, and so forth.49  
By choosing cargo vans as the control group in our DiD framework, our empirical 
strategy affords us the natural ability to explore the price implication of product recalls should 
our B2B buyers switch among passenger vehicle segments (e.g., midsize to fullsize) both within 
the recalled automaker and to the recalled automakers competitors. Thus, our choice of control 
group (cargo van) helps mitigate estimation biases that arise in studies that use non-recalled 
passenger vehicles as the control group (e.g., Ater and Yosef 2018; Che et al. 2020; Strittmatter 
and Lechner 2020). We also check that that cargo van recalls do not overlap with each other. 
Focusing on passenger vehicle category50 leads to a universe of 488 unique recalls (an 
average of 1 recall every 2.99 days). Due to such high frequency, to establish the causal impact 
of a single recall, we must carefully select events to avoid any potential contamination that may 
arise from overlapping recalls. Hence we use the following three steps to isolate specific recall 
events. First, similar to event studies (e.g., Agrawal and Kamakura 1995; Chen et al. 2009), we 
apply a narrow, one-day window {-1, +1} for vehicle transactions before and after the recall 
announcement. If a focal recall occurs on day 0, transactions one day prior and one day later 
enter the empirical analysis. The auction prices for yet-to-be-recalled make-model-year vehicles 
before the recall is announced constitute the credible counterfactual for post-recall prices, had the 
                                                      
49 Conceptually, this is similar to the approach used by Liu and Shankar (2015), who use the characteristics of 
nonpassenger vehicle categories (e.g., minivan, light truck) to build instruments for the passenger car category. 
Moreover, in the automobile industry, competition occurs primarily within a vehicle segment (Albuquerque and 
Bronnenberg 2012), i.e., customers first select a segment (e.g., compact, full-size) and then choose among the 
various car brands within it (Zhou et al. 2019). 
50 We exclude recalls in other categories (buses, motorbikes, pickups, recreational vehicles, and trucks) as well. 
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recall not been issued. Transactions on day 0 are excluded; they arguably could be part of either 
the pre- or post-recall group.51 The {-1, +1} transaction window assumes that B2B buyers 
quickly adjust in response to product recalls; any influence on used vehicle auction prices 
beyond day 1 is not addressed directly in our model (we test a different window as a robustness 
check, as detailed in Section 6.4). However, if the effects persist, our {-1, +1} window offers a 
conservative estimate of the full effect of product recalls. The narrow time window also is 
appealing, because it mitigates the potential for confounding effects by other exogenous shocks 
or proximate product recalls (Figure 4.1). To ensure that other trailing or following recalls do not 
influence pre-recall observations for a focal recall, we require that, for a focal recall on day 0, 
any trailing recall must be at least two days separate, and the following recall should be at least 
one day apart. This means that for the {-1, +1} period auction transactions to be valid for 
analysis, the focal recall event window is {-2, +1}. This step helps us avoid overlap among recall 
impact and filter recall events.  
Second, to avoid correlational effects across makes, we consider single-make recalls 
only. For example, if a recall includes both Acura and Lexus vehicles, any post-recall changes 
for Acura vehicles cannot be credibly attributed to the Acura recall, because Lexus buyers might 
have switched to Acura due to the simultaneous Lexus recall, and vice versa. Third, as part of 
our mandate to include only passenger vehicles in the treatment group, we remove any recall that 
also includes other vehicle categories.52 For example, a Dodge recall (campaign number 
08E064000) included both sports utility vehicles (Durango) and pickup trucks (Dakota). We 
dropped this event from the analysis, because pickup trucks are not part of the treatment group. 
                                                      
51 We do not observe the exact time during day 0 that a recall notice becomes public knowledge. 
52 These include buses, motorbikes, pickup trucks, recreational vehicles, and trucks. 
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Importantly, fewer makes are available for the control group than the treatment group of 
passenger vehicles, because fewer automakers compete in the cargo van category. Hence, to 
avoid unobserved factors and to ensure the similarity of automakers in both treatment and control 
group, we consider the same set of vehicle makes, which appear in both passenger vehicle and 
cargo van category. We observe four makes in the cargo van category (Chevrolet, Dodge, Ford, 
and Volkswagen). Therefore, the treatment group also consists of these four automakers, which 
correspond to 13 passenger vehicle models (e.g., Focus, Jetta) and 48 unique make-model-year 
units (e.g., Ford-Focus-2005, Dodge-Caravan-2002). Limiting the treatment group to these four 
makes produces 19 unique recalls (Table 4.3) for the estimation. This multistep procedure 
enables us to create recall events that do not overlap with other recalls and avoid other 
confounding factors. None of these events overlaps with any cargo van (control group) recall. 
We then collect B2B auction transactions around these chosen events for the DiD estimation. 
(Please see Table 4.3) 
We also apply several sample selection criteria to the raw data. The odometer readings 
and prices of sold vehicles must be positive. The vehicle condition value must be a non-negative 
number, because this variable can vary only from 0 to 5. To match the auction data period (2005-
2008), we only consider vehicles with model year 2008 or earlier. We drop transactions where 
vehicle’s model-year value is greater than the vehicle’s auction year. To address missing 
segment information for vehicle observations, we refer to the EPA website.53 To ensure 
uniformity, we also check the make and model names in both auction and recall data. 
We create four product groups for the analysis (Figure 4.2). Product group 1 includes 
passenger vehicles recalled by the automaker or the regulator; NHSTA database provides make-
                                                      
53 See https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/download.shtml, accessed December 2020. 
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model-year of recalled vehicles (e.g., Ford Fiesta 2005). Product group 2 consists of passenger 
vehicles that do not face recall, though they belong to the same make as the recalled vehicle. If 
Acura MDX faces recall, its Product group 2 would comprise non-recalled Acura models (e.g., 
Acura RDX). Product group 3 vehicles did not experience a recall, and they belong to competing 
makes. For example, for Acura MDX recall, group 3 might refer to Toyota models. Finally, 
Product group 4 contains the cargo van category vehicles (control group). 
(Please see Figure 4.2) 
For each product group, we seek to answer various research questions. With product 
groups 1 and 4, we can apply the DiD estimator to quantify the direct impact of product recalls 
on transaction prices for the recalled product. Product groups 2 and 4 indicate the effect on the 
transaction prices of unaffected products that belong to the recalled automaker. Product groups 3 
and 4 indicate the effect on the transaction prices of unaffected products of other automakers that 
do not face any recall. 
Estimation 
Using the naturally occurring variation in the timing of the various product recalls, 
coupled with our DiD estimator, we credibly estimate the causal impact of product recalls on the 
wholesale used vehicle transactions with auto dealers (buyers and sellers). Figure 4.3 displays 
the change in mean auction prices, before and after recalls, revealing that the mean auction price 
is lower one day after a recall than one-day prior. A product recall may have a negative impact 
on the transaction prices of recalled products in used vehicle markets. However, the mean prices 
for product group 2, non-recalled models with the same make, are higher one day after the recall 
than one day before, implying a positive spillover effect. We also observe changes in the auction 
prices of vehicles of other makes, in product group 3, reflecting a negative spillover effect on 
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competitors. These results are exploratory, but they imply the possibility of determining direct 
and spillover effects of product recalls in the empirical context of B2B used vehicle sales. 
(Please see Figure 4.3) 
We use the following basic model specification for our analysis: 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼3𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (3) 
where i corresponds to a particular group (treatment or control), and j corresponds to pre vs post 
recall period. Pij  is the used vehicle’s transaction price in group i in j period. The indicator 
Treatedi takes a value of 1 for the treatment group and 0 otherwise. Postrecallj equals 1 for the 
post-recall period and 0 otherwise. The coefficient 𝛼𝛼3 captures the impact of the product recall 
on the treated group in the post-recall period.  
To reduce threats from omitted factors, we include a battery of fixed effects that account 
for time-invariant differences between the treatment and control groups. First, vehicle-specific 
fixed effects (make and models) account for unobserved time-invariant differences that could 
affect both recall probability and prices. For example, a specific make might follow a higher 
manufacturing quality standard due to host country quality regulations, which could affect the 
vehicle’s recall probability. The quality differential also would affect prices, because high-
quality vehicles would be more desirable to buyers. Second, time fixed effects (year, month, and 
weekday) account for seasonality and macroeconomic trends. Kini et al. (2017) find that poor 
financial conditions affect quality, which may lead to more recalls. Therefore, we anticipate that 
economic cycles, such as recessions, not only affect the recall probability but also affect prices, if 
demand decreases during economic slowdowns. Third, we control for time-invariant cross-
sectional differences in demand conditions across auction locations using regional fixed effects.  
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The secondary market setting also requires us to address some potential unobserved 
differences between otherwise identical vehicles, a problem absent in new vehicle markets. In 
particular, two identical make-model-year vehicles might differ greatly, depending on their 
levels of wear-and-tear or mileage. We include the condition score, as reported in the vehicle’s 
condition report (Table WB 4.1; Appendix). We include the vehicle-specific odometer reading 
that provides a flexible measure of the effect of mileage on prices; vehicles with fewer miles 
generally attract more attention and potentially a price premium. These features also account for 
a vehicle’s durability. A higher quality rating vehicle should be more durable than a lower 
quality rating vehicle. Therefore, the vehicle’s condition score would account for its durability. 
Vehicle-specific odometer reading would also capture the variation in vehicles’ durability levels. 
Make and model level fixed effects would control for time-invariant unobservables (e.g., better 
manufacturing facility) that influence a vehicle’s durability. We also integrate an element of the 
competitive environment by considering if the auctioned vehicle was part of a closed sale 
(limited to specific franchised dealers). Auctioneer also provides a labor cost estimate to improve 
the vehicle condition. Controlling for labor costs, which could affect auction prices, helps 
delineate the true impact of the focal recalls. 
Finally, we address some auction features. The lane in which a vehicle appears and its 
sequence within the lane can directly affect prices (Grether et al. 2009). This allow us to allay 
control for unobserved factors such as systematic differences (if any) in the number of potential 
bidders across lanes and over time within the same auction date. We do so because some buyers 
specialize in specific makes, models, or vehicle types; for example, franchise dealers will focus 
on lanes that contain the types of vehicles they want. In turn, auctioneers might group vehicles 
by particular criteria, such as make, in specific lanes or according to a particular sequence to 
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attract larger crowds. Including the sequence number for each vehicle also allows us to 
incorporates the possibility that potential buyers may have less money to spend later in the 
auction than earlier in the auction (Grether et al. 2009). 
In addition, we also condition on the number of times the vehicle moves through the 
auction lane, as well as whether the vehicle was registered on the auctioneer firm’s proprietary 
online platform. Online auctions could increase competition among buyers and thus affect prices. 
Including proprietary platform dummy controls for any systematic differences (e.g., financial 
resources) that might mark buyers who tend to participate online. We also control for the seller’s 
category (dealer/daily rental/factory/lease) for each vehicle. We also indicate if the seller/buyer 
is part of a mega group. Table 4.4 contains the definitions and sources for these covariates. 
(Please see Table 4.4) 
A key identifying assumption of a DiD setting is the parallel trend assumption; in the 
absence of treatment, the difference between the treatment and control groups should be constant 
over time. We validate this assumption by comparing the treatment group’s prices with that of 
the control group during the pretreatment period. This assumption establishes that the treatment 
and control group prices would have changed at a similar rate in the absence of treatment. We 
estimate the following model to assess the parallel trends assumption: 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟) = 𝜃𝜃0 + 𝜃𝜃1𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟 𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟=5𝑟𝑟=1 + ∑ 𝛾𝛾𝑟𝑟 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟=5𝑟𝑟=1 + 𝜃𝜃2𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 
            (4) 
where 𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑟𝑟 takes value 1 when it is t day prior to the recall and 0 otherwise. We defined the 
other variables earlier. We consider a set of 𝛽𝛽 coefficients for each day (day -5 to day -1) prior to 
the recall event (0th day); these 𝛽𝛽 coefficients estimate the difference in the price between the 
treatment and control groups on a specific day prior to the recall. As shown in Table WB 4.2 
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(Appendix), we do not find statistically significant differences in the pretreatment price between 
the treatment and control groups. 
Building on equation 3, the final model specification takes the following form: 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼3𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼4𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃 +
𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖             (5) 
where i corresponds to a particular group (treatment or control). Treatedi takes a value of 1 for 
the treatment group and 0 otherwise. Postrecallj equals 1 for the post-recall period and 0 
otherwise. Covariates include several vehicle features, auction features, and fixed effects. 
A potential threat to identification stems from the concern that a recall may motivate sellers 
to sell recalled vehicles, which would cause selection bias. To temper any residual concern from 
potential selection bias, our main empirical analysis focuses on a narrow window {-1 day, +1 
day} pre- and post recall announcement. We limit our sample to this small window because it is 
highly unlikely that a potential seller would be able to adjust the composition of vehicles they 
bring to the auction floor the day before/after the recall announcement. This lack of adjustment 
possibility arises because, in order to sell vehicle in the auction, the seller has to follow few 
administrative practices (e.g., bringing vehicles to the lot, competing vehicle registration, 
obtaining condition report), which happen at least few days in advance. Thus, we are unlikely to 
observe a surge in vehicles’ supply in the auction on the 1st day due to a recall on the 0th day.  
Results 
Direct Effects 
The net impact of recalls on dealers’ demand responses during used vehicle purchase is 
not clear ex ante. On the one hand, negativity associated with the recall could make a defective 
vehicle an undesirable proposition. This could lead to lower demand for the recalled vehicle in 
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the B2B auction. Federal law does not prohibit dealers from selling a used car with an 
outstanding recall; therefore, dealers can sell the vehicle without any recall repair. On the other 
hand, the dealer may decide to repair the defect to improve the vehicle quality. Since automakers 
pay for the repair costs, this quality improvement occurs at no cost for the dealer.54,55 Such 
possible quality improvement might offset the negativity associated with the recall and 
encourage dealers to consider recalled vehicles’ purchases. These two opposing factors (recall 
negativity and quality improvement) lead to a potential trade-off. The net impact on used vehicle 
auction prices from these two countervailing forces is not entirely obvious ex ante and remains 
an open empirical question in our used vehicles B2B context. 
We first estimate Equation 5 with product group 1 (recalls) as the treatment group. The 
dependent variable (price) is a natural log, so the coefficients in the regression represent the 
proportionate change in price for a one-unit change in the independent variable. In Table 4.5 
(Column 2), the interaction coefficient is negative and significant (𝛽𝛽 = −.106,𝑝𝑝 < .05), 
revealing that used vehicle prices in the treatment group decrease by 10.06% (100*(1 − 𝑇𝑇−.106)) 
relative to the control group in the post-recall period.56 A used passenger vehicle with an average 
price of $10,369 would experience a loss of $1,043. It appears that any favorable demand effect, 
due to the improved, repaired condition of the vehicle (and potential profits) might be offset by 
                                                      
54 Few dealers may even see the recall as an opportunity to enhance customer satisfaction and repeat business. See 
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/despite-three-year-increase-in-recalls-satisfaction-among-recall-
customers-continues-to-climb-300051934.html, accessed December 2020. 
55 The repair process may also carry some costs (e.g., storing and insuring the vehicle while it is waiting for the 
repair, depreciation costs), which might reduce recalled vehicle’s future profitability. Dealers cannot completely 
control these costs, as repair process is also dependent on the affiliated entities (e.g., vehicle manufacturers). During 
2010–2014, approximately 46% of recalls took more than 45 days to be repaired (NADA 2015). Currently, this 
study does not focus on the future profitability of used car transaction between dealer and the consumer. 




the negative effect of the costs associated with the vehicle. Thus, recalled vehicles are less 
financially desirable, which lowers dealers ’willingness to pay at auction. Next, to address 
potential heterogeneity in these effects, we explore four key dimensions: whether the recall 
involved a single or multiple models, who initiated the recall, the vehicle mileage, and the type 
of buyer/dealer. 
Breadth of Recall: We measure the breadth of a recall according to whether it involves 
one or more vehicle models (e.g., Civic). A recall that involves multiple models indicates a 
widespread issue, imposes a greater financial burden on the manufacturer, and may delay remedy 
actions. Such outcomes likely exacerbate dealers’ concerns about buying such models. The 
“Multimodel” variable thus takes a value of 1 if more than one model is involved in the recall 
and 0 otherwise. For the recalled vehicles in product group 1 (Table 4.5, Column 3), we obtain 
separate interaction terms for single and multiple make recalls and find that the interaction 
coefficients, (𝛽𝛽 = −.100,𝑝𝑝 < .05) and (𝛽𝛽 = −.193,𝑝𝑝 < .05), respectively, are negative and 
significant.
𝑇𝑇
57 A recall with multiple models appears to generate strong negative response from 
dealers, suggesting a 17.55% (100*(1 − −.193)) lower prices (equivalent to $1,819). One 
possible explanation for this result could be that recalls involving multiple model likely increase 
dealers ’concerns about repair processes and associated costs. 
Initiator of Recall: Dealers’ responses to the recall could vary depending on who initiates 
the recall (automaker/regulator). On the one hand, a voluntary recall (initiated by a firm) might 
portray the firm as a socially responsible and could reduce the threat of regulatory actions 
(Govindaraj et al. 2004). A voluntary recall might also produce negative outcomes in the form of 
stock market losses (Chen et al. 2009). On the other hand, a mandatory recall (recommended by 
                                                      
57 These two coefficients are not significantly different from each other ((F=1.22, p = .2701). 
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the regulator) may help the automaker avoid costs in the short-term but with the possible risk of 
future regulatory actions (Rupp 2001). A few studies explore the differential impacts of this 
dimension and report mixed results. For example, Jarrell and Peltzman (1985) find limited 
support for the differential impact of recall types on the stock market. In contrast, Liu et al. 
(2017) note positive long-term returns due to a voluntary recall. These studies consider stock 
market outcomes, which reflect investors’ expectations of the present value of future cash flows 
associated with the firm. In the used vehicle market, the price response instead reflects dealers’ 
perceptions of the value of purchasing a used vehicle. Thus, stock market findings might not 
extend to the used vehicle market. 
To understand if automobile recalls impact dealers’ transactions, we create a “MFRInflu” 
variable, which equals 1 for a voluntary recall and 0 otherwise. Results indicate that mandatory 
recalls exert a more negative impact (𝛽𝛽 = −.112,𝑝𝑝 < .05) on auction prices (Table 4.5, Column 
4), suggesting 10.59% lower prices (approximately $1,098); one possible reason could be that 
dealers use mandatory recalls as a signal for the automaker’s lack of willingness or financial 
resources to deal with the defect. Such perceptions likely worry dealers that rely on 
manufacturers to provide repair services and weaken demand for vehicles under mandatory 
recalls. Results do not indicate any negative impact of voluntary recalls; it suggests that buyers 
consider it a positive signal of the automaker’s intentions and preparedness, which could allay 
dealers’ concerns about the remedy plan. 
Vehicle Mileage: We also explore heterogeneity with respect to a key vehicle-specific 
characteristic: mileage reading. We interact Treated X Postrecall with the vehicle’s odometer 
reading to reflect the heterogeneity of vehicles at different stages of their lifecycle. Buyers may 
respond differently to recalls for vehicles that are relatively new and less used or older and 
 
 140 
frequently used. Older vehicles might require more frequent repair and maintenance due to 
natural wear and tear, so a recall might act as an additional signal of quality issue to accentuate 
the need for future maintenance; dealers would be hesitant about acquiring such products. In 
Table 4.5, for product group 1, the interaction coefficient (𝛽𝛽 = −.002,𝑝𝑝 < .05) is negative and 
significant, suggesting that recalled vehicles with more mileage suffer more negative impact in 
terms of their auction prices. An increment of 1000 more miles on the odometer reading leads to 
a .2% (100*(1 − e−.002)) reduction in the auction prices of the treated units in the postrecall 
period. Put differently, a used vehicle with an open recall, with an average price of $10,369, 
would lose $20.7 for every additional 1000 miles. 
Type of Buyer: Unlike B2C buyers, B2B auto dealers differ in terms of their affiliation 
with a vehicle manufacturer (i.e., franchise agreement). While franchise agreements apply only 
to new vehicles, it may limit the composition of used vehicles a franchise dealer may elect to 
acquire in the auction. For example, a Ford franchise dealer may be less willing to acquire a non-
Ford used vehicle and/or have a higher willingness to pay for a Ford used vehicle than a used 
non-Ford vehicle in the auction. Therefore, a franchise dealer’s differential preference and 
differential willingness to pay could temper the negative impact of the product recall. In contrast, 
a franchise dealer’s business structure may also have an opposing influence. Franchise dealers 
earn revenue through two streams (new cars and used cars). If any unfavorable event (e.g., 
recall) influences one revenue stream (e.g., used car business), they could rely on the other 
stream (e.g., new car business). Possibility of this alternative source of revenue may make 
franchise dealers less likely to conduct any business transaction (e.g., purchasing vehicles subject 
to recall) that could incur additional costs (e.g., storing). In this scenario, franchise dealers may 
decide not to purchase recalled vehicles, unless the auction price is very low (so the dealer still 
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can earn a reasonable profit even with the additional costs). Thus, franchise dealers may display 
a higher sensitivity to the product recall leading to an even greater downward pressure on 
transacted prices on the recalled products belonging the same franchise as the dealer. Given the 
countervailing forces, the net impact of dealer’s franchise affiliation on transacted prices of the 
recalled product remains an open empirical question. 
To study this effect, we categorize a dealer into one of the two groups (franchise or 
independent) based on its affiliation. A franchised dealer usually features the associated make or 
manufacturer name in its name (e.g., “Smith Honda Dealership”). Using this information, we 
create a “Franchised” variable that takes a value of 1 if the buyer is a franchise dealer and 0 
otherwise. According to Table 4.5 (Column 6), the interaction coefficient that measures the 
impact on treatment unit prices in the post recall period (𝛽𝛽 = −.001, n. s.) is negative but 
statistically non-significant. Thus, the type of buyer does not seem to systematically impact 
transacted prices of the recalled product. 
(Please see Table 4.5) 
Spillover Effects 
The demand pattern for non-recalled vehicles (product groups 2 and 3) also might change 
with a recall, in line with evidence citing (e.g., Freedman et al. 2012; Marsh et al. 2004) spillover 
effects in consumers’ reactions to recalls. Empirical studies document the spillover effect of 
negative events on other products of the same manufacturer (e.g., Borah and Tellis 2016). For 
example, Liu and Shankar (2015) find negative spillover effects of the recall of a sub-brand on 
the market shares of other sub-brands under the same parent-brand name. Previous research also 
highlights the presence of spillover effect among competitors in different settings (e.g., Ozturk et 
al. 2019; Roehm and Tybout 2006). For example, Freedman et al. (2012) find that competing 
manufacturers lose sales due to a large-scale toy recall’s negative spillover effects; dubbed as a 
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“contagion effect” (Ozturk et al. 2019). A recall signals negative information about the product’s 
industry, so it could lower consumers’ confidence and damage the competitors that produce non-
recalled products. Similarly, Warner (1977) discusses that if a bankruptcy reveals negative 
information about the industry, the negative information could negatively affect competitors’ 
outcomes (i.e., stock prices). 
Importantly, positive spillover effects are also possible (“competitive effect”) in our 
context; potential buyers of recalled products might switch to other non-recalled products 
following a recall crisis. The dealers want to maintain their business, so they likely seek 
alternatives if their preferred options face recalls; this could lead to higher demand for non-
recalled vehicles at the auction. Again, positive spillover effects could be on other products of 
the same automaker or other automakers in the segment. 
To shed light on these effects, we again estimate Equation 5 with product group 2 as the 
treatment group. In the {-1, +1} window, no other recall shocks occur, so any significant change 
in the auction prices of vehicles that were not recalled would suggest a contagion/competitive 
effect. In Column 1 of Table 4.6, we find a positive, significant coefficient (𝛽𝛽 = −.120,𝑝𝑝 < .05) 
for Treated X Postrecall interaction and evidence of the competitive effect, suggesting that used 
vehicle prices in the product group 2 increases by 12.74% (100*(e.120 − 1)) relative to the 
control group in the post-recall period. This result may indicate that dealers substitute recalled 
models with non-recalled models of the same make, leading to a price increase for product group 
2. When we incorporate other covariates (Column 2, Table 4.6), the coefficient remains 
directionally consistent (𝛽𝛽 = −.024,𝑙𝑙. 𝑃𝑃.) but is not statistically significant. This finding 
warrants additional scrutiny. Thus, we explore heterogeneity across different dimensions, similar 
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to those we tested in the main effects analysis in Section 5.1. We also analyze spillover to non-
recalled vehicles of competing makes (i.e., product group 3) in Table 4.7. 
Segment Overlap: Building on prior research (e.g., Ozturk et al. 2019), we explore 
heterogeneity along the vehicle segment (compact, full-size, luxury, midsize, minivan, sports, 
sport utility vehicle, subcompact, and wagon). We examine whether non-recalled models display 
any significant change in prices when (1) non-recalled and recalled models belong to the same 
segment, or (2) non-recalled and recalled models belong to different segments. Any significant 
change in non-recalled models’ prices would highlight whether dealers substitute to non-recalled 
models due to recalls. Substitution could lead to increased demand and price in a B2B auction. 
We also posit that non-recalled models, which belong to the same segment as the recalled 
model, may experience negative spillover effects (reduction in prices). This negative spillover 
may stem from dealers perceiving added uncertainty purchasing vehicles with the same segment 
of the recalled product. Importantly, this within-segment spillover could be on other products of 
the same automaker or other automakers in the segment. 
In line with previous spillover research (e.g., Borah and Tellis 2016), we explore the 
possibility of a negative spillover effect on the demand for non-recalled vehicles that belong to 
the same segment as the recalled vehicle and the same automaker. For example, different models 
of the same automaker may share manufacturing processes or contain same vehicle parts, so a 
defect in one model could appear in the future in other, non-recalled model. Thus, dealers might 
avoid all vehicles of the segment, which includes the recalled model; lower demand for these 
non-recalled models would cause lower prices in the B2B auction market. Therefore, consistent 
with previous research (e.g., Freedman et al. 2012), we could also observe negative spillover 
 
 144 
effects on the non-recalled models that belong to a different automaker but the same segment as 
the recalled model, leading to lower prices in the B2B auction market. 
Dealers (i.e., B2B buyers) may decide to defer their purchases to a later date or seek 
alternatives. Dealers are less likely to defer (in comparison to seeking an alternative vehicle) 
because they need to maintain their businesses. Thus, they likely seek vehicle alternatives in 
other segments, which do not include the recalled model. For example, let us consider that the 
Yaris model (subcompact vehicle segment) of Toyota automaker faces recall. Therefore, dealers 
might switch to non-recalled models in the compact vehicle segment (i.e., segments different 
from the recall model’s segment). Higher demand for non-recalled models in the compact 
segment could lead to higher prices for these vehicles in the B2B auction (this positive spillover 
effect is similar to the “competitive effect” discussed in Ozturk et al. 2019). Importantly, dealers 
may switch segments either within the same automaker (e.g., Toyota-compact to Toyota-SUV) 
or across a different automaker (e.g., Toyota-compact to Honda-SUV). We consider both 
possibilities in our empirical analysis. 
Switch within the same automaker (i.e., product group 2): We posit that dealers are more 
likely to switch to non-recalled models within the same automaker. The rationale is that dealers 
prefer to purchase used vehicles of the same make that their affiliated manufacturer produces 
(Hortaçsu et al. 2013). For example, a Toyota affiliated dealer is more likely to seek non-recalled 
models that belong to Toyota in the B2B market. Furthermore, auto dealers might be more 
historically popular for specific make vehicles (e.g., Lexus vs Toyota) among consumers. Such 
reputational association might also limit dealers’ vehicle purchases in the used vehicle market as 
dealers would like to buy those vehicles that are more likely to be bought by the consumers. 
Dealers might also have vehicle part contracts with certain make-specific part suppliers. Due to 
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these constraints (e.g., franchise association, reputation, supplier contracts), we expect dealers to 
switch to non-recalled models within the same automaker (for example, Toyota to Toyota) than 
across a different automaker (for example, Toyota to Honda). Thus, we are more likely to 
observe the aforementioned positive spillover effect (which leads to higher prices) for non-
recalled models that belong to the same automaker as the recalled model. 
In order to estimate this effect, we create a segment overlap dummy by matching the non-
recalled vehicle segment with the recalled vehicle segment. For example, Ford Focus belongs to 
the compact car segment. Therefore, the Ford Focus recall would produce a segment overlap 
dummy value of 1 for any compact car and 0 otherwise. We interact Treated X Postrecall with 
overlap dummy in our main specification, as detailed in Column 3 of Table 4.6. The significant 
and positive interaction coefficient for Treated X Postrecall (𝛽𝛽 = .048,𝑝𝑝 < .05) confirms the 
positive spillover effect (when segment overlap dummy is 0). For product group 2, dealers’ 
switch to non-recalled models that do not belong to the same segment as the recalled model leads 
to 4.91% (100*(e.048 − 1)) higher prices for those non-recalled vehicles (an approximate 
increase of $509). The interaction coefficient for Treated X Postrecall X Segment overlap is 
negative (𝛽𝛽 = −.105,𝑝𝑝 < .05); the negative spillover leads to reduced demand for non-recalled 
vehicles in the same segment as the recalled vehicle (segment overlap dummy =1), causing 
5.54% (100*(1 − e−.057)) lower prices (an approximate decrease of $574). 
Switch across different automakers (i.e., product group 3): Dealers may also switch to 
non-recalled models from a different automaker. We repeat the aforementioned segment dummy 
analysis to examine changes in non-recalled models’ prices for this group. 
First consider the non-recalled vehicles belong to the same segment as the recalled 
vehicle. As discussed in the previous section, similar segment models (even though they belong 
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to a different automaker) might still experience the negative spillover effect (contagion effect), 
which would lead to lower demand and lower prices. However, these non-recalled models might 
also experience the positive spillover effect (competitive effect due to dealers’ switch), which 
could increase these vehicles’ prices. Determination of which of these two effects would be 
dominant would require empirical scrutiny.58 
In comparison, the non-recalled models that belong to a different segment may not 
experience the negative spillover effect (because of the different segments). However, these 
models may still experience a positive spillover effect (if dealers switch to these non-recalled 
models), leading to higher demand. But, this effect might be weak as dealers are less likely to 
switch across different automakers (as discussed previously). Determining whether this spillover 
effect would lead to significant change in prices needs to be empirically analysed. 
Column 3 of Table 4.7 contains the spillover results for product group 3. The interaction 
coefficient (𝛽𝛽 = −.058,𝑝𝑝 < .05) for the Treated X Postrecall X Segment overlap (segment 
overlap dummy = 1) is negative, which suggests that negative spillover also affects non-recalled 
vehicles that belong to competing automakers but same segment and leads to 5.63% 
(100*(1 − e−.058)) lower prices compared to competing automaker vehicles that belong to 
different segments (an approximate decrease of $583 for a used vehicle with an average price of 
$10,369). This negative spillover effect is consistent with prior research on contagion effect (e.g., 
Ozturk et al. 2019). Moreover, the non-significant Treated X Postrecall coefficient (𝛽𝛽 =
−.029, n. s.) suggests the positive spillover is limited to same-make vehicles (Table 4.7, Column 
3). This result is consistent with our earlier discussion of dealers’ affiliations; if dealers prefer 
                                                      
58 As discussed in the previous section, dealers might be less likely to switch across different automakers (e.g., 
Toyota midsize vehicle to Ford midsize vehicle) due to dealers’ constraints (e.g., affiliation with automakers, 
reputation). This might weaken the positive spillover (competitive) effect. 
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specific makes, due to their franchise relationship with the automaker, they are more likely to 
seek vehicles with affiliated makes as substitutes for a recalled model. 
Breadth of Recall: We test this effect by interacting recall breadth (single vs. multiple 
model recall dummy) with the Treated X Postrecall effect. The interaction coefficient in Table 
4.6 (Column 4) shows that recalls involving multiple models display significant positive 
spillover effects (𝛽𝛽 = −.178,𝑝𝑝 < .05) on the within-make product group 2; the prices for non-
recalled models increase by 19.48% (100*(e.178 − 1)) due to a recall that spans across more than 
one model. Two factors likely underlie this positive spillover effect. First, a recall that involves 
multiple models affects more buyers, who now may look for possible substitutes among non-
recalled models of the same make. Second, now there are fewer non-recalled substitutes with the 
same make because more models are part of the recall group. This combination should lead to 
higher demand for non-recalled models (positive spillover effects). We do not find this effect for 
product group 3 (Column 4, Table 4.7), so the positive spillover due to buyers ’inclination to 
look for non-recalled substitutes appears limited mainly to the within-make group. 
Type of Buyer: We find heterogeneous responses by buyer types. For vehicles with the 
same make (Column 7, Table 4.6), the interaction coefficient (𝛽𝛽 = .034,𝑝𝑝 < .05) is positive and 
statistically significant, indicating that franchise dealers exert positive effects on the demand 
pattern for the make with which they are affiliated. Franchise dealers tend to be larger, with more 
resources (Genesove 1993), so all else being equal, they may be able to pay higher prices for 
non-recalled vehicles. Vehicles purchased by dealers with franchise affiliation with the vehicle 
display 3.45% (100*(e.034 − 1)) higher prices compared to the vehicles purchased by a dealer 
with no franchise affiliation with the vehicle. We do not find such effect for product group 3 
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(Column 7, Table 4.7), so positive spillovers (related to franchise dealers) are limited to the 
within-make group. We do not find heterogeneous spillover effects across recall initiators. 
(Please see Table 4.6 and 4.7) 
Robustness Assessment 
Potential Selection Bias 
Our empirical analysis thus far is limited to sold vehicles. Should recalls not only affect 
the transacted prices of sold vehicles but also affect the probability of selling a recalled vehicle, 
then our sold-only sample may be subject to selection bias. In order to address this concern, we 
apply a two-step Heckman correction model. In the first step, we model the likelihood of the 
vehicle being sold (Ti = 1 vs. Ti = 0) with a binary Probit structure, using vehicle characteristics 
and market variables. The Heckman method introduces a correlation between the error term of 
the selection equation and the price equation, in the form of the inverse Mills ratio (IMR) as a 
selection correction term. We use this IMR term in the second step (price model) to address 
potential selection bias. 
For model identification purposes, the Heckman selection approach requires an exclusion 
restriction; there exists at least one predictor variable that affects the probability of sale of the 
vehicle but not impact the transacted price of the sold price (Chen et al. 2009). Therefore, we 
consider the number of similar vehicles offered for auction on a particular day in the same 
region.59 For example, for a Honda-Accord-2006 auction on January 1, 2008, we count the 
number of Honda-Accord-2006 vehicles offered for auction on the same day in that region (e.g., 
Northeast, Southeast). More similar unit options may affect the probability of sale for the focal 
                                                      
59 Each auction site belongs to one of six U.S. regions (Northeast, Southeast, Southwest, West coast, Midwest, and 
Florida). 07% of observations did not contain any region information so these were grouped as “other”. It has no 
effect on results. 
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units, but it should not affect a focal unit’s auction price directly. We add this variable to the 
selection equation but exclude it from the second stage for identification (Puhani 2000). 
The Heckman model results for the product group 1 (recalled vehicles) reveal a 
significant and positive IMR (𝛽𝛽 = .115,𝑝𝑝 < .05; Column 1, Table 4.8); this indicates that the 
error terms of the selection model and price model are positively correlated. However, even after 
correcting for the selection bias, the results remain consistent with our previous model (Column 
2, Table 4.5). Recall does not affect the first-stage model (𝛽𝛽 = −.190, n. s. Column 1, Table 4.8). 
The exclusion variable vehicle count is significant and negative (𝛽𝛽 = −.014,𝑝𝑝 < .05), consistent 
with our intuition that more alternative, similar vehicles generally lower the sale probability of a 
specific, focal vehicle. The results for product groups 2 and 3 also are in line with previous 
results. (Please see Table 4.8) 
Matching Analysis 
As an additional robustness test, we combine our DiD estimation strategy with 
propensity-score matching (PSM) to address imbalances in the key variables between the 
treatment and control groups and create a control group in which the observable covariates are 
similar to those for an average treatment group. We first estimate the propensity score for the 
recall (treatment) group, then estimate the DiD model as a weighted least squares regression with 
the weights estimated from the PSM algorithms. Through this process, we ensure the treatment 
group features a similar average level of observable covariates as the control group. We use 
kernel matching method, so the weighted average of all controls for each treated observation is 
inversely proportional to the distance between propensity scores. The results for this analysis are 
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reported in Table 4.9, Panel 1. Our main DiD finding remain robust even after undertaking 
propensity-score matching.60 
Different Control Groups 
We also check the robustness of recall’s direct effect on B2B used vehicles market by 
considering different control groups. First, we consider the non-recalled vehicles of the same 
automaker as a control group. In Table 4.9 (Panel 2), we show that the results remain consistent; 
the interaction coefficient is significant and directionally negative (𝛽𝛽 = −.069,𝑝𝑝 < .05). 
Considering the non-recalled vehicles of other automakers as a control group also suggests 
similar results, with a negative and significant coefficient (𝛽𝛽 = −.050,𝑝𝑝 < .05). 
(Please see Table 4.9) 
Different Transaction Windows 
For the same set of recalls in the main analysis, we also consider a {-2, +2} window for 
the auction transactions, such that the recall carryover effect would persist for two days. We 
present the results for product groups 1–3 in Table WB 4.5 (Appendix). 
Concluding Remarks  
Extant empirical research on product recalls has focused exclusively on consumer-side 
reactions to product recalls. Yet most industries that have been investigated thus far in this 
literature have distribution channels that comprise several B2B intermediary buyers, and the 
decisions of these buyers may also be impacted by product recalls. In parallel the extant literature 
on used products has paid limited attention to the impact of product recalls. Understanding B2B 
implications of product recalls is key to addressing the “B2B knowledge gap” (Lilien 2016) in 
the literature on used products. This study addresses this research gap. We do so by exploiting 
                                                      
60 We obtained similar results with radius matching method (Table WB 4.4; Appendix). 
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the exogenous timing of automobile recalls in the empirical context of used vehicles acquired by 
auto dealers in a B2B wholesale auction market. Specifically, the study examines whether, and to 
what extent auto recalls influence B2B buyers’ purchasing behavior of the recalled product 
(direct effect) and other products of the same automaker or other automakers (spillover effect). 
Contribution: The current study presents several insights that contribute to the extant 
literature on various dimensions. First, this study helps integrate two related yet divergent strands 
of literature in marketing, namely: the literatures on B2B transactions of used goods and the 
literature on product recalls, which thus far has been exclusively focused on new goods and has 
not explored B2B implications of product recalls. The empirical setting is the used vehicle 
wholesale auction market where dealers engage in vehicle purchases from other dealers. We find 
that the wholesale prices for a used vehicle that faces a recall decreases by 10.06% (an average 
drop of $1,043). Several recall and vehicle characteristics moderate this impact. For example, 
recalls that involve multiple models (rather than single-model recalls) cause a stronger negative 
impact on transaction prices. Mandatory recalls, initiated by the government agency, have 
stronger adverse effects on prices than the voluntary recalls. We also observe asymmetric 
impacts on prices due to vehicle mileage; a used vehicle suffers greater negative impacts as the 
odometer reading rises (an approximate loss of $21 for every 1000 miles accrued). 
Second, the study contributes to the literature by documenting the spillover effects of 
recalls in B2B markets. Previous studies identify recalls’ negative spillover to non-affected 
products of the same manufacturer or non-affected competitors in the category (e.g., Borah and 
Tellis 2016). These studies, however, explore only consumer-side reactions. We find both 
negative and positive spillover effects of recalls on other non-recalled models that belong to the 
same automaker in B2B markets. Specifically, non-recalled models, which belong to the same 
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vehicle segment as the recalled model, experience lower demand at B2B auction (thus about 
5.54% lower prices). This effect is consistent with the aforementioned consumer-side reactions 
that find a negative spillover effect on non-recalled products (contagion effect) due to diminished 
consumer confidence. Competing automakers’ non-recalled models, which belong to the same 
segment as the recalled model, also experience lower prices (about 5.63%) due to the contagion 
effect.  
We also observe a positive spillover effect. For the same automaker vehicles, we find that 
non-recalled models, which belong to a different segment as the recalled model, experience 
higher demand at B2B auction (thus about 4.91% higher prices). Positive spillover suggests 
dealers’ substitution to non-recalled models (competitive effect). Results also display interesting 
heterogeneity. For example, franchise dealers, which are affiliated with the recalled vehicle 
manufacturer, pay higher transaction prices (about 3.45% higher) for non-recalled models of the 
same make than the non-franchise dealers. This finding highlights that franchise relationships 
could be beneficial for associated automakers’ used vehicle demand. Our findings (direct and 
spillover effect) also suggest implications for the auctioneer because the auctioneer’s revenue is 
tied with vehicles’ sale prices. A lower/higher transaction price could decrease/increase the 
auctioneer’s revenue. 
Policy landscape: Our findings are also timely and policy relevant. For example, this 
study can directly inform the ongoing policy debate surrounding the recently proposed Used Car 
Safety Recall Repair Act. This proposed Act would mandate repairs for used vehicles subject to 
safety recalls before being sold, leased, or loaned to consumers (Congress 2019). Although the 
legislation would reduce consumers’ exposure to defective vehicles, it has evoked strong 
criticism from the NADA (2020), which asserted: “Due to a lack of replacement auto parts, it 
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can take months for recalled vehicles to be repaired. Since a used vehicle sitting idle on a 
dealer’s lot depreciates by 2% per month on average, this bill would force dealerships to either 
pay consumers significantly less for trade-ins with open recalls or not accept trade-ins at all.” 
Such discussion might partly explain why previous versions of this bill (S. 900, S.1634)61 did not 
pass in Congress. 
Our findings can inform this debate. For dealers, we show that recalled vehicles are 
vulnerable to adverse demand reactions, whereas non-recalled models of the same make could 
earn higher prices. Without claiming direct evidence of policy interventions’ impact, our study 
suggests how auto dealers adjust their demand for recalled products resulting in a spillover 
effects on non-recalled vehicles, even without any policy intervention. While we do not formally 
investigate the proposed guidelines advanced in the Used Car Safety Recall Repair Act, our 
findings do highlight a potential concern that the act may unintentionally further increase the 
demand for substitute (non-recalled) vehicles and prompt higher prices for them. Without a 
formal structural model we cannot speak to the welfare implications of such price adjustments to 
the end consumer.62 Given the B2B focus of this paper, a structural model focused on end-
consumers remains outside the scope of this study and a fruitful area of future policy research.  
Research implications: This study raises the possibility of exploring new research angles 
regarding automakers’ role in affecting dealers’ B2B purchases during recalls. For example, 
what could be the impact on dealers’ purchases if automakers invest in establishing more 
effective repair processes (e.g., quick availability of replacement parts for dealers during a 
                                                      
61 See Bill S.900: https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/900.  
See Bill S.1634: https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/1634, accessed April 2021. 
62 We do not observe retail prices for used vehicles sale to consumers, thus cannot assess implications for dealer’s 
profit for each vehicle transaction. 
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recall)? As discussed earlier, auto industry experts cite a lack of replacement auto parts during 
the recall process as a serious concern for the dealers because slow availability of vehicle parts 
could lead to additional costs such as depreciation, insurance, and storage (NADA 2015). 
Ideally, if a defective vehicle gets repaired without any delay or additional costs, the dealer 
should not be concerned about acquiring recalled vehicles in auctions. In such a scenario, B2B 
transactions of recalled vehicles might not observe any price change. However, currently such 
concerns do arise, which possibly change vehicles’ demand in auctions. Therefore, exploring 
how changes in the automaker’s repair processes could allay dealers’ concerns and provide 
buffer against a recall’s impact on the B2B secondary market could be a future research area. 
This study also carries research implications for the crisis communication between an 
automaker and the dealer. We find that focal automaker’s non-recalled vehicles, which belong to 
the same segment as the recalled vehicle, face a negative spillover effect. Roehm and Tybout 
(2006) discuss that stakeholders might activate a scandal spillover target (e.g., a category) as the 
scandal information is processed. When the scandal attribute is associated with the category, 
activation of a category as a spillover target is especially likely to occur. Therefore, what actions 
(i.e., immediate communication) could the marketing managers of focal automaker take to limit a 
recall’s spillover impact? What could be the key elements of such communication? Our study 
finds a negative spillover within the recalled vehicle’s segment (e.g., compact). Therefore, we 
speculate that as soon as there is a recall, automakers should swiftly relay relevant information 
(e.g., common suppliers, scope of defect) to dealers to explain how the defect does not affect its 
non-recalled vehicles. Helping disassociate defect information from non-recalled products could 
reduce the negative spillover impact. In particular, impact of recall seems to be stronger when a 
recall is government mandated.  
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Similarly, focus on other automakers, who do not face a recall, could present another 
research opportunity. Marketing managers of non-recalled automakers should keep an eye on 
others’ recall. We find that other automakers’ vehicles that belong to the same segment as the 
recalled vehicle also face a negative spillover. Roehm and Tybout (2006) discuss that 
competitors of the scandalized brand might also be considered guilty by association. Social 
comparison theory suggests that firms can protect their image or status by avoiding comparisons 
with another firm undergoing a crisis (Snyder, Lassegard, and Ford 1986). Therefore, if the 
automaker, which does not face a recall, proactively communicates information regarding how 
the specific recall does not associate with its vehicles, it could help possibly minimize the 
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Table 4.1: Selected Literature 
 











Drinks Primary B2C No Brand equity 
Existing consumers and potential 
future consumers expect different 
assurances from a recalling firm. 
Chen et al. 
(2009) 
Consume
r goods Primary B2C No Stock 
A proactive recall strategy has a 
stronger negative effect on the firm 
value.  
Hora et al. 
(2011) Toy Primary B2C No 
Time to 
recall 
The time to recall, measured by the 
difference between recall 
announcement and product first sold 
date, is associated with the recall 
strategy (preventive vs. reactive) 





Auto Primary B2C No Sales 
Strong consumer disutility for travel; 
dealers have local demand areas 
shared with a small set of competitors. 
Eilert et al. 
(2017) Auto Primary B2C No 
Time to 





drugs Primary B2C Yes Stock 
With recalls, shareholders bear large 
losses, substantially greater than the 




eutical Primary B2C Yes Stock 
Dangerous drug announcements have 
no effect on other drugs sales and do 
not affect the share of European drug 
makers doing little business in the US. 
Marsh et al. 
(2004) Food Primary B2C Yes Price 
Meat recalls significantly affected 
category demand, with favorable 
effects on demand for meat 
substitutes, offset by more negative 
effects on meat demand. 
Van Heerde 
et al. (2007) Food Primary B2C Yes Sales 
Due to recalls, a firm may experience 
reduced own effectiveness for its 
marketing instruments and increased 
cross-sensitivity to rivals’ marketing 
mix  activities. 
Freedman et 
al. (2012) Toy Primary B2C Yes Sales 
For firms with recalls, unit sales of 
toys involved in the recall fall relative 
to sales of toys in other categories. No 
evidence of within-manufacturer 
spillovers to dissimilar toys. 
Cleeren et al. 
(2013) 
Consume
r goods Primary B2C Yes Brand share 
Postrecall advertisements and price 
changes affect the product’s brand 
share and category purchases. 
Collins et al. 
(2013) 
Pharmac




Withdrawal of Vioxx had positive and 
negative effects for specific substitute 
drugs in its own class (COX-2s) and 
led to an overall increase in the use of 
both its most direct competitor class 





Auto Primary B2C Yes Sales, Ads 
When recalls are associated with 
greater media attention and severe 
consequences, consumers’ responses 
are more negative. 
Borah and 
Tellis (2016) Auto Primary B2C Yes 
Social 
chatter 
Negative chatter about one nameplate 
increases negative chatter for another, 
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for nameplates within the same brand 
across segments and across brands 
within segments. 
Bachmann et 
al. (2019) Auto Primary B2C Yes Sales 
The Volkswagen scandal reduced U.S. 
sales of other German auto 
manufacturers, principally driven by 
an adverse reputation spillover, 
reinforced by consumer substitution 
away from diesel vehicles. 
He et al. 
(2018) Airlines Primary B2C Yes 
Number of 
tweets 
After the Germanwings Flight 9525 
crash, on average, other airlines 
increased their defensive marketing 
efforts but decreased their offensive 
marketing efforts, possibly due to 
negative spillover. 
Zhou et al. 
(2019) Auto Primary B2C Yes 
Competitor 
promotions 
Toyota recalls induced competitive 
promotions of approximately $850, 
but did not significantly affect sales. 
Ater and 
Yosef (2018) Auto 
Secondar
y B2C No 
Price 
(listing) 
Volkswagen’s emissions scandal had 
a statistically significant, negative 
effect on the number of transactions 
involving vehicles made by 








Supply of used Volkswagen diesel 
vehicles increased after the emission 
scandal. The positive supply-side 
effects increase with the probability of 
manipulation. The negative impacts 
on the asking prices of used cars are 









For GM cars, the resale market 
efficiently discounted new recall 
information. Recalls diminish the 
resale value of the recalled product but 





y B2C Yes Price 
The 2009–2010 Toyota recall 
negatively affected the resale market 
for automobiles but they were 
quantitatively small (less than 2% of 
the vehicle’s resale value), statistically 
indistinguishable from 0.   
Che et al. 
(2020) Auto 
Secondar




The Volkswagen diesel emission 
scandal decreased final bid prices by 
14% and 9% in the diesel and gasoline 
car markets, respectively. 




In a B2B secondary market, buyers 
display lower demand for recalled 
models, leading to lower transaction 
prices for these vehicles. Non-recalled 
models with the same make as the 
recalled model, but different segment, 
experience higher prices, suggesting a 
positive spillover effect. Vehicles in 
the same segment as the recalled 




Table 4.2: Summary Statistics 
 
Variables Min Max Median Mean Standard deviation 
Prices 1 341000 12000 12473 7018 
Odometer Reading 0 999999 29830 42916 38525 
Vehicle Condition (see Table WB 4.1; Appendix) 
 Condition Level # of Obs. % Observations 
1 Condition 3 5730314 58.58% 
2 Condition 4 2081364 21.28% 
3 Condition 2 1439340 14.72% 
4 Condition 1 266478 2.72% 
5 Condition 5 210945 2.16% 
6 Condition 0 52985 .54% 
Vehicle Model    Vehicle Make 
 Model No. of Obs. % of Obs.    Make No. of Obs. % Obs. 
1 TAURUS 409042 4.18%   1 FORD 2279047 23.30% 
2 EXPLORER 331616 3.39%   2 CHEVROLET 1643887 16.81% 
3 CARAVAN 263645 2.70%   3 DODGE 1124119 11.49% 
4 IMPALA 248915 2.54%   4 CHRYSLER 735540 7.52% 
5 MALIBU 241193 2.47%   5 TOYOTA 550298 5.63% 
6 RAM 206042 2.11%   6 NISSAN 516465 5.28% 
7 TRAILBLAZER 181310 1.85%   7 HYUNDAI 320271 3.27% 
8 FOCUS 168337 1.72%   8 HONDA 296288 3.03% 
9 SEBRING 167660 1.71%   9 MITSUBISHI 211117 2.16% 
10 SILVERADO 163694 1.67%   10 LINCOLN 205984 2.11% 
Vehicle Category    Auction Location 
 Category No. of Obs. % of Obs.    Location No. of Obs. % of Obs. 
1 MIDSIZE CAR 2427149 24.81%   1 Region 5 1957369 20.0% 
2 SUV 2391522 24.45%   2 Region 4 1866685 19.1% 
3 COMPACT CAR 1228079 12.56%   3 Region 3 1813881 18.5% 
4 LUXURY CAR 1090986 11.15%   4 Region 6 1733025 17.7% 
5 PICKUP 1079542 11.04%   5 Region 2 1204531 12.3% 
6 MINIVAN 818862 8.37%   6 Region 1 1199069 12.3% 
7 SPORTS CAR 329973 3.37%   7 Region - other 6866 .07% 
8 VAN 214794 2.20%       
9 FULLSIZE 122506 1.25%       





Table 4.3: Recall Events 
 
Sr. Campaign Number Defects Influenced By Recall Date 
1 05V030000 Latches/Locks/Linkages NHTSA 2/1/05 
2 05V061000 Seats Firm 2/18/05 
3 05V155000 Fuel System, Gasoline NHTSA 4/14/05 
4 05V206000 Electrical System Firm 5/9/05 
5 05V494000 Latches/Locks/Linkages Firm 10/27/05 
6 06E018000 Service Brakes NHTSA 3/1/06 
7 06E089000 Suspension Firm 10/27/06 
8 07V063000 Exterior Lighting Firm 2/20/07 
9 07V092000 Electrical System NHTSA 3/9/07 
10 07V328000 Seat Belts Firm 7/20/07 
11 07V482000 Exterior Lighting Firm 10/16/07 
12 08V082000 Air Bags NHTSA 2/25/08 
13 08V231000 Exterior Lighting NHTSA 5/21/08 
14 08V235000 Engine And Engine Cooling Firm 5/28/08 
15 08E039000 Exterior Lighting NHTSA 6/10/08 
16 08E048000 Exterior Lighting NHTSA 8/8/08 
17 08E064000 Suspension Firm 10/20/08 
18 08V577000 Steering Firm 11/3/08 
19 08V634000 Visibility Firm 12/2/08 
 
 
Table 4.4: Definition and Sources of Covariates 
Variable Definition Source 
Recalls Number of recalls initiated by the firm/regulator NHTSA 
Transaction price Final auction price of the sold vehicle Auction company 
Highest bid price Highest bid received when the vehicle was not sold Auction company 
Make Make of the vehicle Auction company 
Model  Model of the vehicle Auction company 
Model year Model year of the vehicle Auction company 
Odometer reading Odometer reading of the sold vehicle. Auction company 
Times run Number of times vehicles was presented in auction earlier Auction company 
Lane number Number of the auction lane where vehicle was presented Auction company 
Lane sequence Vehicle’s sequence number in the lane Auction company 
Buyer mega group Whether buyer is a part of a mega group Auction company 
Seller mega group Whether seller is part of a mega group Auction company 
Labor costs Estimated labor costs required to improve vehicle condition Auction company 
Platform Whether the vehicle was registered to sell on the proprietary platform Auction company 
Condition Condition level of the vehicle  Auction company 
Region Region name of the auction site Auction company 
Vehicle source Source of the vehicle (factory, lease, dealer, daily rental, repo) Auction company 
Auction year Year when vehicle was auctioned Auction company 
Auction month Month when vehicle was auctioned Auction company 








Covariates Covariates Multimodel MFRInflu Odometer Franchised 
Treated .411** .401** .401** .398** .398** .396** 
Postrecall -.02 .03 .040 .021 .055 .032 
Treated × Postrecall -.148** -.106**    -.102** 
Treated × Postrecall × Multimodel=0   -.100*    
Treated × Postrecall × Multimodel=1   -.193*    
Treated × Postrecall × MFRInflu =0    -.112**   
Treated × Postrecall × MFRInflu =1    -.043   
Treated × Postrecall × Odometer     -.002**  
Treated × Postrecall × Franchised      -.001 
Constant 1.924*** .981*** .971*** .987*** .956*** .980*** 
Covariates No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Day FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4279 4279 4279 4279 4279 4279 
R2 .033 .77 .77 .77 .77 .77 
Notes: Cargo van category is the control group. The dependent variable is log of sales price. FE = fixed effect. The covariates 
include vehicle condition, vehicle’s number of previous runs, lane number, sequence in lane, labor costs, odometer reading, 
and dummies for several variables (whether auction was closed to few firms, platform registration, buyer mega group, seller 
mega group, auction region, vehicle source, make, and model). Franchised variable specification includes main effects. Model 





Table 4.6: Spillover Impact on Product Group 2 (Non-Recalled, Same Make) 
 
 No Covariates Covariates Segment Multimodel MFRInflu Odometer Franchised 
Treated .189** 1.500** 1.474** 1.503** 1.505** 1.553** 1.501** 
Postrecall -.020 .145** .162** .142** .138** .146** .150** 
Treated × Postrecall .120** .024 .048*    .016 
Treated × Postrecall × 
Segment 
    -.105*     
Treated × Postrecall × 
Multimodel=0    .021    
Treated × Postrecall × 
Multimodel=1      .178*    
Treated × Postrecall × 
MFRInflu =0     .027   
Treated × Postrecall × 
MFRInflu =1     -.0016   
Treated × Postrecall × 
Odometer      -.0004  
Treated × Postrecall × 
Franchised            .034** 
Constant 1.924** -.238 -.231 -.234 -.226 -.261 -.237 
Covariates No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Day FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 21159 21159 21159 21159 21159 21159 21159 
R-squared .018 .79 .79 .79 .79 .79 .79 
Notes: Cargo van category is the control group. The dependent variable is log of sales price. FE = fixed effect. The covariates 
include vehicle condition, vehicle’s number of previous runs, lane number, sequence in lane, labor costs, odometer reading, 
and dummies for several variables (whether auction was closed to few firms, platform registration, buyer mega group, seller 
mega group, auction region, vehicle source, make, and model). Franchised specification includes main effects. Model 





Table 4.7: Spillover Impact on Product Group 3 (Non-Recalled, Different Make) 
 
 No Covariates Covariates Segment Multimodel MFRInflu Odometer Franchised 
Treated .458** -1.433** -1.437** -1.433** -1.434** -1.428** -1.428** 
Postrecall -.020 -.162** -.163** -.163** -.162** -.152** -.160** 
Treated × Postrecall -.016 .013 .029    .013 
Treated × Postrecall × 
Segment   -.058**     
Treated × Postrecall × 
Multimodel=0    .012    
Treated × Postrecall × 
Multimodel=1    .013    
Treated × Postrecall × 
MFRInflu =0     .0112   
Treated × Postrecall × 
MFRInflu =1        .014   
Treated × Postrecall × 
Odometer      .00006  
Treated × Postrecall × 
Franchised       .0004 
Constant 1.924** 3.479** 2.534** 3.480** 3.480** 3.470** 3.468** 
Covariates No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Day FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 137125 137125 137125 137125 137125 137125 137125 
R2 .009 .81 .81 .81 .81 .81 .81 
Notes: Cargo van category is the control group. The dependent variable is log of sales price. FE = fixed effect. The covariates 
include vehicle condition, vehicle’s number of previous runs, lane number, sequence in lane, labor costs, odometer reading, 
and dummies for several variables (whether auction was closed to few firms, platform registration, buyer mega group, seller 
mega group, auction region, vehicle source, make, and model). Franchised specification includes corresponding main effects. 





Table 4.8: Robustness Check, Heckman Model Results 
 
 Product Group 1 Product Group 2 Product Group 3 
Outcome equation    
Treated .358 (.291) .264 (.205) -.897** (.094) 
Postrecall -.177** (.061) -.049 (.026) -.014 (.013) 
Treated × Postrecall -.103* (.041) .025 (.016) .013 (.012) 
Inverse Mills Ratio .115* (.047) -.0047 (.021) -.011 (.009) 
Covariates Yes Yes Yes 
Selection equation    
Treated -2.050 (756) .549 (.813) -.845 (.665) 
Postrecall -5.42 (321.6) -2.03** (.138) -.238** (.065) 
Treated × Postrecall .19 (.143) -.038 (.062) .063 (.049) 
Vehicle count -.014** (.002) -.004** (.0006) -.003** (.0001) 
Covariates Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6103 25909 172986 
Notes: Cargo van category is the control group. For the outcome equation, the dependent variable is log of sales 
price. For the selection equation, the dependent variable is a dummy (1/0) indicating whether the vehicle was sold. 
The covariates include vehicle condition, vehicle’s number of previous runs, lane number, sequence in lane, labor 
costs, odometer reading, and dummies for several variables (whether auction was closed to few dealers, platform 




Table 4.9: Robustness Check 
 
 Panel 1 Panel 2 









Treated .455** (.087) 1.492** (.131) 1.418** (.148) .121** (.011) .052** (.007) 
Postrecall -.132 (.197) .115* (.049) .023 (.053) .036** (.006) .009** (.001) 
Treated × Postrecall -.134* (.053) .023 (.021) .014 (.017) -.069** (.011) -.050** (.008) 
Constant 1.354** (.345) -.430* (.205) -.309 (.196) 2.462** (.136) 1.609** (.231) 
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Propensity score 
matching Yes Yes Yes - - 
Observations 4209 20701 53435 36190 653773 
R2 .79 .77 .76 .81 .80 
Notes: Panel 1 analysis uses kernel matching method and displays direct and spillover effects on three product groups. Panel 2 
displays the direct effects on product group 1 (recalled vehicles), with different control groups. The dependent variable is log of 
sales price. The covariates include vehicle condition, vehicle’s number of previous runs, lane number, sequence in lane, labor 
costs, odometer reading, and dummies for several variables (whether auction was closed to few firms, platform registration, 
buyer mega group, seller mega group, auction region, vehicle source, make, model, year, month, and day). Heteroskedasticity 
adjusted robust standard errors are in parenthesis.*p < .05, **p < .01. 
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Figure 4.1: Periodicity of Product Recalls 
 
 
Notes: Blue lines indicate the number of recalls (Y axis) in a week across all makes. Red lines 
indicate weeks without any recall. 
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Table WB 2.1: Lobbying Issue Names 
 
Accounting Homeland Security 
Advertising Housing 
Aerospace Immigration 
Agriculture Indian/Native American Affairs 
Alcohol & Drug Abuse Insurance 
Animals Labor Issues/Antitrust/Workplace 
Apparel/Clothing Industry/Textiles Intelligence and Surveillance  
Arts/Entertainment Law Enforcement/Crime/Criminal Justice 
Automotive Industry Manufacturing 
Aviation/Aircraft/Airlines Marine/Maritime/Boating/Fisheries 
Banking Medical/Disease Research/Clinical Labs 
Bankruptcy Media (Information/Publishing) 
Beverage Industry Medicare/Medicaid 
Budget/Appropriations Minting/Money/Gold Standard 
Clean Air & Water (Quality) Natural Resources 
Commodities (Big Ticket) Pharmacy 
Chemicals/Chemical Industry Postal 
Civil Rights/Civil Liberties Railroads 
Communications/Broadcasting/Radio/TV Real Estate/Land Use/Conservation 
Computer Industry Religion 
Consumer Issues/Safety/Protection Retirement 
Constitution Roads/Highway 
Copyright/Patent/Trademark Science/Technology 
Defense Small Business 
District of Columbia Sports/Athletics 
Disaster Planning/Emergencies Miscellaneous Tariff Bills 




Family Issues/Abortion/Adoption Trade (Domestic & Foreign) 
Firearms/Guns/Ammunition Transportation 
Financial Institutions/Investments/Securities Travel/Tourism 
Food Industry (Safety, Labeling, etc.) Trucking/Shipping 
Foreign Relations Urban Development/Municipalities 
Fuel/Gas/Oil Unemployment 
Gaming/Gambling/Casino Utilities 
Government Issues Veterans 




Table WB 2.2: Firm Names Considered 
 
AMERICAN HONDA INC. GENERAL MOTORS CO NISSAN NORTH AMERICA 
AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR GENERAL MOTORS CO. NISSAN NORTH AMERICA INC 
AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO GENERAL MOTORS COMPA NISSAN NORTH AMERICA INC. 
AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO. GENERAL MOTORS COMPANY NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC 
AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO. INC. GENERAL MOTORS COMPANY, LLC NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC. 
AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC. GENERAL MOTORS CORP. NISSAN OF NORTH AMERICA 
AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO.,INC GENERAL MOTORS CORPERATION PORSCHE CARS INC 
AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO.,INC. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION PORSCHE CARS NORTH AMERICA 
AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR COMPANY GENERAL MOTORS INC TESLA INC 
AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR COMPANY 
INC. 
GENERAL MOTORS INC. TESLA INC. 
AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR COMPANY 
USA 
GENERAL MOTORS, CORP. TESLA MOTORS 
AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR COMPANY, 
INC. 
GENERAL MOTORS, LLC TESLA MOTORS INC 
AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CORP. GENERAL MOTORS, LLC. TESLA MOTORS INC. 
AMERICAN HONDA MOTORS GENERAL MOTORS/ UAW TESLA MOTORS, INC 
AMERICAN HONDA MOTORS CO HONDA MOTOR CO TESLA MOTORS, INC. 
AMERICAN HONDA MOTORS, INC. HONDA MOTOR CO. TESLAMOTORS 
BMW GROUP HONDA NORTH AMERICA TOYOTA MOT 
BMW MANAGEMENT HONDA NORTH AMERICA, INC TOYOTA MOTOR CARS 
BMW MANUFACTURING HONDA NORTH AMERICA, INC. TOYOTA MOTOR CORP. 
BMW OF NORTH AMERICA HYUNDAI AMERICA TOYOTA MOTOR MANUFACTURI 
DAIMLER A.G. HYUNDAI KIA AMERICA TOYOTA MOTOR MANUFACTURING 
DAIMLER AG HYUNDAI KIA AMERICA TECH CTR TOYOTA MOTOR NORTH AMERICA 
DAIMLER CHRYSLER HYUNDAI KIA AMERICA TECH. TOYOTA MOTOR SALES 
DAIMLER CORPORATION HYUNDAI MANUFACTURING TOYOTA MOTOR SALES U 
DAIMLER TRUCKS HYUNDAI MOTOR TOYOTA MOTOR SALES U.S.A. 
DAIMLERCHRYLSER HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERCIA TOYOTA MOTOR SALES U.S.A. IN 
FORD MOTOR HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERIC TOYOTA MOTOR SALES U.S.A. INC. 
FORD MOTOR CO. HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA TOYOTA MOTOR SALES USA 
FORD MOTOR COMPANY HYUNDAI MOTOR AMRICA TOYOTA MOTOR SALES USA INC 
FORD AUTOMOTIVE HYUNDAI MOTOR COMPANY TOYOTA MOTOR SALES USA INC. 
FORD COMPANY HYUNDAI MOTOR GROUP TOYOTA MOTOR SALES USA, INC. 
FORD MOTER CO HYUNDAI MOTOR MANUF TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, INC. 
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FORD MOTER CO. HYUNDAI MOTORS AMERICA TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U.S.A, INC. 
FORD MOTER COMPANY HYUNDAI-KIA TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U.S.A. 
FORD MOTOR CO HYUNDAI-KIA AMERICA TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U.S.A. INC. 
FORD MOTOR CO, HYUNDAI-KIA AMERICA TECH CTR TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U.S.A., INC. 
FORD MOTOR CO. HYUNDAI-KIA AMERICA TECH CTR. 
TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, US 
HEADQUARTERS 
FORD MOTOR COM JAGUAR DISTRIBUTION CORP TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, US. INC. 
FORD MOTOR COMP JAGUAR LAND ROVER TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, US., INC. 
FORD MOTOR COMPANY JAGUAR NORTH AMERICA TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, USA 
FORD MOTOR CORP KIA MOTORS TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, USA INC 
FORD MOTOR CORPORATION KIA MOTORS AMERICA TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, USA INC. 
FORD MOTORS CO U.A.W. KIA MOTORS AMERICA INC TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, USA, 
FORD MOTORS CO. KIA MOTORS AMERICA, INC TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, USA, INC 
FORD/ MAZDA CORP. KIA MOTORS AMERICA, INC. TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, USA, INC. 
FORD/UAW LAND ROVER JAGUAR VENTURA 
TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, USA, INC. 
COMPANY 
GENERAL MORTORS MAZDA MOTOR OF AMERICAN TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, USA., INC. 
GENERAL MORTORS CORP. MAZDA NORTH AMERICA TOYOTA MOTORS 
GENERAL MOTERS MAZDA NORTH AMERICAN OP. TOYOTA MOTORS SALES 
GENERAL MOTOR 
MAZDA NORTH AMERICAN 
OPERATION 
TOYOTA MOTORS USA 
GENERAL MOTOR CO. 
MAZDA NORTH AMERICAN 
OPERATIONS 
TOYOTA NORTH AMERICA 
GENERAL MOTOR COMPANY 
MAZDA NORTH AMERICAN 
OPERTIONS 
VOLKSWAGEN 
GENERAL MOTOR CORP MAZDA NORTH AMERICAN OPS  
GENERAL MOTOR CORP. NISSAN AMERICAS  
GENERAL MOTOR CORPS NISSAN AUTOMOTIVE  
GENERAL MOTOR LLC NISSAN CORP  
GENERAL MOTORS NISSAN MOTOR  
GENERAL MOTORS CO. NISSAN MOTOR CORP.  




Table WB 2.3: Location Names 
 
State County State County 
Alabama Talladega Mississippi Madison 
Alabama Montgomery Mississippi Union 
Alabama Tuscaloosa Missouri Saint Charles 
Alabama Madison New Jersey Bergen 
California Los Angeles New Jersey Camden 
California Orange New York Schenectady 
California Santa Clara North Carolina Alamance 
California Alameda North Carolina Guilford 
Georgia Fulton Ohio Union 
Georgia Troup Ohio Lorain 
Illinois Cook Ohio Trumbull 
Illinois McLean Ohio Logan 
Indiana Huntington South Carolina Greenville 
Indiana Decatur South Carolina Florence 
Indiana Tippecanoe Tennessee Williamson 
Indiana Gibson Tennessee Maury 
Kansas Clay Tennessee Franklin 
Kansas Wyandotte Tennessee Rutherford 
Kentucky Jefferson Tennessee Hamilton 
Kentucky Warren Texas Tarrant 
Kentucky Scott Texas Bexar 
Michigan Oakland Virginia Fairfax 
Michigan Wayne West Virginia Putnam 
Michigan Eaton   
Michigan Genesee   






Table WB 2.4: Non-linear Estimates for Probit Model 
 
Recall equation Voluntary recall Mandatory recall 
Constant .825 (1.524) -1.332 (1.609) 
Lobbying -1.356*** (.306) -1.698*** (.305) 
Complaints .001 (.001) .001 (.0004) 
Deaths -.029 (.051) -.071 (.042) 
States .027 (.032) .027 (.033) 
Rating -.559 (.346) -.015 (.471) 
Sales -1.262 (1.841)   
Liabilities_std -.031 (.017)   
Capex_std .0003 (.0002)   
Agency_costs -.206 (.38)   
Fixed effects Yes Yes 
Endogenous variable equation     
Constant .244 (.70) .394 (.571) 
Contribution_hq -.0003 (.003) .000 (.002) 
Contribution_plant -.017*** (.003) -.017*** (.003) 
Complaints 8.04 X 10-6 (.0003) -.00001 .0003 
Deaths -.007 (.018) -.010 (.023) 
States .003 (.005) .005 (.008) 
Rating -.107 (.211) -.189 (.147) 
Sales .668 (.993)   
Liabilities_std .0004 (.0004)   
Capex_std -.00003 (.00003)   
Agency_costs .076 (.089)   
Fixed effects Yes Yes 
Notes: Lobbying amount is in millions of USDs. In recall equation, binary 0/1 (1= recall; 0= no recall) 
is the dependent variable. Errors are clustered at the firm level and shown in parenthesis. 






Table WB 4.1: Condition Table 
 
Grade 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Paint and Body 








and body panels 
require replacement 
Conventional 




body and paint 
work 
No or minor 
defects 
 




this vehicle by 
industry 
standards 
Parts broken and 
missing Requires parts 
Small dents 


























near the end of 





Windshield may be 
damaged 
Minor pitting of 
glass   
Interior 
Mechanical and 








Signs of excess 
wear 
Signs of normal 






signs of wear 
  






No odors  
Frame/Unibody   
Repaired or 
unrepaired frame 
structure or frame 
damage 
No repairs or 
alterations 
No repairs or 
alterations 






























Fluid levels low 
or require 
replacement 
 Fluid levels full and clean 
Tires 
  Worn or mismatched 
Average or 
better Identical Identical 
   Match by size 
and style 






Table WB 4.2: Pretreatment Period Analysis 
 
 Model 1 
 Estimates Std. Error 
Constant -.112 (.447) 
Treated 1.563* (.617) 
Eventday1 -.045 (.032) 
Eventday2 -.007 (.038) 
Eventday3 .029 (.040) 
Eventday4 .03 (.033) 
Treated:Eventday1 .02 (.043) 
Treated:Eventday2 .052 (.045) 
Treated:Eventday3 .065 (.043) 
Treated:Eventday4 -.033 (.046) 
Covariates Yes 
Year FE Yes 
Month FE Yes 
Day FE Yes 
Observations 7,219 
R2 0.753 
F Statistic 208.2*** (df = 104; 7114) 
Notes: Data include pre-treatment observations (day-1 to day -5). Reference level is “day -5” 
observations. The dependent variable is log of sales price. Cargo van category is the control group. The 
covariates include vehicle’s number of previous runs, lane number, sequence in lane, labor costs, 
vehicle condition, odometer reading, and dummies for several variables (make, model, whether auction 
was closed to few firms, platform registration, buyer mega group, seller mega group, region, and 





Table WB 4.3: Modelyear Analysis 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Estimates Std. Error Estimates Std. Error 
Constant -.395 (1.357) -.742 (1.153) 
Treated -.538** (.07) -.520** (.068) 
Postrecall .0907 (.072) .158* (.066) 
Treated # Postrecall -.0697+ (.036) -.0713* (.034) 
Residuals   .145** (.012) 
Covariates Yes Yes 
Observations 4,279 4,279 
R-squared .81 .82 
Notes: Model 1 includes model year dummies as a covariate. For model 2, we first regress condition 
variable on model year, collect its residuals and incorporate this residual as an additional variable. 
Cargo van category is the control group. The dependent variable is log of sales price. The covariates 
include vehicle’s number of previous runs, lane number, sequence in lane, labor costs, odometer 
reading, and dummies for several variables (make, model, whether auction was closed to few firms, 
platform registration, buyer mega group, seller mega group, region, vehicle source, year, month, and 
day). +p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01. 
 
  
Table WB 4.4: Robustness Check 
 
Outcome equation Product Group 1 Product Group 2 Product Group 3 
Treated .409** (.085) 1.484** (0.165) 1.422** (0.164) 
Postrecall .0301 (.082) 0.166** (0.0544) -0.219** (0.0536) 
Treated × Postrecall -.0880* (.039) 0.0370 (0.0227) 0.00994 (0.0197) 
Constant 1.141** (.258) -0.189 (0.193) 0.281 (0.190) 
Covariates Yes Yes Yes 
Propensity score matching Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4209 20701 53435 
R2 .80 .80 .78 
Notes: This analysis considers the radius matching. The dependent variable is log of sales price. Cargo 
van category is the control group. The covariates include vehicle’s number of previous runs, lane number, 
sequence in lane, labor costs, vehicle condition, odometer reading, and dummies for several variables 
(make, model, whether auction was closed to few firms, platform registration, buyer mega group, seller 






Table WB 4.5: Robustness Checks: Different Time Window 
 
a. Product Group 1 
 
No 
Covariates Covariates Multimodel MFRInflu Odometer Franchised 
Treated .452** 2.236** 2.236** 2.236** 2.243** 2.237** 
Postrecall -.055* .077* .077* .077* .078* .078* 
Treated × Postrecall -.111** -.093**    -.088** 
Treated × Postrecall × 
Multimodel=0 
  -.092**    
Treated × Postrecall × 
Multimodel=1 
  -.119    
Treated × Postrecall × 
MFRInflu =0 
   -.093**   
Treated × Postrecall × 
MFRInflu =1 
   -.098   
Treated × Postrecall × 
Odometer 
    -.0018**  
Treated × Postrecall × 
Franchised 
     -.0026 
Constant 1.921** -.878** -.877** -.878** -.874** -.889** 
Covariates No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Day FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7637 7637 7637 7637 7637 7637 
R2 .046 .76 .76 .76 .76 .76 
 
b. Product Group 2 
 No Covariates Covariates Segment Multimodel MFRInflu Odometer Franchised 
Treated .158** 1.557** 1.525** 1.559** 1.572** 1.595** 1.558** 
Postrecall -.055* .042* .056** .040* .047* .068* .045* 
Treated × Postrecall .225** .010 .039**    .0027 
Treated × Postrecall × 
Segment   -.13**     
Treated × Postrecall × 
Multimodel=0    .007    
Treated × Postrecall × 
Multimodel=1    .166*    
Treated × Postrecall × 
MFRInflu =0     .011   
Treated × Postrecall × 
MFRInflu =1     -.013   
Treated × Postrecall × 
Odometer      -.0005  
Treated × Postrecall × 
Franchised       .035** 
Constant 1.921** .228 .289 .226 .192 .194 .234 
Covariates No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Day FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 38536 38536 38536 38536 38536 38536 38536 
R2 .026 .78 .78 .78 .78 .78 .78 
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c. Product Group 3 
 No Covariates Covariates Segment Multimodel MFRInflu Odometer Franchised 
Treated .446** -3.986** -3.987** -3.986** -3.989** -3.971** -3.964** 
Postrecall -.055* .026 .020 .0256 .0233 .048 .026 
Treated × Postrecall .053 .023 .039**    .025 
Treated × Postrecall × 
Segment   -.064**     
Treated × Postrecall × 
Multimodel=0    .0252    
Treated × Postrecall × 
Multimodel=1    .0194    
Treated × Postrecall × 
MFRInflu =0     .016   
Treated × Postrecall × 
MFRInflu =1     .030*   
Treated × Postrecall × 
Odometer      
-.008 X 
10-3   
Treated × Postrecall × 
Franchised       -.0065** 
Constant 1.921** 5.478** 5.469** 5.477** 5.492** 5.463** 5.440** 
Covariates No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Day FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 235890 235890 235890 235890 235890 235890 235890 
R2 .009 .80 .80 .80 .80 .80 .80 
Notes: Cargo van category is the control group. The dependent variable is log of sales price. FE = fixed effect. The covariates 
include vehicle’s number of previous runs, lane number, sequence in lane, labor costs, vehicle condition, odometer reading, 
and dummies for several variables (make, model, whether auction was closed to few firms, platform registration, buyer mega 
group, seller mega group, region, and vehicle source). *p < .05, **p < .01. 
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Figure WB 2.2: Other Sources for Recall Information 
 














Source: https://www.nhtsa.gov/  
 
 
 
